Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in August, 2012
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Barbara, an analyst at the Cleveland Clinic, and Anthony, a stay-at-home father for two-year-old triplets and ten-year-old, filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 701. On Schedule B listing assets, they included a joint interest in “Anticipated 2009 Income Tax Refund,” value “unknown.” On their joint returns for 2009, they listed: adjusted gross income: $59,402; total tax liability: $2,934; total credits: $2,934; payroll taxes withheld: $6,777; and total federal tax refund: $8,542. On line 51, “Tax and Credits,” they listed $2,903 for the Child Tax Credit (CTC). On line 65, “Payments,” they listed $1,097 for additional CTC. They amended Schedule B, changing the unknown value of their tax refund. They specified $4,000 as the portion of their refund due to the CTC and $4,542 for the portion not due to the CTC. They amended Schedule C of the bankruptcy petition, to list the $4,000 portion as exempt pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2329.66(A)(9)(g). The Trustee objected, arguing that $2,903 of the CTC, the so-called “non-refundable portion,” was not exempt. The bankruptcy court sustained the Trustee’s objection, reducing the exemption to $1,907. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed View "Zingale v. Rabin" on Justia Law

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Goldberg, a medical malpractice attorney, appeared before Judge Maloney in several cases. Following complaints that Goldberg concealed assets and retained unearned fees, Maloney ordered Goldberg to pay the estates involved. Goldberg failed to do so. Maloney directed him to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. Following a hearing, Maloney found Goldberg to be in criminal contempt and cited Goldberg for attempting to suborn witnesses, charges that did not appear on the hearing notice. Goldberg received a sentence of 18 months. An Ohio appellate court affirmed. Before the Ohio Supreme Court, Goldberg argued for the first time that he had not received sufficient notice of the charges and ineffective assistance because his attorney failed to raise this notice claim. The Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. In 2004, the district court granted habeas relief on the basis that Goldberg received constitutionally inadequate notice. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Goldberg had procedurally defaulted on his lack-of-notice claim by failing to raise it in the state court of appeals. On remand, the district court determined that Goldberg had not demonstrated sufficient cause or prejudice to overcome the procedural default, and denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Goldberg v. Maloney" on Justia Law

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Benton, a pre-trial detainee was hospitalized for seizures. Benton resisted return to jail. Officers used double handcuffs, shackles, and a belly chain. Gray and others escorted Benton to the jail’s Medical Unit. Benton was supposed to be placed on a bed without restraints. Benton resisted and made threats. While Benton was restrained, Gray placed Benton in a carotid restraint or a “sleeper hold.” Benton lost consciousness. Gray ordered removal of Benton’s restraints. Officers heard choking sounds, but Gray did not stop. After the restraints were removed, Gray ordered the others to leave. Benton was silent and motionless when they left. Despite a requirement that officers seek medical attention when force is used or an inmate is injured, Gray did not inform medical personnel. Minutes later, a deputy entered Benton’s cell. Benton was not breathing. Benton was later declared brain dead. Following fabricated reports, Gray lied to Internal Affairs; the coroner pronounced death by natural causes. An external investigation began four years later due to statements by a correctional officer. The coroner changed her verdict to homicide. Convicted of civil rights violations, 18 U.S.C. 242, falsifying and making false entries in a document, 18 U.S.C. 1519, and making false statements to an FBI agent, 18 U.S.C. 1001, Gray received a below-guidelines sentence of 36 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Gray" on Justia Law

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In 2007, Fifth Third loaned Buford $406,000 in exchange for a mortgage on property that Buford purportedly owned. Fifth Third obtained a title-insurance policy from Direct Title, an issuing agent for Chicago Title. Direct Title was a fraudulent agent; its sole “member” was the actual title owner of the property and conspired with Buford to use that single property as collateral to obtain multiple loans from different lenders. When creditors foreclosed on the property in state court, Fifth Third intervened and asked Chicago Title to defend and compensate. Chicago Title refused to defend or indemnify. Chicago Title sought to avoid summary judgment, indicating that it needed discovery on the questions whether “Fifth Third failed to follow objectively reasonable and prudent underwriting standards” in processing Buford’s loan application and whether Direct Title had authority to issue the title-insurance policy. The district court granted Fifth Third summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that “When a party comes to us with nine grounds for reversing the district court, that usually means there are none.”View "Fifth Third Mortg. Co. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Tennessee law allows individuals with gun permits to carry handguns in public places owned or operated by the state (Tenn. Code 39-17-1311(b)(1)(H)) and defines a “handgun” as “any firearm with a barrel length of less than twelve inches” designed or adapted to be fired with one hand. Armed with a Draco AK-47 pistol, Embody went to Radnor Lake State Natural Area, near Nashville, on a Sunday afternoon. Dressed in camouflage, he slung the gun with its eleven-and-a-half-inch barrel across his chest with an attached loaded, 30-round clip. Embody anticipated attention and carried an audio-recording device. With assistance from police, a park ranger disarmed Embody at gunpoint to determine whether the AK-47 qualified under the law, releasing him about two-and-one-half hours later, after determining it was. Embody sued, claiming violations of Second, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted defendant summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The scope of the investigation was reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the stop. To the extent Embody argues that the Second Amendment prevents Tennessee from prohibiting certain firearms in state parks, qualified immunity applies. No court has held that the Second Amendment encompasses a right to bear arms within state parks. View "Embody v. Ward" on Justia Law

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In 2006, the Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless and Service Employees International Union, Local 1199 sued Blackwell, then Ohio Secretary of State, challenging provisions of Ohio’s 2006 Voter ID law under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The parties negotiated consent orders in 2006 and 2008. NEOCH and SEIU successfully sought attorneys’ fees with respect to the 2008 orders. The Ohio Secretary of State appealed the fee and cost award, and the parties ultimately negotiated a consent decree signed by the district court in April 2010. In June 2010, the plaintiffs again sought attorneys’ fees and costs, for work performed regarding prior motions for attorneys’ fees submitted in the litigation, during the appeal of the award of attorneys’ fees, and negotiating the consent decree. The district court granted the motion in part, but because it found that the motion regarded a supplemental fee request, it reduced the fee award to three percent of the award granted in the main case. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the state’s argument that the 2010 consent decree was a settlement in full of all of the plaintiffs’ claims, waiving any claim for further attorneys’ fees. View "NE OH Coalition for Homeless v. Sec'y of State of OH" on Justia Law

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In 2003, Berrington began working for Wal-Mart; he took several approved leaves of absence. In February 2007, Berrington began a leave that was approved through April, 2007. Berrington, did not return to work after April 30. Berrington claims that because of conversations he had with managers, he did not believe he needed to update or extend his leave. In mid-May, a personnel manager contacted Berrington and told him to update his paperwork, which Berrington did. Three days later, Berrington was informed that he was fired, but that he could be rehired after 90 days. Berrington applied for unemployment benefits. Wal-Mart opposed Berrington’s request on the basis that Berrington voluntarily terminated his employment by failing to return from a leave of absence. Wal-Mart’s paperwork recommended rehiring Berrington. While the dispute was pending Berrington reapplied, but Wal-Mart did not hire him. He reapplied a second time, without success. Since August 2007, the store has hired employees to positions for which Berrington is qualified. Berrington contends Wal-Mart refused to hire him because he filed for unemployment benefits, which he eventually received. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, declining “to carve an unprecedented category of public policy claims out of Michigan law.” View "Berrington v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

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Tingle alleged that she was disciplined and ultimately terminated from employment by the nursing home, in retaliation for speaking with investigators from the Ohio Department of Health following the death of a nursing home resident. She brought her claim under Ohio Revised Code 3721.24(A), which prohibits retaliation for participating in a Department of Health investigation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The employer claimed that the termination was justified by the company’s progressive discipline policy. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Once a defendant has advanced a non-retaliatory reason for terminating an employee, it is the plaintiff’s burden to come forward with evidence that would tend to undermine the legitimacy of that reason. Tingle’s allegations were insufficient to suggest that the defendants lacked an honest belief in their proffered reasons for their actions. View "Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, " on Justia Law

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Adkins, a state prisoner, sued corrections officer Wolever under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Wolever assaulted Adkins by yanking his hands through a slot in the cell door before removing his handcuffs. Before Adkins filed suit, an inspector at the prison reviewed color Polaroid photographs of Adkins’s injuries and stationary video footage of the area. During discovery, Adkins asked Wolever to produce photographs and video footage. Prison officials could not locate the video footage or the color photographs. Because Wolever produced only black and white copies of the original photographs and did not produce the video footage, Adkins asked the trial court to instruct the jury that it could presume that the missing evidence would be favorable to Adkins. The district court applied state law and denied the request; Michigan’s spoliation instruction required Adkins to demonstrate that the spoliated evidence was under Wolever’s control, which it was not. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The en banc court reversed, concluding that federal law governs spoliation sanctions in federal court litigation. On remand, the district court allowed the parties to conduct more discovery and held an evidentiary hearing, then concluded that Adkins was not entitled to the requested inference. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Adkins v. Wolever" on Justia Law

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Lexmark manufactures printers and toner cartridges. Remanufacturers acquire used Lexmark cartridges, refill them, and sell them at a lower cost. Lexmark developed microchips for the cartridges and the printers so that Lexmark printers will reject cartridges not containing a matching microchip and patented certain aspects of the cartridges. SC began replicating the microchips and selling them to remanufacturers along with other parts for repair and resale of Lexmark toner cartridges. Lexmark sued SC for copyright violations related to its source code in making the duplicate microchips and obtained a preliminary injunction. SC counterclaimed under federal and state antitrust and false-advertising laws. While that suit was pending, SC redesigned its microchips and sued Lexmark for declaratory judgment to establish that the redesigned microchips did not infringe any copyright. Lexmark counterclaimed again for copyright violations and added patent counterclaims. The suits were consolidated. The Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction and rejected Lexmark’s copyright theories. On remand, the court dismissed all SC counterclaims. A jury held that SC did not induce patent infringement and advised that Lexmark misused its patents. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of federal antitrust claims, but reversed dismissal of SC’s claims under the Lanham Act and certain state law claims. View "Static Control Components, Inc v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law