Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After officers saw him put a handgun in his waistband, defendant was arrested on the porch of a house. The officers found marijuana and cocaine on top of defendant's wallet, near where he was sitting. He pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm 18 U.S.C. 922(g). A presentence report assigned a total offense level of 25 and a criminal history category of VI, and recommended between 110 and 120 months' imprisonment. Defendant objected to a four-level enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony (USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)), arguing that he did not possess drugs when he was arrested. The district court applied the enhancement and imposed a 108-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The enhancement was unwarranted and the sentence was not procedurally reasonable. The drug possession was a felony rather than a misdemeanor only because of defendant's prior drug convictions. Although there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that he committed a felony under Tennessee law by possessing the drugs, the government did not sufficiently demonstrate that defendant's possession of a firearm facilitated, or had the potential to facilitate, his felony drug possession.

Indicted for rape of an 11-year-old, defendant was convicted of attempted rape, a second-degree felony (O.R.C. 2923.02/2907.02). At the time, statutes included a rebuttable presumption in favor of minimum sentences for second degree felonies (two years) unless the court determined that probation adequately satisfied the purposes of sentencing or supported a longer sentence; trial courts were required, in some cases, to make additional, findings. The trial court found that defendant had served time for a prior conviction, was a sexual predator, and posed the greatest likelihood of recidivism, and imposed a sentence of eight years. While appeal was pending, a 2006 Ohio supreme court case gave courts discretion to impose any sentence within the ranges without making specific findings. On remand, the trial court again imposed a sentence of eight years, finding only that defendant is a sexual predator. After exhausting state remedies, defendant sought habeas corpus asserting that retroactive application of the 2006 decision violated the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Defendant was always at risk for the eight-year maximum sentence, based on his history. The change in law did not limit the right to appellate review.

Plaintiffs paid off their home mortgage early and were charged a $30 "payoff statement fee" and a $14 "recording fee" in connection with the prepayment. They challenged the fees as violations of the mortgage contract, of state laws, and of the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2601. The district court dismissed the suit as preempted by the federal Home Owners’ Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. 1461, and for failure to state a claim under RESPA. The Sixth Circuit held that the other claims were properly dismissed, but remanded a breach of contract claim. A Michigan Usury Act claim was preempted by HOLA; plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the deed recording statute, the state consumer protection law, or RESPA, which does not apply to charges imposed after the settlement. The court rejected a claim by the FDIC, appointed as receiver for the defendant-lender, that the court had been deprived of jurisdiction by the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. 1281(d).

In 2005 defendant entered a plea of guilty to aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. 2). The plea agreement stated that the parties believed defendant qualified for sentencing under the career offender guideline, USSG 4B1, and reserved the right to appeal the sentence. The sentencing report noted felony convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated assault in Ohio in 1995 and for felonious assault in Ohio in 1999. With a total adjusted offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI, the guideline range was 262 to 327 months. Defendant did not object to the report. The district court granted a six-level reduction for defendant's substantial assistance, which lowered the offense level to 28 and the applicable guideline range to 140 to 175 months. The district court imposed a sentence of 144 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Ohio aggravated assault conviction qualified as a crime of violence. The court rejected a collateral challenge to the 1999 conviction.

Defendant sent six threatening letters to the federal district judge who had sentenced him to prison for fraudulent use of an unauthorized credit card. The unsigned letters demanded money and threatened the judge's life. One of them contained a white-powder substance, which was later determined to be a harmless artificial sweetener. Defendant pled guilty to committing a hoax involving a biological weapon (18 U.S.C. 1038(a)(1)). The Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentence of 30 to 37 months in prison. The district court imposed a sentence of 60 months, the statutory maximum, and ordered that he have no contact with any member of the postal service during his three years of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence as reasonable. The court noted the effect of the crime on the operation of government.

Defendant, a sheriff's deputy, was convicted of falsifying a document (18 U.S.C. 1519), with respect to the death of a pretrial detainee. Following transport from a hospital, where the detainee had been treated for seizures, deputies subdued the detainee, shoved him so that he hit his head on a wall, then put him in a "sleeper hold" that rendered him unconscious. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the structure of the indictment was duplicitous and that the district court's failure to provide the jury with a specific unanimity instruction violated his right to a unanimous verdict.

Defendant pled guilty to transporting child pornography and received an 87-month prison sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court addressed all arguments for a lower sentence and reasonably imposed a bottom-of-the-guidelines sentence, regardless of defendant's arguments based on his loss of livelihood and family.

Defendant was convicted on 22 counts arising out of his involvement in the distribution of heroin over a four-year period. The district court imposed a mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 1,000 grams of heroin, and imposed concurrent sentences for all but two of the other offenses. Consecutive sentences were imposed on each of two convictions for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 924(c)convictions; the admission of certain co-conspirator statements under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); the allowance of testimony regarding recorded calls to which the witness was not a party; and failure to give a requested jury instruction regarding multiple conspiracies. With respect to sentencing, the court rejected arguments that the notice of enhanced penalties was defective; that it was error to impose consecutive sentences for the 924(c) convictions; and that the sentence of life imprisonment violated double jeopardy and constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

After a 911 call reporting shots fired from a yellow vehicle, police apprehended petitioner and recovered a gun from his vehicle. The defense argued that someone else placed the gun in the vehicle and falsely reported a shooting. An officer testified that he found petitioner in the yellow vehicle at the address reported in the call and saw the gun on the front seat when petitioner exited the car. Petitioner tried to escape and had to be subdued with pepper spray. Pedestrians in the area stated that no shots had been fired. Petitioner was found guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, resisting a police officer, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. He exhausted state remedies. The district court granted an evidentiary hearing and denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The 911 call, from a purported eyewitness, and petitioner's evasive conduct gave rise to reasonable suspicion that he was involved in a shooting, justifying an investigatory stop. Neither trial counsel's failure to interview witnesses nor her decision not to file a motion to suppress prejudiced petitioner.

Debtor filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code and, a month later, filed a Certificate of Credit Counseling stating that the counseling session was completed post-petition. At a hearing Debtor represented that the certificate was incorrect and that he actually completed counseling before he filed his petition. The court issued an order for the Debtor to show cause why his case should not be dismissed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 109(h) and inviting the Trustee to make inquiries to the credit counseling agency. At a later hearing, the Trustee represented that, although the Debtor completed the online portion of counseling prior to filing, he did not complete the telephone component until later. The bankruptcy court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.The requirements of 109(h) are unambiguous and the statutory exemptions were not present, so the court did not have discretion to ignore, modify, or defer the requirements, which are a prerequisite to obtaining relief.