Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The debtor filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11. Prior to expiration of the 120-day deadline to assume or reject nonresidential real property leases provided for under 11 U.S.C. 365, debtor obtained a 90-day extension of time to assume or reject leases, making August 30, 2010, the deadline. On August 13, 2010, the debtor filed a second motion for an extension. The landlord would not consent and, on August 27, the trustee filed a motion to assume the lease. The bankruptcy court held that the deadline set forth in 11 U.S.C. 365(d)(4) for assuming a nonresidential real property lease is satisfied upon the debtor filing a motion to assume the lease. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiff alleges that his former employer and two police officers conspired to bring false charges against him and unlawfully seize him in order to have him sent back to prison on a supervised-release violation by fabricating a police report alleging that plaintiff broke the window of the former employer's car and calling in a false tip that led to search of his car. The charge of violation of supervised release was dropped. The former employer acknowledges that plaintiff did not break the window. The officer was forced to resign and was acquitted of witness and evidence tampering, The district court granted defendants summary judgment in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. A reasonable jury could find that the officer agreed to stop plaintiff's care without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, although there was no evidence that the officer who executed the traffic stop shared the greater conspiratorial objective.

Plaintiff, a pipefitter, worked with asbestos-containing gaskets made by defendant from 1962 until 1970. From 1962 until 1975, he also sustained significant exposure to asbestos insulation. He died in 2008, of mesothelioma, a cancer of the lining of the lung. Before his death, plaintiff sued under theories including strict liability and negligence. Defendant does not dispute that asbestos-containing products likely caused the mesothelioma, but argues that the mesothelioma was caused by exposure to asbestos insulation, and that its own gaskets were not a substantial factor. A jury awarded plaintiff $516,094. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Given that plaintiff failed to quantify the exposure to asbestos from defendant's gaskets and concedes that plaintiff sustained massive exposure to asbestos from non-defendant sources, there was insufficient evidence to infer that defendant's gaskets probably, as opposed to possibly, were a substantial cause of plaintiff's mesothelioma.

Indicted for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute over 1 kilogram of cocaine base and over 100 grams of powder cocaine, defendant entered a plea agreement that stipulated to 180 months of imprisonment. The parties attached a Sentencing Guidelines work sheet showing a range of 168 to 210 months, based on a final offense level of 35 and a criminal history category of I. The presentence report, however, determined that the range was 210 to 262 months, assessing a four-level enhancement rather than the two-level enhancement applied on the worksheet. The district judge accepted the agreement and sentenced defendant to 180 months. After the Sentencing Commission lowered the base offense levels for crack cocaine offenses and made the amendments retroactive, defendant filed a motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Because his sentence was "based on" guidelines that changed, defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) and the district court apparently did not consider whether defendant is entitled to a sentence reduction under the circumstances in light of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors.

Petitioner, 16 years old at the time, was charged with first-degree murder and firearm possession during a felony after admitting that he was present at the scene of the 1984 murder. The juvenile court waived jurisdiction, so that defendant was tried as an adult. His counsel did not appeal and he was convicted. Evidence included three witnesses who testified that defendant had told them that he killed the victim. He was sentenced to life in prison, plus two years for the gun charge. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Multiple attempts at collateral relief failed. The district court denied a 2006 petition for habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, that it deemed to be "successive" under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). The Sixth Circuit affirmed after finding that the petition was not successive because it followed a remedial appeal ordered on a prior petition. The credibility determination of the trial judge should not be overturned; given the evidence against him, defendant cannot show prejudice.

Pleased with the results of their first collaboration, the author and musician co-authored and recorded a second song. The relationship collapsed and the musician signed as a recording artist with unrelated recording and management companies. Accusations and altercations followed, and the author filed suit, alleging a "novel" claim of copyright infringement against the musician and others for preventing the author from commercially exploiting the two songs through threats contained in cease-and-desist letters and requests to music retailers that the songs not be offered for sale. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim of copyright infringement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the copyright infringement claim, but reversed dismissal of a declaratory judgment claim. The author's allegation that the musician transferred an interest in the first song, which she did not own, is not the same thing as creating an improper copy of the song and such transfer does not constitute infringement under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 106. The cease-and-desist letters on which the declaratory judgment action was based essentially challenge the authorship and ownership of the songs, implicating federal law, so its dismissal as a state law claim was improper.

In 1992 a brokerage firm established a nonqualified defined benefit plan for a select group of highly compensated executives. The plan contains provisions that, if triggered, result in discontinuance of payments and forfeiture of benefits accrued, regardless of how long a participant has been enrolled. Plaintiffs are executives who left the firm and went to work for a rival company, triggering provisions that forfeited benefits. After exhausting their claims before the plan's administrative committee, they filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1053(a)(2), claiming improper denial of benefits. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The existence of an ERISA plan is not a jurisdictional issue and defendants waived their argument that the plan was not an ERISA plan by neglecting to raise it until after summary judgment, but the district court should have remanded the issue of whether the plan is qualifies as a top-hat, deferred-compensation plan under section 201(2) of ERISA: a plan which is unfunded and is maintained by an employer primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select group of management or highly compensated employees.

Plaintiff suffered a back injury in a work-related vehicle accident in 1994, developed depression, then sought social security disability benefits. The Commissioner of Social Security adjudged him not to be disabled for purposes benefits. The district court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The ALJ did not apply the "treating physicians" or "good reasons" rules in rejecting the treating doctor's opinion. That opinion was not patently wrong, so the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiffs developed tardive dyskinesia as a result of use of generic metoclopramide, a drug prescribed for treatment of gastroesophageal reflux disease. They filed individual suits against manufacturers, alleging failure include adequate information on product labels concerning the risks of taking the drug long-term. They also named as parties manufacturers of the name-brand form of metoclopramide, alleging fraud and tortious misrepresentation. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' tort claims against the generic defendants on preemption grounds, finding conflict with federal regulation of generic drugs. The court also dismissed claims against name-brand defendants for failure to allege that they had ingested Reglan, a threshold requirement for a products-liability action under Kentucky law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that name-brand manufacturers have no duty to individuals who have never taken the drug they manufacture.

Based on a 1997 killing, defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack and to intentionally kill one or more persons in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, preserving the right to appeal denial of his motions to dismiss based on denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.The case, at times, involved 24 other defendants and numerous motions to continue, join, sever, and dismiss that delayed the beginning of defendant's trial. While at times he requested a speedy trial or wrote letters informing the court of the lengthy delay, defendant mostly caused or contributed to the delay through his admitted "vigorous" motion practice and requests for continuances; he never opposed any requested continuance. He did not show prejudice as a result of the delays. Taken as a whole, the "Barker" factors weigh against defendant, even with an 11-year delay from indictment to sentencing, they do not support a speedy-trial claim.