Knall Beverage, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 293 Pension Plan

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by Justia Inc
The employers were formerly contributing members of the Teamsters Local Union No. 293 Pension Plan. In 2007-2008 each employer reached an agreement with the Plan to terminate its membership. They were required to pay, and have paid, “withdrawal liability” reflecting each employer’s share of unfunded, vested pension benefits under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C. 1381–1461. Under the Act, if the plan is terminated altogether by a “mass withdrawal” of the remaining members within three years, the earlier withdrawing members may be subject to additional “reallocation liability.” Disputes about the amount of such reallocation liability are subject to mandatory arbitration. The employers claim that a 2009 mass withdrawal was expedited to occur within the three-year period in order that they would be subject to reallocation liability. The Plan trustees sought more than $12 million in additional funds from the employers. The district court dismissed their suit for failure to complete arbitration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Act requires that the claim of “sham” mass withdrawal be arbitrated. View "Knall Beverage, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 293 Pension Plan" on Justia Law

Wilkins v. Daniels

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by Justia Inc
In 2011, an Ohio man released more than 50 exotic animals before committing suicide. Partially in response, the state enacted the Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act, Ohio Rev. Code 935.01–935.99. All persons in possession of dangerous wild animals before September 5, 2012, were required to register with the Ohio Department of Agriculture and to microchip each registered animal upon registration. The Act prohibits possession of a dangerous wild animal after January 1, 2014. A person already in possession of a dangerous wild animal and wishing to continue to possess the animal after that date may obtain a wildlife shelter permit or a wildlife propagation permit. Owners of exotic animals challenged the Act as violating First Amendment rights to freedom of association and speech, arguing that the permitting requirements are so onerously expensive that the only viable means of compliance would be to join the Association of Zoos and Aquariums or the Zoological Association of America, for which there are exemptions. They argued that they are compelled to associate with those organizations and to subsidize the organizations’ speech and that the microchipping requirement constitutes a physical taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court denied injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The owners are not compelled to join the AZA or ZAA and the Act does not effect a physical taking. View "Wilkins v. Daniels" on Justia Law

United States v. Mitchell

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by Justia Inc
Mitchell was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). A Presentence Investigation Report classified Mitchell as an “armed career criminal” under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) on account of having committed three violent felonies: a 1988 conviction for robbery under now-repealed Tenn. Code 39-2-501(a); (2) a 2003 conviction for robbery under Tenn. Code 39-13-401; and a 2003 conviction for intentionally evading arrest in an automobile. The Report assigned Mitchell a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI, which resulted in a Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Mitchell to 300 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the two robbery convictions did not qualify as crimes of violence for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

United States v. Romero-Caspeta

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by Justia Inc
Caspeta, a Mexican citizen born in 1973, attempted to enter the U.S. in 1999, using a border pass issued to another individual, and was sentenced to 90 days of custody and 2 years of supervised release for violating 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(3). The sentence was suspended. He was escorted across a bridge back to Mexico and was given an Order instructing him that he was prohibited from re-entering the U.S. for five years and that if he wished to re-enter the U.S. he would first need to obtain the permission of the Attorney General. The Notice included a warning that violation would be subject to prosecution for a felony. In 2012, Caspeta was convicted of a traffic offense in Detroit and was charged with unlawful reentry under 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). He argued that once more than five years had elapsed since his removal, so that the statute did not require him to obtain consent prior to reentry. He was found guilty. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the statutory scheme does not eliminate the need for consent after five years, but only makes consent possible after five years. View "United States v. Romero-Caspeta" on Justia Law

United States v. Elmore

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by Justia Inc
Elmore pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography and received a below-guidelines sentence of 51 months in prison, followed by 10 years of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence, rejecting arguments that the district judge unfairly treated Elmore’s abusive childhood as an aggravating, rather than mitigating, factor in sentencing; placed unreasonable weight on the need to punish and deter Elmore; and skewed the sentence upward by comparing Elmore’s sentence to a harsher regional subset of cases, rather than looking to sentencing practices nationally, and relying on a “gut feeling,” rather than informed reason. The court properly weighed the various competing sentencing objectives and accorded due weight to factors calling for leniency in Elmore’s case. View "United States v. Elmore" on Justia Law

Foythong v. Holder

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by Justia Inc
Foythong, a Thai citizen, came to the U.S. in 2001 as a non-immigrant visitor and did not leave when his visa expired. In 2004, Foythong, still married to his Thai wife, married a U.S. citizen, Langevin, who sought to adjust Foythong’s status to lawful permanent resident based on the marriage. After investigating, DHS issued notice of intent to deny the petition on the ground that the marriage was a sham, based on significant discrepancies in testimony. Langevin withdrew the petition; the marriage ended. In 2010, Foythong married again, 12 days before a scheduled removal hearing. His third wife, Clark, a U.S. citizen, requested a marriage-based visa on his behalf. DHS denied the petition. Michigan does not recognize consular divorces, rendering ineffective Foythong’s effort to divorce his Thai wife through a consulate in Chicago. DHS stated that the fraudulent marriage to Langevin precluded Foythong from any future adjustment of status based on marriage. The immigration judge ordered removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. In 2013, Foythong asked the Board to reopen his case, stating that he had legally divorced his first wife and married Clark. The Board denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit denied review, citing 8 U.S.C. 1154(c), which imposes a one-strike rule, so that, after one prior finding of a sham marriage, immigration authorities must reject all future efforts at adjustment of status based on marriage. View "Foythong v. Holder" on Justia Law

Rorrer v. City of Stow

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by Justia Inc
Rorrer worked as a Stow firefighter from 1999 until July, 2008. On July 4, 2008, Rorrer lost all vision in one eye in a bottle-rocket accident unrelated to his work. The city terminated Rorrer because of his monocular vision. In September, 2008, the surgeon who operated on Rorrer’s eye cleared Rorrer to return to work without restriction. Rorrer arranged a return-to-work physical with Dr. Moten, the Department physician. After examining Rorrer, Moten’s colleague, Dr. Henderson, told Rorrer he should be able to return to duty without restriction, but qualified this statement by written cautions about using a self-contained breathing apparatus and driving at high speeds. Fire Chief Kalbaugh took the position that Rorrer was unfit to return to work and told Rorrer to call Moten, who told Rorrer that he “was sorry” for the “confusion” but that Rorrer could not return to work because “fire regs” would not allow it. National Fire Protection Association guidelines state that monocular vision compromises the firefighter’s ability to safely perform an essential Job Task. Rorrer claimed that the city had never adopted or applied those guidelines. The district court granted the city summary judgment on claims of disability discrimination and impermissible retaliation (for Rorrer’s opposition to discipline of another firefighter) under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Ohio law, and the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of First Amendment and ADA retaliation claims, but reversed as to the other ADA and Ohio discrimination claims. View "Rorrer v. City of Stow" on Justia Law

Lester v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.

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by Justia Inc
After a fire damaged her house, Lester filed a claim with Allstate. The company asked Lester and her husband to answer questions under oath. Lester responded that they would submit to examinations only if Allstate first showed them its investigative files. Allstate refused to turn over the files, stating that doing so “could jeopardize the integrity” of its inquiry. Allstate eventually gave Lester 10 days to schedule an examination, warning that, if she did not submit to an examination, it would deny the claim. Lester never responded, but sued the company. The district court granted Allstate summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the insurance policy requires Lester to “submit to examinations under oath” at Allstate’s request and that Tennessee law permits denial of a claim when the policyholder refuses to participate in an examination under oath. The company’s refusal to share its investigative files before examining her is reasonable and did not breach a duty of good faith. Tennessee presumes that failure to participate in an examination results in prejudice to the insurer, and makes it the policyholder’s burden to demonstrate that the company suffered no harm. Lester never introduced any evidence to rebut the presumption. View "Lester v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Howard v. United States

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by Justia Inc
Howard has been involved with the criminal-justice system since he was 11 years old. In 2006, at age 21, he pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) as a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, his attorney objected to several Presentence Investigation Report assignments of criminal-history points for Howard’s juvenile offenses. The district court sustained two objections, leaving Howard in Criminal History Category V, with a guidelines-recommended range of 130 to 162 months of imprisonment. The court sentenced Howard to the statutory maximum of 120 months of imprisonment. Howard later filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255 alleging that his attorney’s representation was constitutionally deficient for failure to object to the PSR’s award of two criminal history points related to his juvenile stay at a school for adjudicated delinquents. The district court denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Howard’s allegations of attorney misconduct and incompetence were troubling, and if proven true, might support a finding of constitutionally deficient performance, but in this case, the attorney’s representation did not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment’s basic protections. An objection would have been futile, and Howard did not explain how his sentence would be different but for the other misconduct he alleged. View "Howard v. United States" on Justia Law

King v. Berghuis

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by Justia Inc
King pled guilty to armed robbery and bank robbery while on parole for a prior felony offense. As part of the plea agreement, the state agreed that consecutive sentencing would not apply and the court imposed concurrent sentences for the armed robbery and bank robbery convictions. As required by Michigan law, the court imposed those sentences consecutive to King’s parole sentence. King sought to withdraw his plea, arguing only that the prosecutor impermissibly reneged on the plea deal by failing to abide by his promise of leniency. The state trial court found that the prosecutor never promised something that was not within his power: having the parole sentence run concurrently with the newly-imposed sentences. King then sought habeas relief. The federal district court denied the claim, finding the state court’s determination that there was no breach of King’s plea agreement was not objectively unreasonable. On appeal, King claimed that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered under the Supreme Court’s holding in Boykin v. Alabama. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that, with respect to this new claim, King failed to exhaust state remedies. View "King v. Berghuis" on Justia Law