Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff is the surviving spouse of a 39-year AK employee, who died in 2008, then receiving a monthly pension benefit of $1,386. Plaintiff applied for the surviving spouse benefit and was advised that she was entitled to$693 (50%), reduced by 50% of her social security widow’s benefit (not yet determined), but not less than $140 per month. SSA first advised AK that plaintiff’s monthly benefit would be $458. Weeks later, SSA indicated that the widow’s benefit would be $1469. AK calculated the $140 benefit. Plaintiff received a statement from SSA indicating her widow’s benefit amount was $485 and plaintiff’s own earnings benefit was $973: a total monthly payment of $1,458. Plaintiff calculated that 50% of the $485 widow’s benefit, subtracted from $693, yielded a monthly benefit of $450.50 under the AK Plan. According to AK, $458 represented only the remainder of the entire widow’s benefit, $1,469, after offset for plaintiff’s own old-age retirement benefit, $1,011. In an action under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001, the district court awarded judgment to plaintiff. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that AK’s proposed interpretation of the plan language to be truer to its plain meaning when read with reference to the law it expressly refers to. View "Lipker v. AK Steel Corp." on Justia Law

Al-Mansoob filed a lawsuit concerning a traffic accident in July 2009. When he instituted Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings two months later, he did not list his claims against Malloy and Wilburn Archer Trucking, Inc. (Defendants), among his assets, but did list a suit against State Farm, arising out of the same accident. Upon learning of the omission, Defendants sought summary judgment, arguing that Al-Mansoob was judicially estopped from pursuing the claims. Relying on a Sixth Circuit case decided a few days before Al-Mansoob filed his response, the district court granted the motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that judicial estoppel should not apply to the trustee, who had been substituted as real party in interest, and that Al-Mansoob’s failure to disclose the case was inadvertent in any event. View "Al-Mansoob v. Malloy" on Justia Law

Stone owned STM, which owed Fifth Third about $1 million, secured by liens on business assets and on Stone’s house. Stone’s attorney, Atherton, introduced Stone to Waldman, a potential investor. Stone did not know that Atherton was indebted to Waldman and had given Waldman STM’s proprietary business data. Atherton filed STM’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition to preserve assets so that Waldman could acquire them. Atherton allowed the automatic stay to expire. Fifth Third foreclosed, obtaining judgments and a lien on Stone’s house. Waldman paid Fifth Third $900,000 for the bank’s rights. Waldman and Atherton offered to pay off Stone’s debts and employ him in exchange for STM’s assets and told Stone to sign documents without reading them, to meet a filing deadline. The documents actually transferred all STM assets exchange for a job. Ultimately, Waldman owned all STM assets and Stone’s indebtedness, with no obligation to forgive it. Waldman filed garnishment actions; Stone filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, alleging that Waldman had fraudulently acquired debts and assets. Atherton was disbarred. The bankruptcy court found that Waldman and Atherton had perpetrated “egregious frauds,” invalidated Stone’s obligations, and awarded Stone $1,191,374 in compensatory and $2,000,000 in punitive damages. The district court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the discharge, but vacated the award of damages as unauthorized. View "Waldman v. Stone" on Justia Law

American Freedom Defense Initiative is a nonprofit corporation that wanted to place an advertisement on the side of city buses in Michigan. The advertisement read: “Fatwa on your head? Is your family or community threatening you? Leaving Islam? Got Questions? Get Answers! RefugefromIslam.com”. Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART), refused to display the advertisement. AFDI sued, claiming a First Amendment violation. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, holding that plaintiffs likely could show that SMART’s decision was arbitrary. The Sixth Circuit reversed. SMART’s policy prohibits: political or political campaign advertising; advertising promoting the sale of alcohol or tobacco; advertising that is false, misleading, or deceptive; advertising that is clearly defamatory or likely to hold up to scorn or ridicule any person or group of persons; and advertising that is obscene or pornographic; or in advocacy of imminent lawlessness or unlawful violent action. The restrictions, which concern a nonpublic forum are reasonable, viewpoint-neutral limits that do not deny AFDI’s First Amendment rights. The injunction would cause substantial harm to others, compelling SMART to post on its buses messages that have strong potential to alienate people and decrease ridership; the public interest would not be served by this preliminary injunction. View "Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg'l Transp." on Justia Law

In 2008, Auday, age 47, started work at a Wet Seal store. In 2009, Wet Seal fired her. She claimed that the termination was unlawful and discriminatory. Days later, Auday filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing $510,725 in liabilities and $204,370 in assets, without mention of the age-discrimination claim, required by 11 U.S.C. 521(a)(1)(B)(i). Three months later, her lawyer (Pinchak) asked the trustee how to be hired to pursue the claim. Neither the trustee nor Pinchak informed the bankruptcy court, which discharged Auday in January 2010. In February, the trustee applied for authority to hire, Pinchak to pursue the claim against Wet Seal. The court granted the application, but the trustee did not hire Pinchak nor was the schedule amended. Auday later sued Wet Seal, seeking $500,000 in damages. The district court granted Wet Seal judgment, holding that failure to list a potential claim on her bankruptcy petition barred her from bringing the claim. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. When Auday filed for bankruptcy, her estate became the owner of all of her property, including tort claims that accrued before filing, 11 U.S.C. 541(a)(1) The trustee may bring the claim or abandon it, returning it to Auday, which would require notice to creditors View "Auday v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004 a jury convicted Middlebrook of assault with intent to murder, felony firearm possession, and unlawful driving away of a motor vehicle in connection with the shooting of his former girlfriend. On appeal, Middlebrook argued that he was denied a fair trial when the jury was exposed to extraneous influences and engaged in premature deliberations. The Michigan Court of Appeals determined that there were no extraneous influences; the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The district court denied federal habeas relief without addressing the issue of premature deliberations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The trial court conducted the necessary inquiry into the allegation of extraneous influences on the jury and the Supreme Court has not entertained a case involving premature deliberations. This is not a case where the state court unreasonably refused to extend a legal principle to a new context in which it should apply. View "Middlebrook v. Napel" on Justia Law

Mortgage banker Henry and 445 of his colleagues sued Quicken Loans, claiming failure to pay them overtime wages from 2003 to 2007, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201. Quicken responded that the mortgage bankers fell within an exemption to the FLSA. The district court entered judgment for Quicken. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, based on an FLSA exemption for employees, compensated at a rate of not less than $455 per week, whose primary duty is the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers, and whose primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. View "Henry v. Quicken Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

On October 29, 1994, people, including Gover, congregated at a house from which Ratliff and Hunter sold marijuana to discuss a robbery. Ratliff believed that “Ricky” and the stolen items could be found nearby. Ratliff and Hunter got in the front seat of a vehicle. Witnesses testified that the backseat occupants were Catchings and Gover. The car traveled to a house where people on the porch said that Ricky was not there. As the car left, a gun fired from the rear passenger window. Two people sustained non-fatal injuries, but a bullet killed nine-year-old Michelle. Witnesses testified that Gover said that he shot because someone laughed at him. The Lannette house was later fired upon. Officers detained Hunter and Ratliff. Ratliff implicated Gover. Officer Johnson testified to Ratliff’s statement. Officer Jamison testified to what he observed and what occupants told him about the shooting. Gover was sentenced to 60-100 years and unsuccessfully appealed and challenged rulings in Michigan courts. He filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition. The district court held that, while its introduction violated Gover’s Sixth Amendment rights, Johnson’s testimony relaying Ratliff’s statement was harmless and that Jamison’s testimony did not violate the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Gover v. Perry" on Justia Law

Hatcher is appealing his conviction for conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana. He moved to file his appendix under seal to prevent the public disclosure of personal identifying information. The government has not responded. The Sixth Circuit granted the motion in part, noting that the record contains limited redactable material. While documents filed in the appeals court generally must be made available to the public, documents sealed in the district court must continue under seal, 6th Cir. R. 25(h)(5). Documents whose privacy protection was governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49.1 are governed by the same rule on appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(5). Rule 49.1 permits redaction of certain personal identifying information, including social security numbers and home addresses, but does not permit redaction of court filings related to certain charging documents in criminal matters. The appendix at issue contains exhibits that were admitted during Hatcher’s sentencing hearing, but are not included in the record on appeal that apparently were not sealed before the district court and contain limited references to information permitted to be redacted under Rule 49.1. View "United States v. Hatcher" on Justia Law

In 1992, Haddad purchased a condominium. He timely paid association assessments and lived at the home until 2005. Since then, the condominium has remained vacant or leased. In October 2008, Haddad received a collection letter from the firm, representing the condominium association, stating that Haddad he was in default on $898 of association dues and that if the amount was not paid within 30 days, the association would commence proceedings for a lien against the condominium. In December 2008, Haddad received a second notice. Haddad timely responded to both, requesting verification of the debt. The firm did not verify the debts and recorded a Notice of Lien in May 2009. The condominium association eventually corrected its records. The lien was discharged in 2010. Haddad sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, and the Michigan Collection Practices Act (445.251), alleging violations of prohibitions on use of false, deceptive, or misleading representation and continuing collection of a disputed debt without verification of a debt incurred for personal rather than business purposes. The district court granted the firm summary judgment, holding that the assessments were not debts under the statutes because the property was a rental. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. View "Haddad v. Alexander, Zelmanski, Danner & Fioritto, PLLC" on Justia Law