Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Buxton Craig Heyerman was imprisoned for more than seventeen years as a pretrial detainee after a state appellate court reversed his criminal conviction and remanded the matter to the trial court. He filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Defendants-Appellees, Calhoun County, the Calhoun County Prosecutor's Office, the Michigan Department of Corrections and the Michigan Parole Board, alleging that this lengthy detention violated his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial rights. Upon review, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Defendants-Appellees were not liable for the alleged constitutional violation under section 1983, and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in their favor. View "Heyerman v. County of Calhoun" on Justia Law

Jones, a Michigan inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a prison doctor and nurses, alleging retaliation and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment to the nurses. Jones filed objections. Thereafter, the district court granted summary judgment to the doctor and dismissed the case. Seven days later, Jones filed a second set of objections. Eight months later, Jones filed a mandamus petition with the district court seeking to compel ruling on his objections. The district court did not construe the petition as a motion for reconsideration and denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit denied mandamus, noting that Jones may challenge the district court’s decision on direct appeal and has not shown that the district court erred. However, the objections were filed within30 days of the judgment and specify the parties involved in the appeal, meeting the requirements for a notice of appeal, so the court directed the clerk to file the objections as a notice of appeal. View "In re: Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiff began experiencing severe headaches and swelling in his left eye in 2007 while incarcerated. Shortly after his release, plaintiff was diagnosed with Ewing’s Sarcoma, a serious form of bone cancer. According to plaintiff, surgery would have been sufficient to treat the disease had prison staff detected it earlier. However, due to the late diagnosis, chemotherapy and radiation are now necessary. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court held that plaintiff pled sufficient facts upon which one could draw the inference that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment and committed medical malpractice. The doctor and nurse filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing that their involvement with plaintiff was minimal and cannot form the basis for a finding of deliberate indifference or gross negligence. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the defendants entitled to qualified immunity. Neither negligent medical care, nor delay in providing medical care, can rise to the level of a constitutional violation absent specific allegations of sufficiently harmful acts or omissions reflecting deliberate indifference.

Cybriwsky served as Turner's attorney to obtain social security disability benefits. The representation agreement relieved Turner of the obligation to pay if they did not win the case, but assigned to Cybriwsky any fees that the court may award under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 42 U.S.C. 2412. After holding a hearing, the Commissioner denied Turner's benefits request. The district court reversed and remanded and Turner sought attorney’s fees under the EAJA. The district court denied this motion, finding that Turner did not “incur” fees as a result of the remand and that the assignment was void under the Anti-Assignment Act, 31 U.S.C. 3727. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A "sentence-four remand," 42 U.S.C. 405(g), like the remand at issue, makes the plaintiff a "prevailing party" under the EAJA. The award is consistent with the purposes of EAJA. Litigants "incur" fees under the EAJA when they have an express or implied legal obligation to pay over such an award to their legal representatives, regardless of whether the court subsequently voids the assignment provision under the AAA.

Defendant was convicted of the assault of another inmate. He retained trial counsel to pursue his appeal of right, but the attorney failed to timely file. He filed delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied for lack of merit. The Michigan Supreme Court denied appeal. Defendant pursued state collateral proceedings and filed a motion for relief in the trial court, alleging ineffective assistance for failing to timely pursue appeal. The trial court denied the motion, and the higher courts denied subsequent applications for leave to appeal the denial. The district court conditionally granted a habeas petition, finding that counsel was ineffective for failing to timely pursue appeal of right. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. When counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, prejudice is presumed with no further showing. Appellate review of the denial of collateral relief is not a sufficient substitute for direct appeal; an applicant denied leave to appeal does not receive the benefit of oral argument, nor does the defendant have a right to appointed counsel on post-conviction review.

Ohio enacted legislation under which it no longer will apply the "best available technology" standard to small emitters as part of its state implementation plan (SIP) for National Ambient Air Quality Standards for certain types of air pollutants (Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7409). Act. The U.S. EPA did not approve a change to the SIP, but has taken no action to require the state to enforce the standard. Environmentalists sued under the Clean Air Act’s citizen-suit provision. The district court entered an injunction expressly ordering the state to administer the federal rule. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for dismissal, concluding that intervening Supreme Court precedent and the text and structure of the Clean Air Act itself indicate that the citizen-suit provision does not authorize this lawsuit, but authorizes suit against the federal EPA.

Defendant dismissed Lewis from her position as a registered nurse at one of the company's retirement homes. Lewis sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), in 2007, claiming that the company fired her because she had a medical condition that made it difficult for her to walk and that occasionally required her to use a wheelchair. The company responded that it dismissed Lewis based on an outburst at work. The ADA prohibited discrimination "because of" the disability of an employee. The district court adopted the company’s proposed jury instruction: that Lewis could prevail only if "the fact that plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability was the sole reason for the defendant's decision to terminate plaintiff." The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, and stated that neither the use of "solely" nor plaintiff’s proposed "motivating factor" was appropriate.

Marzetti, which markets five varieties of “New York Brand the Original Texas Toast” croutons, sued under 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) alleging infringement based on Roskam’s use of the mark “Texas Toast” on its packaged croutons. The district court agreed with Roskam that the terminology is generic when describing a type of crouton, so that the mark “Texas Toast” is not entitled to trademark protection and that even if “Texas Toast” were a protectable mark, Roskam’s use did not create a likelihood of confusion among consumers. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the generic quality of the mark.

Defendant entered a guilty plea to two counts of receiving and selling stolen firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(j) and 2(a). Although he claimed to have sold 16-17 guns, the presentence report attributed more than 200 firearms to defendant based on the total number of firearms involved in the theft underlying the conspiracy counts, resulting in a 10-level increase to the base offense level, USSG 2K2.1(b)(1)(E). Defendant did not physically participate in the theft and did not plead guilty to the conspiracy. Neither of the parties, nor the court, noted the discrepancy between the number of firearms charged in the indictment and the number admitted to by defendant during the plea hearing. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence. A guilty plea does not constitute an admission of facts included in the indictment that were not necessary to sustain the conviction, and defendant did not otherwise admit the facts in question.

About four years after a driver, insured by State Farm, collided with Phelps’s car and caused a spine injury that required surgery, Phelps filed suit, alleging that State Farm violated Kentucky’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm on the ground that Phelps had failed to show that the three years taken to settle her claim raised a genuine dispute as to whether State Farm had acted in bad faith. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting State Farm’s low initial offer, extensive delays, four transfers to new adjusters, and prolonged refusal to disclose policy limits.