Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2003, petitioner pled guilty to unarmed robbery of $10 that occurred when he was 17 years old and had no prior criminal history. He suffered from A.D.H.D. and had been in special education since first grade. After being sentenced to “boot camp,” petitioner returned to court for violating rules. After a 20-minute hearing, at which supporters offered counseling and employment, the judge sentenced him to 1 to 15 years in prison. He served six years. He did not pursue direct appeal. The judgment became final in 2005. Efforts to obtain post-conviction relief in state court were unsuccessful. In September, 2006, a Michigan court rejected a second post-conviction motion as prohibited by state law. The supreme court denied appeal. In 2007, petitioner filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus. The district court found that the limitations period was tolled while the second motion was pending in state court despite the motion being barred. The court issued an unconditional writ on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel and due-process grounds. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for determination of whether equitable tolling of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2) applies. The second motion could not be accepted and, therefore, was not “properly filed,” so the petition was not timely.

Plaintiff rented a car, drove 64 miles in one day, refilled the fuel tank, and returned the car to the same location from which he rented the car. In addition to rental and other fees that he does not dispute, he was charged a $13.99 fuel service fee that he challenged by filing a putative class action, claiming breach of contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment. Defendant claimed that, because plaintiff drove fewer than 75 miles during the rental period, to avoid the charge he was required to return the car with a full fuel tank and to submit a receipt. The district court dismissed, finding that the contract was not ambiguous. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the voluntary payment doctrine.

Plaintiff fell and broke bones while walking in defendant’s campground. She sought damages for medical expenses and lost earning capacity. Before her injury, she worked part-time in childcare, earning $9,000 to $10,000 annually; she claims that her injuries forced her to switch jobs and work as a full-time manicurist. She presented testimony of an accountant, that, but for her injury, plaintiff could have earned approximately $17,600 a year as a full-time childcare worker; her annual earning capacity as a full-time manicurist was approximately the same. Factoring in her disability and increased likelihood of missed work, he concluded that lost earning capacity totaled $232,346. The jury awarded $200,000. The Sixth Circuit reversed. On remand, the district court excluded the accountant’s expert testimony as unduly speculative. Although plaintiff testified that her injuries prevented her from performing procedures that would have earned additional money, the court instructed the jury that it could not award damages for lost earning capacity. The jury awarded $10,000. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to liability, but vacated on damages. The expert testimony was not unreasonably speculative; the court “appears to have misunderstood the concept of lost earning capacity.”

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery, felonious assault, (with firearm specifications) and possession of cocaine and sentenced to 258 months' imprisonment. On direct appeal he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, prejudice due to the failure to suppress the photographic array identification, and insufficient evidence. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioner did not file a timely appeal, but almost six years later, filed an unsuccessful motion for leave to file a delayed appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court. He also pursued post-conviction relief in state courts without success. The district court denied a habeas corpus petition as barred by the one-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2244(d). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Petitioner was aware of the factual predicate of his claims at the time of his direct appeal, and the claims do not implicate sections 2244(d)(1)(B) or 2244(d)(1)(C). The limitations period began to run on the date that his judgment became final, at the expiration of the time for seeking direct review. Neither statutory nor equitable tolling apply and petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. .

Dorn Sprinkler, formed in 1977 and operated by its owner, David, failed to contribute to benefit funds required by its collective bargaining agreement for three months in 2006-2007. Employees organized a work stoppage. Sprinkler went out of business with its required contributions still unpaid. David’s son, Christopher, lead salesman at Sprinkler, had formed a company called Dorn Fire Protection during the 1990s but had not started doing business. Shortly before financial troubles at his father's business, Christopher began operations. The Union submitted a request to arbitrate to Fire Protection under the theory that it is an alter ego of Sprinkler. Fire Protection refused. The district court, finding that Fire Protection is not an alter ego of Sprinkler, granted summary judgment to defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The management structures at the companies were not substantially identical; there was no substantial continuity in employees, customers or equipment. There was no proof of intent to avoid the bargaining agreement.

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(5)(B). He challenged denial of a motion to suppress floppy disks discovered in his house and five conditions imposed on supervised release. He claimed ineffective assistance of counsel in his attorney's failure to preserve his right to appeal denial of the motion to suppress. The conditions restrict his ability to access the internet, to associate with minors, to associate with persons who have sexual attraction to minors, to seek employment involving interaction with minors, and to engage in activities involving minors, and to frequent places where minors gather. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the record insufficient for review, with respect to the ineffective assistance claim. In light of defendant's unconditional plea, the court declined to review denial of the motion to suppress or the conditions.

Defendant pled guilty to knowingly possessing more than 7100 images of child pornography on his computer, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B). Some of the images involved bondage, torture, and rape of prepubescent children. The USSG recommended sentence was 78 to 97 months' imprisonment. The district court imposed a sentence of one day in custody, a term of supervised release of five years, and a $100 special assessment, based on defendant's lack of criminal history and a psychological assessment that concluded that he was low-risk. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence as substantively unreasonable. While a court may consider the defendant's personal characteristics, it may not disregard other factors, such as seriousness of the offense, deterrence, and avoiding sentencing disparities.

Current and former African–American employees brought suit alleging that they were exposed to a racially hostile work environment in defendant's warehouses and, in response to a motion for summary judgment, submitted a detailed list of incidents, scattered sporadically over 25 years, including vulgar graffiti, overtly racist comments by coworkers, and racially motivated pranks. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly found that plaintiffs failed to show they were aware of the majority of harassment alleged by their fellow employees and correctly concluded that plaintiffs' claims should be considered individually.

Defendant pleaded guilty to three child pornography offenses, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), 2252A(a)(2), and 2252A(a)(5)(B) and was sentenced to 121 months imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an argument that that the district court violated FRCP 32(i) by preparing its sentencing opinion before announcing its sentence. The court conducted "exhaustive" review of submissions and arguments before reaching its decision. The court's reliance on sex offender studies was not excessive. The court properly applied several child pornography enhancements from USSG 2G2.2 and acted within its discretion in discounting a psychological report on defendant, considering defendant's lawful activities, considering the duration of his unlawful conduct, and reviewing images possessed by defendant.

Hardesty, a resident of Utah, solicited Schneider, a physician and resident of Ohio, for an investment involving purchase of medical-malpractice insurance from Hardesty's foreign-based company. The investment was to provide federal-tax benefits and make him a partial owner of an insurance company. Hardesty's $500,000 was transferred and eventually frozen because of SEC proceedings against a Ponzi scheme involving more than $100,000,000. Hardesty hired Nelson, a Utah attorney, to recover the funds. Nelson corresponded with Schneider and the defendants, but did not recover the money. Schneider sued multiple defendants, including Hardesty and Nelson, alleging fraud and misrepresentation. Schneider alleged that letters written by Nelson contained false statements by which Nelson furthered the scheme to defraud Schneider. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court improperly applied the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, as opposed to the prima facie standard, in determining whether Schneider pleaded facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Nelson, but the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process and is proper under Ohio's long-arm statute even under the more demanding standard.