Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Juvenile Court standing order provided that social workers had authority to remove and provide temporary emergency care for children at imminent risk of serious physical or emotional harm and to request assistance by law enforcement officers. At a 2002 meeting, social workers determined that exigent circumstances required immediate removal of the children from Nancy’s home. A Temporary Emergency Care Order was completed in consultation with an assistant prosecuting attorney and a supervisor. A social worker, accompanied by police, went to Nancy’s home and took the children into temporary custody, and, the next day, filed a complaint for abuse, neglect, and temporary custody, with a notarized document detailing supporting reasons. A magistrate found that probable cause existed to support removal. In November 2005, Nancy and the children sued the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services, the social workers, and others. In 2010, the district court granted in part and denied in part the social workers’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of absolute immunity, denied the social workers’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and granted the children partial summary judgment on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to both absolute and qualified immunity. View "Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Dayton Title brokered real estate closings and had a trust account at PNC Bank for clients’ funds. In 1998-1999, Dayton facilitated bridge loans from defendants to Chari, from $1.9 million to $3.2 million, for commercial real estate purchases. Defendants would deposit funds into Dayton’s PNC account, which Dayton would transfer to Chari. Chari’s loan payments would pass through Dayton’s account. The first six bridge loans were paid, but not always on time. Defendants provided Chari another bridge loan, for $4.8 million. After the due date, Chari deposited a $4.885 million check into Dayton’s account. The PNC teller did not place a hold on the check. On the same day, Dayton “pursuant to Chari’s instructions” issued checks to defendants. PNC extended a provisional credit for the value of Chari’s check, as is standard for business accounts. After the checks were paid, PNC learned that Chari’s check was a forgery drawn on a non-existing account, exercised its right of “charge back” on the Dayton account, and regained about $740,000 of the provisional credit. Dayton was forced into bankruptcy. Chari declared bankruptcy and was convicted of racketeering, fraud, and forgery. Dayton’s bankruptcy estate and PNC sued, seeking to avoid the $4.885 million transfer to defendants as fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. 548 and Ohio Rev. Code 1336.04(A)(2). The bankruptcy court held that all but $722,101.49 of the transfer was fraudulent. The district court held that all but $20,747.13 of the transfer was not fraudulent. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, reinstating the bankruptcy court holding. Dayton did not hold the provisional credit funds in trust; the funds were not encumbered by a lien at the time of transfer. The funds were “assets” held by Dayton, so the transfer satisfied the statutory definition of “fraudulent.” View "In re: Dayton Title Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Ramos, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the U.S. without inspection or authorization in 2009, at the age of 14. In removal proceedings, he sought asylum and withholding of removal, claiming that, in El Salvador, members of a gang had begun attempting to recruit him when he was 11 years old and had threatened to beat him if he refused to join. Neither Ramos nor acquaintances, having refused to join, were physically harmed by gang members. A member of the gang was arrested for the murder of a neighbor child who had stolen gang property. An Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals found that Ramos had not established membership in a particular social group protected under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Sixth Circuit denied review, noting that the social visibility of a particular social group refers to whether those with the relevant shared characteristic are perceived as a group by society, rather than whether the group’s individual members are visually recognizable “on-sight.” View "Umana-Ramos v. Holder" on Justia Law

The Thomas M. Cooley Law School, accredited by the ABA, enrolls more students than any other U.S. law school and plans to expand. Cooley charges full-time students tuition of $36,750 per year, exclusive of other costs, and, according to U.S. News & World Report, has the lowest admission standards of any accredited law school. The school has a very low retention rate. In a 66-page complaint, 12 graduates claimed that the school disseminated false employment statistics, upon which they relied as assurances that they would obtain full-time attorney jobs after graduating. The graduates did not obtain the kind of employment the statistics advertised; some found employment at all. They claimed that, had they known the truth, they would not have attended Cooley or would have paid less tuition, and sought, among other relief, partial tuition reimbursement, which they estimated for the class would be $300,000,000. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Michigan Consumer Protection Act does not apply to the facts. The complaint shows that one of the statistics on which they relied was objectively true and reliance on the statistics, without further inquiry, was unreasonable. View "MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School" on Justia Law

Kinds was assaulted and threatened by her live-in boyfriend. She requested time off to find a new place to live, but did not have vacation time available and was not eligible for Family and Medical Leave Act leave because she had worked less than 1,250 hours for her employer during the previous 12 months, 29 U.S.C. 2611(2)(A). The company granted her one week of discretionary leave. She returned to work for about a month, after which she was eligible for FMLA leave. She applied for leave the following day and returned part-time about two months later. Her employer notified the administrator of its short-term disability insurance plan. Three weeks into her leave, a licensed independent social worker diagnosed Kinds as having a severe depression episode. Following approval of disability benefits for part of Kinds’s absence, her employer approved the period after her diagnosis for FMLA leave and asked Kinds to submit medical certification for the period that was not approved. Neither Kinds nor her healthcare providers timely submitted documentation. After an extension, the employer denied FMLA leave, determined that Kinds’s absence during the period at issue was unexcused, and terminated Kinds’s employment. The district court dismissed her FMLA lawsuit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Kinds v. OH Bell Tel. Co." on Justia Law

Hogg, charged with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine and possession with intent to distribute an unspecified quantity of cocaine, pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine and was sentenced to 188 months of imprisonment. He sought to withdraw his plea, based on newly-discovered evidence of criminal charges against the prosecution’s lead detective and violation of Fed.R.Crim.P.11(b)(1)(H)-(I) by incorrectly advising him of the penalty range for the offense to which he pled guilty. The court denied both arguments. On appeal, Hogg argued that the government offered him an inducement that was not included in his written plea agreement and that he was entitled to sentencing under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. The court had applied provisions in effect at the time he committed his offense. The Sixth Circuit remanded to allow withdrawal of the plea. Neither the court nor counsel correctly anticipated the effect of the new enactment on the statutory penalty range for the offense to which Hogg pled guilty. The court cautioned, “be careful what you wish for,” because in exchange for the deal Hogg wants to reject, he was allowed to plead guilty to an offense involving significantly less crack cocaine than he admitted responsibility for in his agreement. View "United States v. Hogg" on Justia Law

Capozzi, a federal prisoner, rolled out of a transport van and fled. Personnel pursued him, firing shots. Two days later agents discovered Capozzi hiding in a wooded area. He was indicted for escaping from custody, 18 U.S.C. 751(a) and sought to present a defense of necessity, arguing that he faced an imminent risk of death or serious bodily injury due to post-traumatic arteriovenous fistula originating from a chest stabbing. Capozzi claims that he believed that escape at that moment was his only chance at saving his life. The district court denied the motion and refused to instruct the jury on the defense. During deliberations, the jury submitted a note stating that without a transcript it could not make a decision. The court gave a supplemental instruction designed for deadlock, to which neither party objected. After additional deliberation, the court concluded that the jury was deadlocked, polled the jurors, and over Capozzi’s objection, declared a mistrial. A retrial was scheduled, but Capozzi pled guilty. The government objected to a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The court found that because the government did not move for a reduction, Capozzi was entitled only to a two-level reduction and sentenced Capozzi to 51 months, the top of his Guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Capozzi" on Justia Law

Nichols, a Tennessee state prisoner awaiting execution, had an “oppressive and forlorn childhood, due to his father’s abuse, his mother’s illness, their poverty, and the church-dominated society into which he was born” in 1960. Nichols graduated high school; he enlisted in the Army in 1981. He was discharged two years early. In 1984, he pled guilty to burglary and assault with attempt to rape. A psychological report found nothing remarkable. He married and had a stable relationship. In 1987 Nichols returned to jail for a prowling conviction and parole violation. He was released and returned to his wife and job. He began disappearing at night. Following rapes or attempted rapes of 12 women (Pulley died as a result) in 1988-1989, police received an anonymous tip identifying Nichols. Police showed photo-arrays to four victims, each of whom identified Nichols immediately. Nichols waived counsel and Miranda rights and videotaped a confession to four rapes. After being allowed to sleep, Nichols confessed to other rapes. Additional victims identified Nichols. Nichols directed a detective to recover the board used to murder Pulley. Nichols’s wife stated that Nichols had confessed to her. A Ph.D. and an M.D. found Nichols competent to stand trial. State courts rejected his appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief. In 2005 DNA testing confirmed Nichols as the source of sperm on Pulley’s clothing. The district court rejected his federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance and multiple procedural arguments. View "Nichols v. Heidle" on Justia Law

Carpenter sued Flint, a councilwoman and the mayor, based on Carpenter’s termination from his position as Director of Transportation, asserting age and political discrimination, breach of contract, wrongful discharge, gross negligence, defamation, and invasion of privacy. Defendants argued that the complaint failed to identify which claims were alleged against which defendants, and that the allegations were “excessively esoteric, compound and argumentative.” Carpenter did not respond by the court’s deadline, and about five weeks later, a stipulated order entered, permitting Carpenter to file an amended complaint by April 21, 2011. Counsel manually filed an amended complaint on May 20, 2011, violating a local rule requiring electronic filing. The clerk accepted the filing, but issued a warning. Carpenter failed to timely respond to a renewed motion to strike. Carpenter responded to a resulting show-cause order, but failed to abide by local rules. Another warning issued. Carpenter’s response to a second show-cause order was noncompliant. The court warned that “future failure to comply … will not be tolerated.” After more than five months without docket activity, the court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Defendants bore some responsibility for delays and the length of delay does not establish the kind of conduct or clear record warranting dismissal; lesser sanctions were appropriate. View "Carpenter v. City of Flint" on Justia Law

Shweika applied for naturalization in 2004. Three years passed without review. Shweika obtained a writ, compelling USCIS to complete review by May 30, 2008. On May 29, 2008, USCIS denied the application because Shweika failed to provide certified copies of expungement documents to meet his burden to establish good moral character. Shweika sought a hearing. Although regulations require that USCIS schedule a hearing within 180 days of a timely request, 10 months passed. Shweika returned to the district court, which found that mandamus was unnecessary, but did not dismiss. The immigration officer conducted a de novo review, contrary to Shweika’s expectations, asking about a conviction from 1992, and allegations by Shweika’s ex-wife suggesting domestic violence. Shweika’s attorney asked to stop the hearing because the inquiry exceeded the scope of appeal; the officer refused. On advice of counsel, Shwika left. USCIS denied Shweika’s application on the record before it. Although noting that USCIS equivocated over whether denial was on the merits or for failure to prosecute, the district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit vacated, reasoning that that the 8 U.S.C. 1421(c) hearing requirement is nonjurisdictional, but that Shweika was not free to disregard the requirement, if he did so. View "Shweika v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law