Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The city accepted a proposal to develop city-owned property. The developer formed companies to develop and own the affordable housing portion of the project. The city gave the developer an option to purchase the property under certain conditions. The developer failed to meet a condition that it obtain a demolition permit by a specific date. The city terminated the agreement. The developer alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601, and state laws, claiming that the city knew or should have known that the condition was impossible to meet and actually terminated the agreement because the project would accommodate handicapped tenants. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The facts alleged do not plausibly support findings: that the city designed the agreement to fail by including a condition it should have known that plaintiffs, sophisticated developers, could not meet; that the city did not want to house the handicapped; or that termination caused handicapped individuals to suffer disproportionately more than others.

Defendant committed several armed robberies in South Carolina and Tennessee. He was convicted in South Carolina state court and sentenced to 25 years. He pled guilty to federal charges of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(d), and carrying a firearm during the robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1), with respect to the Tennessee robberies and was sentenced as a career offender, based on two prior convictions. The court imposed a sentence at the low end of the guidelines: 188 months on count one, to run concurrently with the 25-year sentence, with an 84-month consecutive sentence on count 2. On remand, the government abandoned its contention that defendant was a career offender. Defendant sought a sentence at the low end of the now-applicable guidelines, consistent with the original sentence, at the low end of the career-offender range. A newly-assigned judge imposed a low-end sentence of 77 months, to run consecutively to the 25-year sentence, so that defendant may spend up to six more years in prison than under the original sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The remand was not limited to eliminating career offender status. The court and prosecution were not bound to concurrent sentencing. Defendant took the risk of a harsher sentence.

In 2002, defendant was convicted of sexual battery, requiring him to register as a sex offender under Ohio law. Three days before he was released from prison, in 2005, he signed a notice acknowledging his duty to register personally in each county in Ohio, or any other state where he resided, upon five days of arriving there. He did not register in Ohio. Some time before the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. 2250, went into effect, he moved permanently to Kentucky and did not register. He made sporadic trips from Kentucky to West Virginia, including several after SORNA became effective. In 2009 he was arrested for parole violation. He entered a conditional plea to violation of SORNA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to SORNA as constituting an ex post facto law and invalid exercise of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.

In 2006, petitioner was convicted of rape and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, friend of his girlfriend's daughter and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. The Ohio Court of Appeal rejected a challenge to a ruling that denied him the opportunity to present evidence of the minor's sexual history through her friend's testimony, arguing that the state waived protections of Ohio's rape-shield law when it chose to introduce evidence about the minor's lack of past sexual activity. The Ohio Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The district court denied his petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the state court decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law on petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.

During the 2008 campaign, Joe, a plumber working near Toledo, asked then-candidate Obama about a proposed tax plan’s impact on Joe’s ability to own a business. The interaction was replayed by national media. Joe later accepted media requests and criticized Obama’s policies, resulting in Senator McCain’s reference to "Joe the Plumber." After Joe’s media moment, employees of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, Obama supporters, searched his name in databases and that the Inspector General found no legitimate agency purpose for those searches. Defendants were suspended from their positions. Joe filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violation of privacy rights. The district court granted defendants judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not suffer sufficient adverse action: he did not suffer a threat to his livelihood, was not defamed, did not endure a search or seizure, and did not experience the public disclosure of embarrassing information. He did not allege continuing investigation or "chilling" of First Amendment rights; "a person of ordinary firmness" would not be deterred or chilled. In his privacy claim, Joe did not identify an interest "fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."

The court's February 2010 decision was reversed by the United States Supreme Court, the Court, which held that the incumbent local exchange carrier, Michigan Bell, must lease its existing entrance facilities for interconnection at cost-based rates, Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, (2011). In response, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded.

Defendant, charged as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)), moved to suppress evidence seized in the automobile search (a loaded revolver found under the driver's seat) and his later statements admitting that the firearm belonged to him. The court granted the motion and the government appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While the officer had probable cause to stop the car and arrest the driver, based on traffic violations, the occupants were not within reaching distance of the seat when the car was searched. The officer's testimony did not establish reasonable suspicion to justify a protective search.

In 1972, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Paroled 20 years later, he was arrested in 1997 for aggravated robbery. Petitioner faked inability to walk and had to be transported to court in a wheelchair. During transport he attacked the officer, stole her pistol, carjacked a vehicle and killed the owner. He carjacked another vehicle and attempted another carjacking before surrendering and giving a lengthy, videotaped, confession. He was convicted of aggravated murder by prior calculation and design, aggravated murder during commission of a felony and 10 other counts. The jury recommended a death sentence. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. State courts denied post-conviction relief. The federal district court denied habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, finding that defendant was improperly prevented from presenting voluntary intoxication as a mitigating factor but that any error was harmless. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek a change in venue, by introducing incarceration records during the penalty phase, and by failing to present mitigating evidence regarding juvenile incarceration, and that the trial court improperly prohibited defendant from arguing voluntary intoxication as a mitigating factor.

Officers activated their lights and approached defendant's vehicle, which was parked in an otherwise empty coin-operated carwash in an area in which several drug arrests had been made. After seeing furtive movements, and observing marijuana on the dashboard, they requested that defendant leave exit the vehicle. He complied. The officers arrested defendant and searched the vehicle. They discovered a gun, crack cocaine, and marijuana. Defendant was charged with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The Sixth Circuit upheld denial of a motion to suppress. Defendant and the officers had a consensual encounter; no seizure occurred when the officers parked their cruiser and approached defendant's vehicle. They did not block his exit. Even if a seizure had occurred, the officers had reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop.

Ohio law gives certain mayors jurisdiction to "hear and determine any prosecution for the violation of an ordinance of the municipal corporation, to hear and determine any case involving a violation of a vehicle parking or standing ordinance ... and all criminal causes involving any moving traffic violation occurring on a state highway located within the boundaries of the [city],” OH Rev. Code 1905.01(A). Plaintiff represents a 750-member class in a case under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the Due Process Clause based on the mayor presiding over no-contest traffic violation cases in Mayor's Court. The district court rejected the claim, relying on non-binding Sixth Circuit precedent stating that entering a judgment of guilty after a plea of no contest is a purely ministerial function that a mayor can undertake without violating due process. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a mayor presiding over a Mayor’s Court is per se unconstitutional. A mayor presiding over a Mayor’s Court does not violate due process when he acts in a purely ministerial capacity.