Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ross and Burston were indicted for conspiracy to utter counterfeit securities and substantive counts related to the conspiracy. They gave counterfeit “official checks,” purportedly issued by Comerica Bank, to private vehicle owners and quickly resold the cars. Ross conceived the scheme and was primarily responsible for orchestrating it. Burston sold several vehicles. Before trial, Ross exhibited bizarre, paranoid behavior, causing withdrawal of three court-appointed attorneys. While represented by the third attorney, Ross moved to represent himself. The government sought a competency examination. The court denied the motions, with no finding as to Ross’s ability to represent himself, but later granted Ross’s motion and appointed standby counsel. The court subsequently held a competency hearing based on the report of a court-appointed psychologist and its own observations and found Ross competent to stand trial. A fourth attorney was appointed as standby counsel. Ross was sentenced to 60 months for conspiracy and 78 months for each substantive count, to be served concurrently. Burston was convicted of conspiracy, acquitted of the substantive count, and sentenced to 30 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to Burston, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Ross was unconstitutionally deprived of representation during his competency hearing.View "United States v. Burston" on Justia Law

The DeGroots divorced; Joel was ordered to pay child support. The court awarded Joy the residence and ordered Joy to pay $48,000 for Joel’s equity in installments. Joy paid $10,000.00. Joel later filed a no-asset chapter 7 petition, listing Joy’s claim of $10,336.33 for unpaid support and medical bills, but not listing the receivable or the lien as assets. Following negotiations, of which the trustee was aware, Joy waived claims to support and Joel released his lien. Neither sought relief from the stay. The Trustee filed notice claiming ownership of the lien for the estate (11 U.S.C. 541(a)(1)). Joy did not receive notice and, when the trustee notified creditors that there might be assets, did not file a claim because she believed it extinguished by the settlement. The trustee later reported no assets and the case closed. Joy attempted to refinance her mortgage and discovered the assignment of lien. The case was reopened (11 U.S.C. 350(b)). The Trustee agreed to subordinate his lien to that of the mortgage company in exchange for $5,000.00. The bankruptcy court concluded that, while the trustee may administer the $5,000.00, the balance should be deemed abandoned under 11 U.S.C. 554(c) and (d). The Bankruptcy Panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "In re: DeGroot" on Justia Law

Jones shot Lipford four times in a Memphis parking lot, and Lipford’s car was taken. The prosecution argued that the incident was a robbery and carjacking, while Jones and Washington described a drug deal gone bad and denied taking the vehicle. The jury found Washington guilty of carjacking without serious bodily injury and the court sentenced him to 180 months in prison. The jury returned guilty verdicts against Jones for carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury and for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a carjacking. The court sentenced him to 210 months in prison for the first count and 120 months for the second count. He was given sentencing enhancements for obstruction of justice (perjury) and for the infliction of a permanent or life-threatening injury. Both defendants’ sentences are within the guidelines. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly disallowed impeachment questioning on the basis of the victim-witness’s prior conviction for theft of services, because that crime did not involve a dishonest act for purposes of Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2). The district court did not abuse its discretion in its responses to jury questions or in its sentencing determinations. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

Carpenter pled guilty to the charge of failing to appear for sentencing (18 U.S.C. 3146(a)(1)). The district court sentenced him to 13 months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release. At the sentencing hearing, the court did not orally pronounce the conditions of supervision, and Carpenter’s counsel raised no objection to the imposed sentence. On the same day, in a written judgment, the court outlined conditions of supervised release. Special Condition 1 provides: The defendant shall participate in a program of testing and treatment for substance abuse, as directed by the probation officer, until such time as the defendant is released from the program by the probation officer, and shall pay a portion of the cost according to his ability, as determined by the probation officer. Rejecting a claim that the condition constituted an impermissible delegation of judicial authority, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Dawson hit his girlfriend and pointed a gun at her son, threatening to kill them. Police responded and saw Dawson discarding a stolen firearm. Dawson was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and possession of a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(j). Dawson moved to exclude testimony regarding the altercation. The trial court granted the motion to the extent of excluding references to “aggravated assault.” It instructed the jury that it could convict based on either actual or constructive possession. Dawson did not object to the instructions. Dawson argued that he should not be sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), because a 1993 conviction for attempted rape did not qualify as a violent felony and two 1988 convictions for violent felonies should count as only one predicate because they were based on a single event. The district court concluded that the 1993 conviction, a 2001 conviction for aggravated burglary, and one of the 1988 convictions qualified and, on remand, sentenced Dawson to 180 months, the ACCA statutory minimum, then denied a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. 2255, based on the admission of the assault evidence, the constructive possession instruction, and ineffective assistance. The Sixth Circuit rejected his appeal. View "Dawson v. United States" on Justia Law

Wells Fargo foreclosed on Frank’s home by advertisement. Frank is deceased and Mitan is the estate representative. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation purchased the home at a sheriff’s sale in February 2010, and the redemption period expired six months later. Two weeks prior to expiration, Mitan sued, claiming that the foreclosure was contrary to Michigan law. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court did not establish an adequate record to determine whether Wells Fargo complied with the law. If the foreclosure was void, Mitan’s rights were not terminated at the end of the redemption period. When a lender wishes to foreclose by advertisement on a principal residence, it must provide the borrower with notice designating a person whom the borrower may contact to negotiate a loan modification. Mich. Comp. Laws 600.3205a(1). If the borrower requests negotiation, the lender’s designated person may request certain documents. If negotiations fail, the designated person is required to apply statutory calculations to determine whether the borrower qualifies for a loan modification. If the borrower qualifies, the lender may not foreclose by advertisement unless the designated person offers a modification agreement that the borrower fails to timely return. View "Mitan v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp." on Justia Law

Police officers and an agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, on patrol in an unmarked car, observed that Defendant’s SUV did not have a front license plate, as required by Ohio law. They followed Defendant to the parking lot of an apartment complex where Defendant’s fiancé and children were known to reside. Defendant had already exited and had begun walking toward the building when the officers pulled up, turned on their lights, and ordered Defendant to turn around. Defendant walked back to his vehicle, and the officers could see that he was not carrying any weapons. Officers claim Defendant told them to “go ahead” and search; an officer immediately noticed a gun barrel behind the center console. Defendant was arrested for improper handling of a firearm in a vehicle and read his Miranda rights. Defendant had previously been convicted of bank fraud, for which he was serving supervised release. Defendant was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and sentenced to 41 months for the firearm conviction plus 12 months to be served consecutively for the violation of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction, but remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Cochrane" on Justia Law

In 1988, Thompson was murdered in Detroit. Bell was found guilty of felony murder and possessing a firearm while committing a felony. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. On appeal he argued that counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to interview two alibi witnesses and present them at trial. The conviction was affirmed on the merits by the Michigan Court of Appeals in 1992 and the state supreme court denied review. In 2006 Bell sought habeas corpus. Counsel was appointed and, while investigating, found what was believed to be material, relevant evidence not disclosed by the prosecution, in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The district court granted a stay and Michigan courts denied Bell’s claims on the merits. The district court granted Bell’s petition with regard to Brady and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court did not properly defer to the trial court with respect to the alleged Brady violation and that Bell did not prove that it was more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty. Equitable tolling was not appropriate; Bell’s ineffective-assistance claim remains precluded by AEDPA’s statute of limitations. View "Bell v. Howe" on Justia Law

Dorothy resided at the Landing assisted living facility from 2001 until 2007. She was 80 years old in 2007. She had Parkinson’s disease, dementia, and had suffered a stroke in 2001. She had no history of diabetes or hypoglycemia. She was able to groom herself, use the restroom, walk with a walker, and feed herself. An employee discovered Dorothy in an unresponsive state in her room. She spent 15 months in a semicomatose state before dying. Her son sued for negligence, violation of Ohio’s Patients’ Bill of Rights (OH Rev Code 3721.17), and wrongful death. He alleged that employees mistakenly gave Dorothy antidiabetic medication, which caused hypoglycemia and resulted in permanent brain dysfunction. Because he could not prove exactly how Dorothy received the medication, he requested a jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur, which the district court gave. The jury awarded $680,000 in compensatory damages and $1,250,000 in punitive damages, plus attorney fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to jury instructions on res ipsa and punitive damages and rejected a claim of judicial bias, but remanded with instructions to reduce the punitive damages award to $800,000. View "Freudeman v. Landing of Canton" on Justia Law

Erie County filed a purported class action on behalf of itself and other counties in northern Ohio, claiming that Morton and Cargill conspired to fix the price of rock salt in northern Ohio by geographically dividing the market and excluding competition, in violation of Ohio’s Valentine Act (Ohio Rev. Code 1331.01-1331.15), analogous to federal antitrust statutes, including the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1-7). The district court dismissed, finding that the alleged facts were just as consistent with lawful parallel conduct as with a conspiracy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The alleged “failure to compete” indicates no more than a natural and independent desire to avoid a turf war and preserve profits guaranteed by regional dominance. Erie County’s concession that it was not bound by the “Buy Ohio” law defeated its claim of conspiracy evidenced by submission of sham bids. View "Erie Cnty. v. Morton Salt Co." on Justia Law