Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Abdallahi entered the U.S. lawfully in 2000 as a visitor, remained longer than permitted, and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Those claims were withdrawn with his 2005 request for adjustment of status, following his marriage to a citizen. At a hearing, Abdallahi testified about his experience as a gendarme in the Mauritanian military, 1989 to 1998, stating that his duties required that he pour cold water on black prisoners, kick them, and ensure that they had no food or toilet access. Abdallahi witnessed others, including those ranked beneath him, mistreat prisoners. Abdallahi stated that he could not stop the acts, even though he thought them “against humanity,” because he feared they would torture him. Abdallahi was regarded as a black African. Abdallahi decided to leave Mauritania when his cousin disappeared, believing that the government would “eliminate” him. Over Abdallahi’s objections, the decision finding him inadmissible was made by an immigration judge who had not personally heard his testimony. The BIA affirmed, finding that he had “committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the commission of . . . any act of torture,” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(E)(iii). The Sixth Circuit denied review. . View "Abdallahi v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2005 Jones pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). He was classified as an armed career criminal based on three prior felony convictions and sentenced to a term of 188 months of imprisonment. One of those prior convictions was for reckless homicide under Kentucky law. His pro se motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 on the basis of Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) was denied. Holding that Jones qualified for equitable tolling of the limitations period, the Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing. The conviction for reckless homicide cannot be counted under the ACCA. View "Jones v. United States" on Justia Law

After Sharp was arrested on an unrelated warrant, police seized 154 grams of methamphetamine, 10.5 grams of marijuana and drug paraphernalia found inside a shaving kit on the seat of his car. When a police dog and his officer-handler arrived, the driver’s window of Sharp’s car was down. The dog sniffed the exterior of the vehicle, stopped, walked to the driver’s door, and, without formally alerting to the presence of narcotics, jumped through the open window, went into the back seat, then back to the front and looked up or alerted on the front passenger seat. The handler asked the dog to “show me,” and, with his nose, the dog poked the shaving kit on the front seat. Sharp, sentenced to 360 months in prison, appealed denial of his motion to suppress. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A dog’s sniff around the exterior of a car is not a search under the Fourth Amendment; the canine’s jump and subsequent sniff inside the vehicle was not a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the jump was instinctive and not the product of police encouragement View "United States v. Sharp" on Justia Law

The Legislative Ethics Commission conducted a hearing regarding fund-raising by Kentucky Senate President Williams, which attorney Berry attended. Following an executive session from which the public, the media, and Berry were excluded, the Commission dismissed. Berry wrote a letter criticizing disposition of the matter and disseminated copies to the media. The Inquiry Commission of the Kentucky Bar Association issued a warning asserting that the letter violated Kentucky Rule of Professional Conduct 8.2(a), which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer,” by publicly implying that the Commission did not conduct its review appropriately. The disciplinary complaint against Berry was dismissed. Berry did not appeal because Kentucky does not provide for an appeal of the Commission’s findings. Berry sued, alleging that he wished to engage in further criticism of the investigation but has refrained from such speech because he fears professional discipline. The district court granted the KBA summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed; Rule 8.2(a) is unconstitutional as applied to Berry’s speech.View "Berry v. Schmitt" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped by state troopers at the request of DEA agents who were watching a site and monitoring wiretaps while investigation a narcotics/Medicare fraud operation. Troopers discovered large bundles of currency and a suspended Michigan driver’s license in her purse. Between the car and the purse, troopers discovered over $11,000, cash, 39 bottles of codeine cough syrup, and mothballs. The incident report that indicated Defendant was pulled over for a vision obstruction (necklaces and air freshener hanging from rear view mirror) and was arrested based on the questionable status of her license and the illegal narcotics recovered from her vehicle; it did not mention the DEA’s investigation or instructions. Defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1); possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); and criminal forfeiture allegations, 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(C), 28 U.S.C. 2461(c), & 21 U.S.C. 853. The district court granted her motion to suppress. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Because DEA had reasonable suspicion to order the traffic stop and the collective knowledge doctrine applied, the initial stop was valid. Upon detaining defendant, troopers obtained probable cause to search the vehicle under the automobile exception. View "United States v. Lyon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to recover on behalf of themselves and similarly-situated employees and retirees of the City of Cincinnati the current value of the 870,021 shares of Anthem stock that the City received from Anthem’s demutualization. Plaintiffs asserted eight claims for breach of contract and four tort claims against Anthem and three breach of contract claims and four tort claims against the City. The district court certified the class: 2,536 people named as insureds, or former members of a group of insured persons, covered under a health care group policy from June 18 through November 2, 2001. The class included “Class A” members, who had an insurance policy with Anthem prior to its merger with Community in 1995 and “Class B” members who received a health insurance group policy after the merger. The court later dismissed. The Sixth Circuit, exercising jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), affirmed. Plaintiffs cannot recover any demutualization compensation; the City was the policyholder before the merger and maintained its policyholder rights post-merger through a grandfather clause, including any rights to demutualization proceeds. The 2001 demutualization process did not disrupt the City’s membership interests or confer any equity rights to Plaintiffs. View "Mell v. Anthem, Inc." on Justia Law

DiPonio Construction entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Union, which it subsequently terminated according to the terms of the agreement. DiPonio refused to bargain for a new agreement and sought a declaratory judgment. The district court held that even if it possibly had concurrent jurisdiction with the National Labor Relations Board to decide this issue, it would be inappropriate to exercise it, and imposed sanctions (attorney fees) against DiPonio under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The ultimate issue is whether the CBA was entered into pursuant to section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(f), or section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 159(a). If the CBA was a section 8 contract, DiPonio had no duty to negotiate for a new CBA; however, if it is a section 9(a) contract it did. DiPonio’s claims are clearly “primarily representational” and fall within the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB. View "DiPonio Const. Co., Inc. v. Int'l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers" on Justia Law

Bruederle had a severe seizure two days after being booked into the Louisville Metro Corrections jail on assault charges that were eventually dropped. The seizure was likely caused by withdrawal from the many powerful prescription drugs Bruederle was taking at the time to control his back pain. Because police arrested him after business hours on Friday, and he did not manifest an imminent danger of suffering withdrawal symptoms, Bruederle's request for these drugs could not be reviewed until the Monday after his arrest. Bruederle brought a “deliberate indifference” claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that no reasonable juror could find that the defendants violated the Due Process Clause. There is no per se constitutional objection to reasonable policies that regulate the access of prisoners to controlled substances, including prescription drugs. View "Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov't" on Justia Law

Jackson was convicted by an Ohio jury of two murders committed in 2002. The court sentenced him to two separate death sentences. The Supreme Court of Ohio on direct appeal vacated the death sentence for one of the murders based on the trial judge’s errors in limiting the voir dire, but it affirmed the other death sentence. The federal district court denied a habeas corpus petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the “difficulty” of Jackson’s claim that the trial court violated his right to due process of law when, after denying his counsel the right to question the jury concerning pretrial publicity, it denied his motion for a change of venue premised on the extraordinary pretrial publicity present in Lima, Ohio, the small community in which he was tried. There was no clearly established law governing the issue of what questions defense counsel is entitled to ask in order to examine jurors concerning non-racial bias against defendants accused of murdering a child. The court also rejected ineffective assistance claims. View "Cleveland Jackson v. Marc Houk" on Justia Law

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act guarantees returning veterans reemployment with their former employers and prohibits employers from discriminating against veterans based on their military service, 38 U.S.C. 4301–4335. Petty claimed that Metropolitan Government of Nashville-Davidson County violated USERRA in its treatment of him after he returned to Metro’s police department from active duty in the U.S. Army: Metro failed to restore him to his former position of patrol sergeant and discriminated against him on the basis of his military service. Metro had declined to reinstate him because of his alleged dishonesty concerning his military discipline history. Following remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Petty on his reemployment claims and ordered Metro to reinstate him to his former position as a patrol sergeant; the court awarded Petty back pay and partial liquidated damages on his reemployment claims and ruled in his favor on his discrimination claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Metro was on notice of its obligation to reinstate Petty, but never did so. View "Petty v. Metro. Gov't of Nashvlle & Davidson Cty." on Justia Law