Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Denson was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). One month later, he was detained for allegedly supplying a shotgun to an informant who planned a robbery. Denson pled guilty to the felon-in-possession charge and a probation officer prepared a presentence report that identified two state felony convictions that increased the base-offense level, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2), 4B1.1, 4B1.2. Denson objected to inclusion of an Ohio conviction for inciting to violence as a predicate crime of violence. The district court reasoned that the Ohio incitement statute meets the career-offender guideline’s requirement of “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” The court also rejected Denson’s argument that his sentencing range should be reduced because he accepted responsibility, stating that it was “hard to imagine something” that could negate acceptance of responsibility more than another firearm offense involving the sale of a shotgun to a would-be felon. The district court imposed a sentence of 72 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The facts of the Ohio conviction necessarily establish that the species of incitement to which he pled guilty isa crime of violence. The district court properly declined to apply an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. View "United States v. Denson" on Justia Law

Grand Resort, which has operated in the Great Smoky Mountains since 1982, claims that TripAdvisor’s publication of a survey that concluded that Grand Resort was the dirtiest hotel in America caused irreparable damage to its business and that TripAdvisor used a flawed rating system that distorted actual performance and perspective. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the “dirtiest hotels” list is protected opinion; it reflects TripAdvisor’s users’ subjective opinions and is not capable of being defamatory. The court rejected a motion to amend to add claims of trade libel-injurious falsehood and tortious interference with prospective business relationships to the claims of false light-invasion of privacy and of defamation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that amendment of the complaint would be futile. View "Seaton v. TripAdvisor, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2006, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of more than 50 grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); the plea agreement stated that his offense involved 109 grams of cocaine base and that, “The parties agree to recommend that the Court impose a sentence within the range determined pursuant to the advisory Sentencing Guidelines in accordance with the computations and stipulations set forth in this agreement.” The district court accepted the plea. Defendant was subject to a statutory minimum sentence of 240 months of imprisonment because the prosecution moved for a downward departure for Defendant’s substantial assistance to its investigation. The district court granted further reductions for acceptance of responsibility and timely indication of intent to plead guilty, yielding an advisory range of 130 to 162 months. The court imposed a sentence of 130 months. Four years later, Fair Sentencing Act amended the cocaine base sentencing statute (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)). The district court found Defendant ineligible to have his sentence reconsidered. The Sixth Circuit vacated, to “give effect to Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent that the amended Guidelines achieve consistency.” Plugging the new statutory minimums and amended Guidelines into Defendant’s original sentencing formula would yield a sentence of 70 months. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

Droganes is a Kentucky fireworks dealer. In 2007, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) agents raided his business on suspicions that he was illegally selling “display” fireworks and seized more than 800,000 pounds of merchandise, only part of which proved to be contraband. Display fireworks are more powerful than consumer fireworks and are subject to greater regulation. Droganes pleaded guilty to distributing explosives without a license (18 U.S.C. 842(a)(1)) and agreed to forfeit the seized items determined by ATF to be display fireworks.” The government tendered a proposed forfeiture order encompassing all such fireworks, which the district court accepted. Droganes objected to the breadth of the order and the classification standard the government used to classify the fireworks and sought monetary sanctions for alleged failure to return the legal fireworks in a timely manner or to reimburse him. The district court rejected all of his claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court’s determination of forfeiture was consistent with Droganes’s plea agreement. The court acknowledged the “seemingly interminable delays in testing the seized fireworks, many of which the government knew not to be display fireworks.” View "United States v. Droganes" on Justia Law

Greektown, the owner of a Detroit casino, and affiliates filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court confirmed a reorganization plan and named a trustee. Before the plan became effective, the bankruptcy court authorized unsecured creditors to file a fraudulent transfer action under 11 U.S.C. 544 and 550 and the Michigan Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, alleging that Greektown incurred $185 million dollars of debt and simultaneously transferred approximately $177 million to several transferees, including the Tribe. The complaint alleged that the Tribe directly received $6 million and that $145 million transferred to others indirectly benefitted the Tribe because the Michigan Gaming Control Board had required the Tribe to pay this amount to those others if Greektown failed to do so. The Trustee and the Tribe later agreed to a settlement, under which the Tribe would pay $2.75 million and relinquish approximately $2.58 million in claims it had filed, conditioned upon the bankruptcy court’s entering a bar on further claims “arising out of or reasonably flowing from” either the fraudulent transfer proceeding or the allegedly fraudulent transfers themselves. The district court approved the settlement and entered the bar order over objections. Finding the order overly broad, the Sixth Circuit remanded for the court to consider whether the outcome of the actions covered by the bar order would affect the bankruptcy estate. View "Papas v. Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC" on Justia Law

After a physical altercation in 1993, his wife (Carol) told O’Neal and his sons to leave the house. She filed a domestic complaint and planned to change the locks. O’Neal later returned to the house, broke through the front door and fired three shots Carol, one of which fatally wounded her. Carol’s son alleged that O’Neal also attempted to shoot him but that the gun jammed. A police canine unit later found him hiding in a nearby house where he surrendered. He confessed to the shooting. A forensic examination linked the bullet removed from Carol’s body to the pistol in O’Neal’s possession at the time of his surrender. Convicted of aggravated murder, O’Neal was sentenced to death. Ohio courts affirmed and denied post-conviction relief. A federal district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that three sub-70 IQ scores were insufficient on their own to prove O’Neal had significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. The court rejected claims, aimed at the aggravated burglary specification, that O’Neal received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to present the actual lease to support his assertion of contractual privilege to enter the house, and of spousal privilege. View "O'Neal v. Bagley" on Justia Law

Three-month-old Jiyen was killed when 11 shots were fired into his home in a drive-by shooting. Prosecution witnesses testified to overhearing Drummond, discussing a retribution for the death of a fellow gang member, seeing Drummond with an assault rifle 15 minutes before the fatal shots were fired, and to hearing Drummond say that “he didn’t meant [sic] to kill the baby. A search of Drummond’s house yielded ammunition consistent with the shooting and a variety of items tying him to the gang. During the trial, the court twice closed the courtroom, once stating that witnesses felt threatened by some of the spectators. A jury found Drummond guilty on all counts; the trial court sentenced Drummond to death. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State courts denied post-conviction relief. A federal district court granted habeas corpus in part, holding that the state trial court violated Drummond’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Drummond’s family was removed from the courtroom after objection without any explanation regarding the scope of the closure and without considering any alternative options. View "Drummond v. Houk" on Justia Law

An officer pulled over a car with expired tags. Booker was a passenger. The officer smelled marijuana. The driver told the officer that he could search the vehicle. The officer had previously arrested Booker and recovered 13 bags of marijuana concealed in his crotch. A drug-sniffing dog alerted near Booker. During a pat-down, the officer noticed that Booker clenched his buttocks, but found no drugs. Booker’s pockets contained large amounts of currency. A search of the front passenger seat revealed plastic bags: one contained .06 grams of marijuana, the others had residue. The officer arrested Booker for felony possession, despite not recovering enough marijuana to justify such an arrest under Tennessee law. At the police station, Booker fidgeted and tried to barricade himself in the room. During a strip search, officers observed a string protruding from Booker’s anus. Booker’s efforts to conceal the item led to an altercation. Booker was shackled and covered in a blanket for transport to the hospital. Although Booker denied having anything in his rectum, had normal vital signs, and refused to submit to a digital rectal examination, the doctor, who claimed to believe that Booker’s life was in danger, sedated him to perform an examination and removed a rock of crack cocaine, greater than five grams, from Booker’s rectum. The Sixth Circuit reversed Booker’s conviction. The unconsented procedure while Booker was under police control must be attributed to the state for Fourth Amendment purposes and “shocks the conscience.” View "United States v. Booker" on Justia Law

National contracted to produce “Kids Fun Day” events before 2010 Cleveland Indians games, including a collapsible inflatable slide. National purchased a required comprehensive liability insurance policy naming the Indians as additional insureds, from NHIC through an independent broker, CSI. On the application a box was checked, indicating use of a “bounce houses or inflatables.” A “Certificate of Liability Insurance” issued six weeks before the slide collapsed, causing a death. Neither National nor the Indians had received the full policy at the time of the accident. After the accident, National learned that, despite its specific application request, CSI had failed to procure a policy that expressly covered inflatables. In an email exchange, an employee of CSI stated, “Oh, ok. Sorry, I guess I missed it.” Later CSI stated: “inflatable’s [sic] are excluded on the policy you purchase[d] from us. Whoever own the inflatable’s [sic] are [sic] to carry insurance on them and name you … I don’t believe I’ve ever seen you indicate on your applications that inflatable’s [sic] are at your events, but please note, the exclusion is listed on the quotes we sent over to you.” The district court found NHIC not liable to the Indians and that CSI could not be liable in negligence. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to CSI and remanded the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims. View "Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. v. NH Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Broz started a cellular telephone business by organizing a wholly owned S corporation, RFB, in 1991 and purchasing an FCC license to operate a cellular network in Northern Michigan. Broz expanded by organizing additional entities. Alpine and limited liability companies that are taxed as partnerships, were formed to hold and lease FCC licenses. Alpine never operated on-air networks. For the years at issue, Broz deducted: flow-through losses of Alpine on his personal income taxes, on the grounds that he had debt basis in, and was “at risk” with respect to, Alpine; interest, depreciation, startup costs, and other business expenses of the Alpine entities; and the amortization cost of the FCC licenses held by the Alpine entities. The IRS Commissioner determined a deficiency of $18 million in Broz’s income tax filings for the tax years at issue, finding that Broz had insufficient debt basis in Alpine o claim flow-through losses, that Broz was not at risk with respect to investments in the Alpine entities, that the Alpine entities were not entitled to interest, depreciation, startup expense, and other business-related deductions because they were not engaged in an active trade or business. The Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Broz v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law