Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Manning, a lawyer who served as the executor of Barney’s estate and the trustee of a trust for Mrs. Barney, set up accounts at National City Bank, one for the estate and one for the trust. He then wired funds, totaling about $1,250,000, from the bank accounts into the account of his business in violation of his fiduciary duties. Manning’s business failed and Manning confessed to Mrs. Barney that he had absconded with the money from the two accounts. The estate, trust, and Mrs. Barney sued Manning’s law firm in state court, but the suit was rejected on summary judgment. The Barneys then sued the successor to National City Bank to try to recover the money Manning stole. The district court dismissed, citing the affirmative defense of Ohio’s version of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the Barneys failed to plead facts giving rise to an inference that the Bank committed any wrongdoing. View "Estate of Barney v. PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs allege that Greene performed as an exotic dancer at a 2002 party at Detroit’s mayoral residence and that Mayor Kilpatrick’s wife arrived unexpectedly and assaulted Greene. Months later, Greene was shot to death. Stevenson, initially leading the investigation, claims that rumors indicated that Greene’s death and the incident at the mansion were connected. Other officers told Stevenson that she “might get shot like Tammy.” There was some evidence of a coverup. The case was reassigned to the Cold Case squad, earlier than usual for such a transfer. Stevenson later testified that she was about to pursue leads that would have led to questioning people close to the mayor. Stevenson and others were allegedly transferred to inferior positions without credible explanation. Stevenson’s house was broken into twice, and she repeatedly observed officers near her residence. The Cold Case squad encountered many impediments and the investigation was inactive for years. Greene’s murder has not been solved. The minor children of Greene filed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims of conspiracy to deny and denial of access to the courts. The district court entered summary judgment for the city and the mayor. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding exclusion of evidence of the firing of a former deputy chief and of alleged interference with an investigation by the state, and jury instructions concerning the city’s destruction of evidence. View "Flagg v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Kentucky provided medical care to its poorest citizens through Medicaid (42 U.S.C. 1396-1) using a traditional fee-for-service model until 2011, when it transitioned to a managed-care program and awarded Coventry a contract to administer Medicaid services in southeastern Kentucky. Coventry entered into a temporary agreement with Appalachian, the dominant hospital care provider in that area, to provide members in-network hospital care and other services. Coventry soon realized it was losing money, partly because its network included Appalachian, whose patients, on average, were sicker and more expensive to treat. Coventry learned that its competitors were not required to contract with Appalachian and unsuccessfully sought an increase in payment rates. Coventry then noticed termination of Appalachian’s contract, which would have made thousands of Medicaid recipients unable to access healthcare providers at Appalachian’s facilities without first paying fees. Appalachian sued Coventry and state defendants. The district court required Coventry to keep Appalachian in its network for four months longer than the contract specified (until November 1, 2012) and denied Coventry’s motion to require Appalachian to post a security bond. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the bond and otherwise dismissed an appeal as moot because no recognized exception permits review of an expired injunction. View "Appalachian Reg'l Healthcare, Inc. v. Coventry Health & Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2004 Wallace financed a home purchase with a $272,315 mortgage. He took a second mortgage of $164,500 for improvements and to pay down debt. In 2006, Wallace sought a refinance loan of $422,500. Midwest obtained an appraisal from Brock, through the now-defunct Accupraise. A former Accupraise employee explained that Midwest would send a requested appraisal value and Brock would return a tailor-made appraisal, often without seeing the property. Accupraise and Brock valued Wallace’s home at $500,000. Unbeknownst to Wallace, his refinance was an adjustable-rate mortgage that allows negative amortization; he had a teaser rate of two percent that quickly multiplied. For securing a high long-term interest rate, Midwest received a premium in excess of $14,000. The loan created insurmountable financial problems for Wallace. He learned that the true 2006 value of his home was $375,000. Wallace declared bankruptcy, surrendered the home, and sued alleging that he was the victim of a fraudulent scheme violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and Kentucky conspiracy law. Mediation produced a settlement, under which Wallace prevailed on a RESPA claim. The district court granted defendants partial summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed a finding that Wallace did not sufficiently demonstrate that the appraisal proximately caused his financial injuries, but otherwise affirmed. View "Wallace v. Midwest Fin. & Mortg. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Under the Medicaid program, the federal government offsets some state expenses for medical services to low-income persons; a state’s plan must cover medical assistance for specific populations, but a state may expand its Medicaid program by obtaining a waiver for an “experimental, pilot, or demonstration project.” In 1993, Tennessee obtained a waiver for TennCare, to cover uninsured and uninsurable individuals. Following approval, hospitals received reimbursement under the umbrella of TennCare. Because hospitals serving large numbers of low-income patients generally incur higher costs than Medicaid flat payment rates reflect, hospitals that treated a disproportionate share of low-income patients could apply for the “DSH” adjustment. A fiscal intermediary processed requests for reimbursement, including DSH adjustment payments. Due to discrepancies between the practices of fiscal intermediaries in different states, the Secretary issued a 2000 rule, providing that eligibility waiver patients were to be included as individuals “eligible for medical assistance” under Medicaid for purposes of DSH adjustment calculations. The 2005 Deficit Reduction Act ratified the rule. Adventist, a not-for-profit hospital network, provided more than 1,200 patient care days to TennCare expansion waiver patients 1995-2000. The fiscal intermediary did not include those days in calculating the adjustment. The Secretary’s Provider Reimbursement Review Board upheld the exclusion. The district court dismissed, concluding that section 1315 provided the Secretary discretion to exclude expansion waiver patient days from the DSH calculation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Army Corps of Engineers issued two nationwide general permits that authorized surface and underground coalmining operations to discharge dredged and fill material into waters of the United States. The Corps conducted a public notice-and-comment period and completed a cumulative-impacts analysis that projected the permits’ respective environmental impacts before determining that compensatory mitigation would reduce adverse impacts to a minimal level. The Corps disclosed its analyses and findings in each permit’s Environmental Assessment in lieu of an environmental impact statement. Riverkeeper sued, alleging violations of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344(e), the National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706, during the Corps’ issuance of two nationwide coal-mining waste-discharge permits in 2007. The district court granted summary judgment to the Corps. During Riverkeeper’s appeal, the permits at issue expired. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the case remains in controversy and reversed in part. Although the Corps repeatedly objected to the feasibility of Riverkeeper’s demands, in taking the “easier path” of preparing an environmental assessment instead of an environmental impact statement the Corps failed to follow CWA and NEPA regulations by documenting its assessment of environmental impacts and examining past impacts. View "KY Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Rowlette" on Justia Law

Dotson was charged with sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). Prior to trial, the government sought to enter a redacted version of the statement Dotson gave to the authorities following his arrest. Although Dotson requested that the statement be admitted in its entirety, the district court ruled that the redacted portions were inadmissible. A jury convicted Dotson on both counts, and the district court sentenced him to a prison term of 22 years. The Sixth Circuit upheld the evidentiary ruling, stating that omitted statements, indicating that Dotson had a rough upbringing and had been sexually abused as a child; that he considered his girlfriend to be a “blessing” and had intended to marry her, and his concern that the victim knew he was exploiting her, did not make any fact of consequence related to the statutory offenses more or less probable than it would have been without them. The court vacated certain conditions of supervised release in the sentence, relating to computer use and drug testing, because the district court did not articulate a rationale for imposing some of the conditions. View "United States v. Dotson" on Justia Law

Seven affiliated debtors are entities that conducted deep and strip coal mining and operated coal prep plants and loading facilities in three states. The bankruptcy court authorized joint procedural administration, but not substantive consolidation. The administrative expense claims at issue arise from environmental damage. The land and the coal were subject to leases that terminated before commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. The West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP) issued mining permits and National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits to the debtors and affiliated entities for the operations. The bankruptcy court denied WVDEP’s application for administrative expenses against two debtors. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that the court failed to properly analyze the debtors’ potential liability for reclamation obligations associated with permits owned by their affiliate. WVDEP’s administrative expense claims were properly denied to the extent they were based on derivative liability for the debts of the affiliate, either based on veil piercing or substantive consolidation. The court abused its discretion in denying the claims that were based on direct liability for reclamation obligations associated with the permits owned by the affiliate and in denying claims that were independent of the threshold question of joint and several liability for reclamation obligations associated with the permits owned by an affiliate. View "In re: Appalachian Fuels, LLC" on Justia Law

Sejdini and his family are from the former Yugoslavia. In 1987, Sejdini, then less than a year old, entered the U.S., traveling with his mother by boat from Canada. In 1999, the government placed Sejdini in removal proceedings. In 2003, an immigration judge granted Sejdini a special-rule cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, which in 1997 had amended the Immigration and Nationality Act. In 2010, Sejdini was convicted in Michigan state court for possession of Vicodin and ecstasy, for which he received a prison sentence of 18 months to 10 years. The government began removal proceedings; Sejdini applied for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the INA, but the immigration judge barred him, from applying for this relief because he had already received cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Act. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, concluding that cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Act is cancellation of removal under section 240A of the INA. View "Sejdini v. Holder" on Justia Law

Dodd, an African-American mail carrier for the U.S. Postal Service, was the subject of an investigation for failing to deliver mail. He was arrested and held for seven days before charges were dismissed. He filed suit, alleging claims of false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and of race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed Dodd’s FTCA claim because it determined that the claim was preempted by the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. 2301, and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on Dodd’s Title VII claim because Dodd failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to the FTCA claim, noting that the Civil Service Reform Act does not apply to postal employee, but affirmed with respect to the Title VII claim. View "Dodd v. Potter" on Justia Law