Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Thiam, a black woman and a member of the Wolof tribe in Mauritania, suffered physical and sexual violence by white Arab members of the military. She was sent to Senegal, where she lived for about 14 years. She arrived in the U.S. in 2004 with a fake Senegalese passport and applied for asylum. Thiam attended three hearings in Cleveland in 2007, but the presiding IJ was in Arlington, Virginia and conducted the hearings via videoconference. For her final hearing, Thiam traveled to Arlington, believing that her credibility would be apparent in a personal appearance. The IJ found Thiam credible, but concluded that she was barred from seeking asylum because she had firmly resettled in Senegal (8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi)). The IJ found, that though Thiam did suffer past persecution, improvements in the human rights record of Mauritania indicated that she could return to Mauritania. Thiam appealed and sought remand for consideration of new evidence regarding a military coup in Mauritania. The BIA affirmed, applying Fourth Circuit law. The Sixth Circuit declined transfer to the Fourth Circuit as not in the interest of justice, and remanded. The BIA did not follow its own framework for firm-resettlement determinations.

Plaintiff's bank, Firstar, erroneously dishonored her check for her April 2002 monthly mortgage payment to Aames. Firstar issued an "official check" to Aames on April 8, 2002 but also failed to honor that check. Aames notified plaintiff of default on April 20 and assessed a late fee. Firstar ultimately honored her personal check as well as one of two official checks, resulting in two mortgage payments received for the month of April. Plaintiff did not submit a payment for May. Aames sent notice that it had assigned the mortgage to Ocwen, which began dunning plaintiff and her husband, who is not a co-borrower, for the May payment, despite proof of the double payment. No assignment was recorded. Ocwen made endless collection calls, despite cease and desist requests and registry on the federal “Do Not Call” directory; threatened foreclosure; assessed late fees; and reported derogatory information to the credit reporting agencies. Plaintiffs alleged violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The district court dismissed, concluding that neither defendant was covered under the Act as neither was a debt collector. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that defendants cannot "have it both ways."

The center provided care for children of low-income parents and sought license renewal in 2005. The application remained pending for 15 months. During that period, the state agency, ODJFS, reduced its capacity from 88 to 38 children. The agency responsible for funding under Title XX, which provides government assistance for child care, 42 U.S.C. 1397, discontinued public assistance for its services, based on a proposed adjudication, which would reject the renewal application based on alleged improper use of physical discipline and failure to adequately ensure that employees did not have disqualifying criminal convictions. While the matter was pending, the center experienced difficulty with third-party contracts, including liability insurance and workers compensation renewal certification, and went out of business. The center sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, claiming tortious interference with business relationships, based on racial animus. After the center also filed in the Ohio Court of Claims, the district court dismissed the claims against ODJFS. The center continued to amend its federal pleadings, including addition of an antitrust claim, but the claims were ultimately dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that any unwaived claims were barred by the Local Government Antitrust Act.

V&M filed suit against Centimark alleging breach of contract and negligence after metal roof sheeting panels being installed at its steelwork facility fell into an electrical substation, causing loss of power for more than 30 hours. Damages for repairs and lost profits were around $3 million The district court granted Centimark summary judgment, ruling that V&M failed to produce sufficient evidence of causation to sustain either legal claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that genuine issues of material fact exist.

Plaintiff, an employee of the city since 2006, began training for a position at city hall under the supervision of the then-city recorder, Williams. Plaintiff and Williams are friends and landlord-tenant. In 2008, based on a recommendation from Williams, plaintiff was assigned to a deputy clerk position. A few months later, the city fired Williams. The mayor told plaintiff not to call or text Williams, forbade her from promoting any allegations by Williams, and specifically ordered her not to participate in or assist with any lawsuit. He followed up several times, asking plaintiff whether she had been in communication with Williams. Williams did file suit, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation for speaking out against alleged acts of public corruption. Plaintiff then filed suit against the mayor and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied the mayor summary judgment of qualified immunity on a claim of First Amendment prior restraint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff's right to speak publicly and participate in a lawsuit addressing workplace discrimination and public corruption in city government was clearly established.

In 2000, a citizen of Lebanon and a lawful permanent resident of the U.S., filed a Form I-130 relative visa petition on behalf of her son, as an unmarried, adult child of a permanent resident, under 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(2). USCIS approved the petition. Five years later, the son married a U.S. citizen and was admitted as a conditional permanent resident; several months later, the marriage was annulled. In response to notice of intent to terminate his conditional permanent resident status, he indicated that he had separately applied to adjust his status based on the approved visa petition his mother had previously filed on his behalf. USCIS indicated that the status had been automatically revoked on the date of marriage to a citizen. DHS initiated removal. In a suit claiming that, under Michigan law, annulment voids a marriage ab initio, so that USCIS should treat him as though he were never married, the district court determined that the decision of the Secretary of Homeland Security to revoke a visa petition is discretionary and not subject to judicial review. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

In 2009, Debtor filed a chapter 13 petition that was dismissed for failure to file a plan or schedules. Two months later, she filed a pro se chapter 7 petition which was dismissed for failure to produce proper documentation. She soon filed another pro se petition, under chapter 11. Debtor is the owner of 10 parcels of real estate from which she earns $5,340.00 per month in rental income, although she asserts that most of the properties are currently vacant. One of her creditors asserted, and the court agreed, that she was using bankruptcy stays to prevent foreclosure and live rent free. In dismissing the petition the court ordered that: "Debtor, or anyone in contractual privity with the Debtor or anyone having or purporting to have a possessory interest in the real property located at… is permanently barred from ever listing said Property or the debt owed to Creditor in a future bankruptcy petition," 11 U.S.C. 105; 362(d)(4). The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal with prejudice for 180 days and the order granting in rem relief against the specific property, insofar as it applies to Debtor and anyone in contractual privity with the Debtor.

In 2004, actor John Stamos visited a resort with a group of male friends and met Coss, then 17 years old. Coss and her friend attended a party at Stamos's hotel room. Alcohol was served. Stamos and Coss corresponded for several years and, in 2005, Coss flew to Chicago to visit Stamos while he was filming a television show. In 2008, Coss began dating Sippola. After Sippola saw photographs that Coss had of Stamos, the two devised a plan to obtain money from Stamos in exchange for the photographs. They created two fictitious personas. Emails from a fictional 17-year-old girl whom Stamos had purportedly impregnated while on vacation resulted in a cease-and-desist letter. Coss then indicated that another party had pictures of them using drugs and trashing the hotel room. Stamos's lawyer contacted law enforcement. The FBI stepped in and reached an agreement with Sippola’s fictional character to purchase the photographs for $680,000. Sippola and Coss were convicted of conspiracy to commit extortion 18 U.S.C. 371; 875(d) and sentenced to 48 months.. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence and a claim to downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under USSG 3E1.1.

Plaintiffs are 225 current or former employees of steel mills that have changed ownership many times. Calculation of retirement benefits changed with the changes in ownership. The employees claim that their union, employer, and plan administrator violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461, and Ohio common law by intentionally misleading them regarding how pension benefits would be calculated, inducing some to retire early. The district court dismissed, concluding that certain ERISA claims were time-barred, that the others failed to state a claim for relief, and that the common-law claims were preempted by federal law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly applied a three-year limitations period to promises allegedly made in 2003. Plaintiffs did not adequately allege fraud underlying breach of fiduciary duty, nor did they establish that the union was a fiduciary. The court rejected a variety of equitable theories.

The attorney represented more than 400 plaintiffs in a class action related to the diet drug Fen-Phen. Lawyers’ fees were to be limited to 30 percent of the clients' gross recovery. The case settled for almost $200 million. Plaintiffs together received $74 million, 37 percent of the settlement; $20 million was used to establish Kentucky Fund for Healthy Living. The attorney served on the Fund’s board, for which he received $5,350 monthly. The attorney knew that the Kentucky Bar Association was investigating fee division in the case and possible unauthorized practice of law by his paralegal. The attorney subsequently applied to renew his malpractice insurance and answered "no" to questions about possible pending claims and investigations. The policy excluded coverage for dishonest acts and omissions. Members of the class subsequently filed malpractice claims and were awarded $42 million. The insurer sought a declaration that it was entitled to rescind the policy. The district court granted the insurer summary judgment and awarded $233,674.49 for its outlay on defense costs. Class members intervened to protect their ability to recover. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Disbarment constituted a sufficient "regulatory ruling" under the dishonesty exclusion clause and there were material misrepresentations on the application.