Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stoudemire, then age 23, entered the Michigan Department of Corrections system in 2002, suffering from systemic lupus erythematosus, a chronic, painful autoimmune disease; hypercoagulapathy, a related disorder involving tendency to develop blood clots; and depression. Stoudemire bore a significant risk of experiencing kidney and liver damage, heart attacks, amputations, and chronic pain. Stoudemire’s health quickly deteriorated. She experienced a heart attack, liver failure, and life-threatening embolisms. She underwent three amputations, losing both legs below the knee. At her 2007 parole, she suffered from chronic depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and conditions related to medications. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132; and Michigan law, Stoudemire, alleged that she was placed in a segregation unit following her amputation that lacked accommodations for disabled persons, and was subjected to a strip search that served no legitimate purpose. The district court denied motions by the warden and an officer, seeking summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit vacated with respect to the warden, stating that the court did not adequately analyze deliberate indifference, but affirmed with respect to the officer, stating that the excessively invasive nature of the search outweighed any need to conduct it. View "Stoudemire v. MI Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Since enacting a program for black-lung benefits in 1969, known as the Black Lung Benefits Act,83 Stat. 742, Congress has repeatedly amended the claim-filing process, sometimes making it harder for miners and survivors to obtain benefits, sometimes making it easier. The most recent adjustment, part of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, reinstated a presumption that deceased workers who had worked for at least 15 years in underground coal mines and had developed a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment were presumed to be totally disabled by pneumoconiosis and to have died from it. The presumption is rebuttable. The Act also reinstated automatic benefits to any survivor of a miner who had been awarded benefits on a claim filed during his lifetime, 124 Stat. at 260. Groves, a miner for 29 years, filed a claim for benefits in 2006 and died four months later. An ALJ denied his widow benefits. The law changed while her appeal was pending. The Benefits Review Board concluded that the new law covered this claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Vision Processing, LLC v. Groves" on Justia Law

Having secured extensions, the Stockers filed their 2003 tax return in October 2004. In March 2007, the IRS settled an audit of an entity in which the Stockers had lost money. Flintoff, their tax preparer, determined that the Stockers had overpaid 2003 taxes by $64,058 and prepared an amended return, required to be filed within three years of October 15, 2004, 26 U.S.C. 6511(a). Stocker claims that he mailed it at the post office on October 15, but was unable to get date-stamped receipts, because of Flintoff’s failure to give him customer copies of certified mail receipts. Although simultaneous mailings were timely received, the IRS claims that it received the return on October 25; its records reflect that the envelope was postmarked October 19, but it did not retain the envelope. The return-receipt card, to be completed by the certified mail recipient, was left blank and returned to Flintoff, who unsuccessfully requested reconsideration of the refund claim. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Stockers could not establish the jurisdictional prerequisite of a timely-filed return under any method recognized in the Internal Revenue Code or precedent for determining the date of delivery of a federal tax return. View "Stocker v. United States" on Justia Law

Luedtke, a pro se federal prisoner, sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241, alleging that prison officials violated his Thirteenth Amendment rights by refusing to pay him the wages he earned in his prison job, failed to require all inmates to work, discriminated against white inmates in favor of black inmates and “illegal aliens from Mexico,” and improperly placed him on refusal status for the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. The district court dismissed under its screening authority, 28 U.S.C. 2243. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, stating that section 2241 is not the proper vehicle for a prisoner to challenge conditions of confinement. Luedtke’s fourth claim is cognizable under 2241 as a challenge to the execution of a portion of his sentence and the district court erred in dismissing it as unexhausted at the screening stage. Exhaustion is an affirmative defense, generally and in the context of prisoner lawsuits. Even under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, an inmate’s section 1983 claim “may not be dismissed at the screening stage for failure to plead or attach exhibits with proof of exhaustion.” The court denied Luedtke’s motion for appointment of counsel View "Luedtke v. Berkebile" on Justia Law

Petitioners are citizens of Mali who remained in the U.S. longer than authorized under their visitors’ visas. In 2006, Camara sought asylum and withholding of removal based on past persecution she suffered in the form of female genital mutilation (“FGM”); she listed her husband as a derivative applicant. She testified that she was unable to submit her asylum application by the one-year filing deadline because she and her husband had experienced medical problems. The IJ denied Petitioners’ applications, finding that Camara’s FGM constituted past persecution; however, he found that even if Camara’s illness was an “extraordinary circumstance” sufficient to excuse the filing deadline, Camara had failed to show she filed within a reasonable period. On remand, the IJ again rejected the applications. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, finding Kalle removable because: Camara’s lead asylum application was denied; Kalle never applied for individual relief; and withholding of removal is not available derivatively. The Sixth Circuit denied review, rejecting arguments that Kalle was denied due process when the Board failed to consider evidence of his intent to apply for individual withholding of removal and that withholding of removal ought to be available derivatively.View "Camara v. Holder" on Justia Law

Eleven plaintiffs who obtained home loans from Countrywide Bank, sought to challenge alleged racial disparities dating back to 2002 and resulting from Countrywide’s loan-pricing policy for home mortgages. The district court denied class certification, finding that the proposed class failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)’s commonality requirement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs challenged policies that grant broad discretion to local agents; they do not claim that a uniform policy or practice guides how local actors exercise their discretion, such that the corporate guidance caused or contributed to the alleged disparate impacts. To justify certification, class members must unite acts of discretion under a single policy or practice, or through a single mode of exercising discretion; the mere presence of a range within which acts of discretion take place will not suffice to establish commonality. View "Miller v. Countrywide Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

Catchings pleaded guilty to one count of identity theft; he had fraudulently opened personal credit-card accounts using his former clients’ personal information without their knowledge. When calculating the amount of loss pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1), district courts include losses stemming from relevant conduct under section 1B1.3. In Catching’s case, the district court included losses stemming from credit cards that were in the name of U.S. Investments & Construction, a business that Catchings started with a friend. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence. Relevant conduct under United States Sentencing Guidelines 1B1.3 must be criminal conduct to be relevant for the purpose of calculating a defendant’s guidelines range. The conduct involved in opening the U.S. Investments cards involved taking advantage of a trusting friend, but was not criminal. View "Unted States v. Catching" on Justia Law

Klie purchased property with financing from Coldwell Banker, which assigned its rights to the Federal National Mortgage Corporation (Fannie Mae) but continued to service the loan. The assignment was never recorded. In 2007, servicing rights transferred to JP Morgan. Coldwell Banker assigned its rights in the note and mortgage (none) to JP Morgan, which reassigned to Fannie Mae. Chase, an arm of JP Morgan, serviced the loan until Klie died. With the loan in default, Chase’s law firm, RACJ, prepared an assignment of the note and mortgage that purported to establish Chase’s right to foreclose and filed a foreclosure actionf, naming Glazer, a beneficiary of Klie’s estate. The court entered a decree of foreclosure, but later vacated and demanded that RACJ produce the original note. Chase dismissed the foreclosure without prejudice. Glazer filed suit, alleging that Chase and RACJ violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, and Ohio law by falsely stating that Chase owned the note and mortgage, improperly scheduling a foreclosure sale, and refusing to verify the debt upon request. Chase and RACJ moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that mortgage foreclosure is debt collection under the Act. View "Glazer v. Chase Home Fin. LLC" on Justia Law

Susan called 911, seeking help for her 21-year-old son, Andrew, who had “overdosed on some kind of drugs.” EMS personnel waited outside for police per township policy. Sergeant Hunt informed dispatch that he had previously arrested heroin addicts who lived at the address. Hunt was admitted by Andrew’s father and observed Andrew looking very pale. Learning that Hunt was a police officer, Susan demanded that Hunt leave. Hunt explained that rescue personnel have a duty to check the victim, but will not enter a home without a police officer. Susan told Hunt that she was a nurse and that there was no longer any need for EMS. Hunt left and waited in the driveway with medical personnel. Other officers arrived and demanded that the door be opened or that Andrew be sent outside to be checked out. The Strickers continued to resist. A state police dispatcher recommended forced entry to help Andrew, considering Andrew’s history as a heroin user. Assistant Prosecutor Riley agreed that a forced entry was warranted. The officers entered and handcuffed the parents while they administered care to Andrew. The district court granted defendants summary judgment in the Stricklers’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, finding that exigent circumstances justified all of the police’s actions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Stricker v. Twp. of Cambridge " on Justia Law

Sexton, a smoker, spent 25 years working in coal mines. He first applied for Black Lung Act (30 U.S.C. 901) benefits in 1973. The application was unsuccessful as were two other claims. In 2001, two years after the denial became final, Sexton filed a subsequent claim. The district director recommended an award of benefits. Buck Creek Coal requested a formal hearing. While his claim was pending Sexton died. His widow filed her own claim and the district director issued a proposed order awarding benefits in the survivor claim. Buck Creek requested a hearing. The administrative law judge considered four medical opinions, and based on that new evidence, determined that Sexton suffered a total disability from clinical and legal pneumoconiosis and that Sexton established a change in an applicable condition of entitlement pursuant to 20 C.F.R. 725.309 and awarded benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed with respect to Sexton’s claim and affirmed in part and vacated in part with respect to the survivor claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that 20 C.F.R. 725.309 is valid and was correctly applied and that the Board’s decision did not violate principles of finality or res judicata. View "Buck Creek Coal Co. v. Sexton" on Justia Law