Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Debtor paid off a line of credit and a $28,000 loan from her parents and transferred her interest in the marital residence to her husband, Bruno. In a separation agreement, Debtor waived any claim to equity in the residence, about $27,500. Bruno agreed to pay the mortgage and retained four vehicles (marital property) plus three other vehicles and tracts totaling 60 acres, non-marital property. Debtor retained a 1999 Pontiac. Both waived claims to support and retirement accounts. Debtor later filed her chapter 7 no-asset petition, listing an $11,000.00 lien on the Pontiac and $60,763.48 credit card debt (both incurred during marriage). The Trustee filed an adversary complaint to recover the value of alleged fraudulent transfers, 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1)(B), 544, 550. Bruno argued that in a contested divorce, he would have likely received support, insurance and part of Debtor’s pension. The bankruptcy court concluded that Debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value and entered a judgment of $47,635.27. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value, but remanded to amend the judgment to $4,532.98. It was unnecessary to consider the likely outcome of a contested divorce; the issue was comparison of the value Debtor received with the value Debtor transferred. View "In re: Neal" on Justia Law

Boggio and wife, Sarah, resided in Texas. Boggio served military tours, and assigned Sarah power of attorney. They separated; Boggio left the state. Six months later Sarah purchased a car with financing through USAA. Sarah allegedly signed Boggio’s name, unbeknownst to him, on the check issued to the car dealership. The car was later listed on Boggio’s car insurance. The divorce decree confirmed that the car was acquired during the marriage, identified the associated loan as a marital debt, and stated that Sarah alone would be responsible for payment. Later, Boggio, residing in Cincinnati, experienced credit problems due to missed payments. Boggio wrote to consumer reporting agencies and USAA disputing his status as co-obligor. USAA attempted to mail Boggio (but not his counsel) a copy of the allegedly forged check, but the letter was sent to an incorrect Texas address. Because Boggio would not go to Texas to file a police report, USAA declared the dispute a civil matter between the Boggios. In Boggio’s suit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the district court granted summary judgment to USAA. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A reasonable jury could find that USAA’s investigation and notices were unreasonable.View "Boggio v. USAA Fed.l Sav. Bank" on Justia Law

Cleveland sued financial institutions, alleging that by securitizing subprime mortgages and foreclosing on houses, defendants allegedly contributed to declines in property values, shrinking tax base, and increased criminal activity, causing a public nuisance. The district court dismissed, finding preemption by state law and failure to demonstrate that defendants unreasonably interfered with a public right or were the proximate cause of alleged harm. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Cleveland filed another suit in state court against non-diverse institutions, alleging public-nuisance, violation of the Ohio Corrupt Activities Act, (RICO analogue), by inaccurately claiming title to mortgages and notes in foreclosures in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2923.32. Cleveland also sought to recover (Ohio Revised Code 715.261) costs incurred maintaining or demolishing foreclosed houses. While the case was pending, banks sought a declaratory judgment that Cleveland’s public-nuisance claim was preempted by the National Bank Act and an injunction against the suits. The district court suggested that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed. Subsequently, the state court dismissed Cleveland’s public-nuisance and OCAA claims; appeal is pending. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in the first case, so that declaratory relief is now moot. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to the second suit; the district court had jurisdiction.View "Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Clay was appointed as public records coordinator for the City of Memphis. The volume of public-record requests increased substantially during an FBI investigation into awards of city contracts. Clay claims that her efforts to comply with requests were thwarted by delays in response from city employees and even delays in requests for office supplies and a place for the public to review documents. Clay was also concerned with the conduct of various other employees, such as not reporting absences, and “issues regarding nepotism and favoritism based upon personal relationships.” Clay repeatedly raised her concerns to various officials. When a new mayor was sworn in, she began to suspect the new city attorney of abuse of policies and sought records concerning employees in that office. Clay’s employment was terminated and she sued, asserting violations of the Tennessee Public Protection Act, common law retaliatory discharge and wrongful termination, tortious interference with at-will employment, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, deprivation of constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, and violation of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to a First Amendment retaliation claim, but otherwise affirmed. View "Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, TN" on Justia Law

In 2001, Bridges was convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence; the court did not impose a term of incarceration, but sentenced him to one year of probation. In 2010, Bridges was indicted for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). Bridges moved to dismiss, arguing that he qualified for one of the exceptions to the firearm restriction, listed in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). The district court denied the motion and sentenced Bridges to 21 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. An individual who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is prohibited from possessing a firearm, except that a “person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an offense . . . if the conviction . . . is an offense for which the person . . . has had civil rights restored.” Under Michigan law, misdemeanants lose their civil rights only while confined in a correctional facility, Mich. Comp. Laws 168.758b.The Supreme Court has held that the “civil rights restored” clause in an analogous provision does not apply to an offender such as Bridges who lost no civil rights. View "United States v. Bridges" on Justia Law

In 2008 the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Detroit International Bridge Company was immune from the City of Detroit’s zoning ordinances because it was a federal instrumentality for the limited purpose of facilitating commerce over the Ambassador Bridge, which connects Detroit to Ontario, Canada. The federal government was not a party to the suit. Commodities Export, which owned property near the Bridge, later filed suit against Detroit and the United States, claiming that the Bridge Company had unilaterally condemned roads around its property, cutting off the land and causing a regulatory taking. It claimed that Detroit was liable for failing to enforce its own ordinances and demanded that the United States take a position on the Bridge Company’s federal-instrumentality status and control the Company’s actions. The United States cross-claimed against Bridge Company, alleging that it had misappropriated the title of “federal instrumentality.” The district court granted summary judgment for the United States and dismissed the action. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that federal courts have jurisdiction over the government’s cross-claim and owe no deference to the Michigan Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal common law. Bridge Company is not a federal instrumentality. View "Commodities Exp. Co. v. Detroit Int'l Bridge Co." on Justia Law

In 1997, 19-year-old Franklin beat his grandmother, grandfather, and uncle, set the house on fire and left them to die of blunt-force injuries or smoke inhalation. Franklin fled the scene in his grandfather’s car, taking his grandfather’s gun and his grandmother’s jewelry. The trial court found him competent; the jury found Franklin guilty on: seven aggravated arsons, two aggravated robberies, and six aggravated murders. The trial court sentenced Franklin to death and 91 years of imprisonment. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court merged the escaping-detection aggravator into the aggravated-robbery and aggravated-arson aggravators then independently reweighed aggravation and mitigation before determining that death was the appropriate sentence. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims: challenging the pretrial competency hearing and determination of competency; alleging ineffective assistance; challenging denial of a continuance after a defense arson expert died before testifying; challenging admission of “gruesome” photographs; that execution would constitute cruel and unusual punishment and would violate his Equal Protection and Due Process rights because he committed the crimes when he was mentally ill; and that the definition of “reasonable doubt” given in the guilt-phase jury instructions was constitutionally inadequate. View "Franklin v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

In 2008, Michigan passed the MMMA, Comp. Laws 333.26421, to protect medical marijuana. Any “qualifying patient” who possesses a registry identification card is not “subject to arrest, prosecution, or penalty of any manner, or denied any right or privilege, including but not limited to civil penalty or disciplinary action by a business.” Plaintiff was employed by Wal-Mart for five years before he was terminated after testing positive for marijuana, in violation of the company’s drug use policy. The test was administered on the day after Plaintiff injured his knee at work. Plaintiff was diagnosed with sinus cancer and an inoperable brain tumor at age 17; he experiences constant pain and side effects of medications. In 2008, Plaintiff’s oncologist recommended marijuana; Plaintiff obtained a registry card and maintains that he followed state laws, never used marijuana at work, nor did he work under the influence. Plaintiff sued in state court for wrongful discharge and MMMA violation; defendants removed to federal court based on diversity. The district court denied remand and dismissed. The court held that the store manager, a Michigan resident, was fraudulently joined and that the MMMA does not regulate private employment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the manager had no potential liability. View "Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

The Companies manufacture and distribute high-speed cigarette rolling machines that retailers offer to customers who want to roll their own roll cigarettes. Treasury and the Bureau are charged with enforcing the excise tax on tobacco products, 26 U.S.C. 5701. Before the Bureau issued Ruling 2010-4, retailers offering the Companies’ machines to customers were not liable for the excise tax because they were not considered manufacturers. The Ruling deems the retailers manufacturers, and requires them to acquire manufacturer permits and pay the excise tax. The Companies sought, and the district court granted, a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Ruling. During the pendency of appeal, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, which authorized funding for highways and other transit programs, with partial funding to come from amendment of the definition of “manufacturer of tobacco products” to include retailers who make roll-your-own machines available to customers, thereby achieving the same result as the Ruling. The Sixth Circuit vacated and directed that the case be dismissed. The statutory amendment mooted the controversy and the Anti-Injunction Act precluded the court’s exercise of jurisdiction View "Ryo Mach. Rental, LLC, v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury" on Justia Law

Otteren was driving behind his travel companion, Daggett, when Daggett made an illegal U-turn. As Otteren repeated Daggett’s U-turn, his vehicle cut off a motorcycle being driven by Rupert, resulting in his death. Rupert’s widow sued Daggett under the theory that the accident was a reasonably foreseeable result of Daggett’s own negligence because she knew Otteren was following her. The district court granted summary judgment to Daggett upon holding, under Michigan law, that Otteren’s operation of his own vehicle constituted a superseding, intervening cause that cut off any liability on Daggett’s part. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiff raised genuine issues of material fact as to each element of the prima facie negligence case. View "Rupert v. Daggett" on Justia Law