Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a previous proceeding, the National Labor Relations Board found that the medical center violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (3) when it fired eight employees because of their union support and participation in a lawful strike. The Sixth Circuit enforced the NLRB order directing the center to pay back pay to one of the eight discriminatees, rejecting arguments that the discriminatee's felony conviction affected her right to reinstatement and back pay; that her resignation from an interim job tolled back pay liability; and that her medical leave terminateds back pay liability.

Plaintiffs sought insurance coverage for settlement and defense costs related to thousands of asbestos-exposure products-liability lawsuits that began in 1981. Many of the underlying asbestos claims arose from exposure to products manufactured by Reardon, a corporation that sold its assets and liabilities to plaintiff and became a division of plaintiff's business in 1966. The policies did not expressly identify Reardon or its later incarnation as "Named Insureds," but provided coverage for asbestos claims related to the Reardon products, and each has paid pursuant to the policies' aggregate limits for "Products Hazard" claims. The insurance companies, collectively, have paid more than $100 millions plaintiffs sought more than $125 million in additional coverage, arguing that the Products Hazard caps did not apply to the Reardon claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurance companies. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the policy language supported application of the cap,

Defendant hacked the email account of then-Alaska governor and Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin. After forensic examinations revealed that he took action to remove information from his computer relating to the incident, he was indicted on several counts, including identity theft, but only convicted of obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1519. Section 1519, part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, prohibits knowing destruction or alteration of any record with intent to impede, obstruct, or influence investigation of any matter within the jurisdiction of any federal department or agency or in relation to or in contemplation of any such matter or case. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the law was unconstitutionally vague and that there was not sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Defendant's posts indicated "contemplation" of a federal investigation.

In 2008, the Eastern District of Michigan ranked 79th of 90 judicial districts in successful completion of Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases. To improve the situation, the judges began entering orders in Chapter 13 plans that required the IRS to send tax refunds directly to the Chapter 13 trustees, not to the individuals as the Internal Revenue Code contemplates. 26 U.S.C. 6402(a). Chapter 13 plans repay creditors over three to five years, requiring the IRS to track debtors’ returns during several tax cycles. The burden became unmanageable when there were 4,966 affected returns in April 2009. The IRS obtained a declaratory judgment preventing the trustees from enforcing existing refund redirection provisions and a writ of mandamus prohibiting the bankruptcy court from including these provisions in future Chapter 13 plans. The Sixth Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction. The government sued the wrong parties, a group of bankruptcy trustees, but the harm it suffered flows from the bankruptcy court's orders. A judgment against the trustees will not eliminate the problem.

Plaintiff, then age 58, was terminated from his job as shift supervisor in 1998. He claimed that he was terminated because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code 4-21-10. His performance appraisals before 1997 were positive or average; his 1997 appraisal was negative. The company stated that he was terminated as part of a reduction in force and that his responsibilities were shifted to another supervisor. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. Appeal was stayed due to the employer's reorganization in bankruptcy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not establish that the stated reason for termination was pretextual.

In 1975 federal court held that the city had discriminated against minorities in hiring entry-level firefighters. In 1977, the court approved a consent decree that included racial classifications as a remedy. A 2000 amendment noted that the percentage of minority firefighters had increased from four to 26 and set a goal of 33-1/3 percent; the court required that one of every three hires be minority applicants. During the years that followed, the city did not hire, but laid off firefighters. In 2009, the court declined to extend the decree and its racial classifications for another six years. The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that the district court did not make findings concerning whether the racial classifications continue to remedy past discrimination.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B), admitting possession of a computer thumb drive that he knew contained many images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. At sentencing, the district court considered all of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) before imposing a term of incarceration of 57 months. Although both parties requested a ten-year term of supervised release, the court imposed a lifetime term of supervised release with standard and special conditions. The Sixth Circuit vacated because the court did not articulate a rationale for the length of supervised release and some of the conditions it imposed, such as drug and alcohol testing.

In 1986, the Association signed an agreement with Beulah Park governing racing operations; later, they amended to establish a regular process in which the Association periodically would grant or withhold consent to simulcast races to betting facilities outside of Ohio. In 1996, the Association executed a similar agreement with River Downs. Under the agreements, when Beulah Park and River Downs want to simulcast races to out-of-state betting facilities, they send a letter to the Association outlining the terms of the proposed simulcast and requesting authorization. After the Association withheld consent to 2006 requests, Beulah Park and River Downs filed a complaint with the Ohio Racing Commission. The Racing Commission ruled in favor of the race parks. The Association sued, arguing that the federal Interstate Horseracing Act, 15 U.S.C. 3004(a) preempted the Ohio law. The district court agreed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that "To respect the state law is to slight the federal one."

Checking accounts were opened in the name of Diallo by a man with a passport bearing that name. The IRS deposited $3,787 into the account. Diallo withdrew $2,500 before the bank discovered that the money was a tax refund belonging to another. The account was blocked and the bank notified the IRS. The IRS made additional deposits for tax refunds. Diallo attempted to make a withdrawal, but the transaction was blocked. Later that day, at the airport, defendant was flagged for additional screening. The search revealed envelopes containing large amounts of cash and unsealed envelopes containing passports bearing defendant's picture but different names, including the name Diallo. He was indicted for possession of a false passport, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344 and 1028A(a)(1). The district court suppressed the evidence, finding that the government failed to establish that the search was constitutional, and barred admission of the bank records. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Although actual documentation seized during the search must be suppressed, evidence obtained legally and independently of the search is not suppressible, even if the government cannot show that it would have discovered its significance without the illegal search. The minimal deterrent effect of suppression is outweighed by the burden on the truth-seeking function of the courts.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires incumbent local exchange carriers to lease to new competitive LECs, unbundled, at cost, facilities and services (elements) that the FCC deems necessary to provide local telephone service, 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(3), (d)(2). Section 271 requires "Bell operating" companies that seek to provide long-distance service, such as AT&T, to make available a competitive checklist of services to facilitate competition in the local phone service market. In response to regulatory developments, Kentucky competitive LECs asked the state commission to require AT&T to continue de-listed elements. The commission agreed. A district court enjoined enforcement and ordered the commission to calculate the amount a competitive LEC owed AT&T for services obtained at the unlawfully imposed rate. The commission issued another order requiring AT&T to provide de-listed elements at a regulated rate. The court entered another injunction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding conclusions that the commission may not require continued unbundling of de-listed elements; that FCC regulations do not require AT&T to provide to competitive LECs equipment known as a line splitter; and that FCC regulations do not require AT&T to provide unbundled access to high-speed fiber-optic loops in new service areas. LECs, upon request, must package unbundled network elements provided under section 251 with elements mandated only by section 271