Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Weixels filed a Chapter 7 petition; they were not eligible for relief under Chapter 13 due to the amount of their debt. The bankruptcy court dismissed, 11 U.S.C. 707(b)(1), (2) and (3), after considering bank statements, showing that when the Weixels’ bank account had been repeatedly overdrawn, they continued to spend money on entertainment and the trustee’s conclusion that the Weixels, with budget adjustments, had monthly disposable income of $2,308. The, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, rejecting arguments that the bankruptcy court failed to consider the Weixels’ scheduled priority tax debt and their household’s future housing expense. View "In re: Weixel" on Justia Law

Bistline pled guilty to knowingly possessing 305 images and 56 videos of child pornography on his computer, many of which depicted 8- to 10-year-old girls being raped by adult men. His recommended Guidelines sentence was 63 to 78 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Bistline to a single night’s confinement in lockup, plus 10 years’ supervised release. The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that Bistline’s guidelines range should have been “the starting point” for considering the factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and that the court was entitled to consider Bistline’s age, health, and family circumstances, but that those could not justify the sentence imposed. On remand, the district court again imposed a sentence of one day’s confinement and 10 years’ supervised release, stating: “If I have got to send somebody like Mr.Bistline to prison, I’m sorry, someone else will have to do it. I’m not going to do it.” The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for reassignment and resentencing. View "United States v. Bistline" on Justia Law

Mendoza drove a truck from North Carolina to Tennessee with Tavera as a passenger. The truck contained construction equipment. A large quantity of methamphetamine was hidden under nails. The truck was stopped after being followed as part of a sting operation. At trial, Tavera, a roofer, testified that he did not know about the drugs and that he thought he was going to Tennessee to view a construction project. Tavera was convicted of participating in a methamphetamine drug conspiracy and sentenced to 186 months of imprisonment. He subsequently learned that days before the trial Mendoza had participated in plea negotiations in which he told Taylor, the prosecution’s trial lawyer, that Tavera had no knowledge of the drug conspiracy. Mendoza later pled guilty and changed his story. Tavera filed an appeal and a year later moved for a new trial in the district court. The district court has not ruled on the motion. The Sixth Circuit vacated the conviction, based on the “Brady” violation, calling the case “not close,” and recommended that the U.S. Attorney’s office conduct an investigation of why the prosecutorial error occurred. View "United States v. Tavera" on Justia Law

Daley opened an IRA with Merrill Lynch, rolling over $64,646 from another financial institution. He signed a contract with a "liens" provision that pledged the IRA as security for any future debts to Merrill Lynch. No such debts ever arose. Daley never withdrew money from his IRA, borrowed from it or used it as collateral. Two years later, Daley filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and sought protection for the IRAs, 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(3)(C). The trustee objected, contending that the IRA lost its exempt status when Daley signed the lien agreement. The bankruptcy court and the district court ruled in favor of the trustee. The Sixth Circuit reversed. An IRA loses its tax-exempt status if the owner "engages in any transaction prohibited by section 4975 of the tax code. There are six such transactions, including “any direct or indirect” “lending of money or other extension of credit” between the IRA and its owner, 26 U.S.C. 4975(c)(1)(B). Daley never borrowed from the IRA, and Merrill Lynch never extended credit to Daley based on the existence of the IRA. View "Daley v. Mostoller" on Justia Law

Hrivnak filed a purported class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692–1692p, and Ohio consumer-protection law, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1345.01–.99, 4165.01–04, seeking statutory, compensatory, and punitive damages exceeding $25,000, and injunctive and declaratory relief. The suit was based on the conduct of debt management companies and a law firm in dunning hi on credit card debts. The defendants made an offer of judgment of $7,000 plus costs and attorney’s fees, under Civil Rule 68. Hrivnak rejected the offer. The district court rejected the defendants’ claim that the offer rendered the suit moot. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, characterizing defendants’ argument as asserting that claims with little to no chance of success should be dismissed as moot whenever they are mixed in with promising claims that a defendant offers to compensate in full. View "Hrivnak v. NCO Portfolio Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law

Stafford was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and sentenced to 262 months of imprisonment. His guideline calculation was enhanced based on armed-career-criminal status; the fact that the firearm was stolen; possession of a firearm in relation to a felony offense; and reckless endangerment during flight from law enforcement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the verdict and that the district court did not err in allowing gunshot-residue evidence or related expert testimony. The court properly applied the the Armed Career Criminal Act enhancement and enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines. The sentence was procedurally reasonable and the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act is not void for vagueness. View "United States v. Stafford" on Justia Law

Cleveland has had an age-65 mandatory retirement policy for police and fire department personnel since 1960. The policy allowed the chief of police or the fire department to allow a person to continue on active duty on a year to year basis, subject to approval of the Director of Public Safety, following independent medical evaluation. Extensions were routinely granted until 2010, when budget cuts caused lay-offs and the police chief denied all requests. The fire department continued to grant extensions. Former officers, forced into retirement, alleged violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621., Ohio’s age discrimination statute, Ohio Rev. Code 4112, and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Federal law includes an exception that allows state and local governments to set mandatory retirement ages for firefighters and law enforcement officers; the city established that its retirement plan exists for the efficiency of the police department and is not a subterfuge to evade the Act. View "Sadie v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

The debtor worked Saylor’s nightclub and for another entity owned by Saylor, scouting for commercial properties. Debtor obtained loans ($1,018,350) to purchase four Michigan car washes. The loan closings were conducted by another company controlled by Saylor, acting as agent for the title company, which never released loan proceeds to complete the purchases. After the debtor defaulted, Bayview, assignee of the notes, discovered that he did not hold title to the properties securing the notes. Bayview filed claims under the title commitments. The title company claimed that the loan applications contained false statements and denied the claim for failure to exercise due diligence in approving the loans. Bayview sued and the parties settled; Bayview assigned an interest in the notes to the title company, which obtained a default judgment of $10,172,840 against Saylor. The debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The title company filed an adversary complaint claiming that the Bayview notes were undischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(B). The bankruptcy court rejected the argument, holding that under Michigan law, claims for fraud cannot be assigned and that the title company had the right to pursue Saylor, but not the debtor. The district court reversed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the title company can seek nondischargeability under section 523(a)(2) View "Pazdzierz v. First Am. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Brigance worked as a coal miner for 20 years, until he stopped working in 1994 because of shortness of breath, which prevented him from obtaining other employment. Brigance obtained Kentucky state black lung benefits, which expired after about eight years. Brigance sought federal benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. An administrative law judge held that the claim was not barred by the Act’s three-year statute of limitations, 30 U.S.C. 932(f). The Benefits Review Board affirmed an award of benefits. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Brigance admitted that he had a medical determination of total disability (pneumoconiosis) seven years before filing his claim. View "Peabody Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp." on Justia Law

Janosek owns a business that makes welded ring products. The business uses water to cool hydraulics used in the process. In or before 1999 Janosek installed closed loop water chillers that he hoped would recapture the water and significantly decrease water consumption. Instead of seeing a decrease in his water bills, Janosek continued to pay in excess of $150,000 a year until 2002, when the bills dropped to between $10,000 and $25,000 a year. Janosek suspected that he had been over-charged based on the Cleveland Water Department practice of estimating water consumption. Cleveland’s Moral Claims Commission, established to consider monetary claims that Cleveland is not legally obligated to pay, held a hearing, without notifying Janosek, and denied the claim. The district court dismissed Janosek’s case, finding that claims of unjust enrichment, taking without just compensation, and negligence were barred by the statute of limitations, and that a due process claim concerning the lack of notice failed because Janosek had not identified a valid property interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Any legitimate property interest that Janosek had in the overpayments lapsed with the running of the limitations period. View "Janosek v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law