Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Grayson was indicted for conspiracy to distribute powder and crack cocaine and other drugs, 21 U.S.C. 846; 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Grayson pled guilty, reserving the right to appeal the determination that his 2004 Michigan conviction for “maintaining a drug house” qualified as a “prior felony drug offense” under 21 U.S.C. 802(44); the enhancement doubled his five-year mandatory minimum sentence. The Michigan law requires that the defendant knew that the structure at issue was used for keeping or selling drugs, the defendant had some general control over the structure, and that he maintained the structure. Violation is punishable by up to two years in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the enhancement requires a defendant to have been convicted of a drug offense involving possession or distribution, rather than simply aiding others. View "Unted States v. Grayson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, working for Defendant since 1967, was a brakeman on a crew taking a freight train from Defendant’s Cleveland yard to Medina County, Ohio, in 2006. At a Valley City stop, Plaintiff operated a ground switch to move the alignment of the track. Plaintiff stood behind the switch and operated it for 30 minutes to an hour. Witnesses testified and pictures indicated that the ground where Plaintiff worked was muddy and was not covered with ballast. Plaintiff had to urinate while operating the switch and planned to urinate outside, rather than in the toilet compartment of the locomotive, because he found that compartment to be “dirty” and “unusable.” Once Plaintiff completed his tasks, he began to walk from the switch to a field behind the tracks. Within steps of the switch, Plaintiff slipped and twisted his knee. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a torn right meniscus and underwent surgery to repair the cartilage. The district court rejected jury verdicts in favor of Plaintiff on his claims under the Federal Employers Liability Act and the Locomotive Inspection Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding sufficient proof of causation between the jury-determined violations under FELA and LIA and Plaintiff’s injuries. View "Szekeres v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Suits consolidated under 28 U.S.C. 1407 alleged antitrust violations of price fixing and dividing markets by the manufactures of cooling compressors. The district court dismissed the claims of some of the indirect-buyer plaintiffs and declined to enter a final judgment under Civil Rule 54(b) or to certify an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the order did not amount to a “final” decision from which the dismissed plaintiffs may appeal. When a single action involves multiple claims or multiple parties, a ruling that disposes of only some claims or only some parties is ordinarily not “final;” the rule is not different for consolidated multi-district cases. View "In re: Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees of Coca-Cola, suffered work-related injuries and applied for workers’ compensation benefits through Sedgwick, Coca-Cola’s third-party benefit claims administrator. Sedgwick disputed the claims. Plaintiffs claim that Coca-Cola and Sedgwick “engaged in a fraudulent scheme involving the mail . . . to avoid paying benefits to injured employees,” and filed suit under the civil remedies provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c). The district court dismissed. On rehearing, en banc, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs did not plead an injury to their “business or property” that is compensable under RICO. The RICO theory advanced in this case would throw the viability of workers’ compensation schemes into doubt; RICO “does not purport to afford remedies for all torts committed by or against persons engaged in interstate commerce.” The Michigan workers’ compensation scheme provides ample mechanisms by which the employee can contest denials. View "Jackson. Segwick Claims Mgmt. Servs." on Justia Law

Bennett was walking her dog in Garfield Heights, Ohio when she was struck on the left knee by a vehicle driven by Pastel. The accident threw Bennett onto the car’s hood. Bennett sued Pastel’s insurer, State Farm, which characterized as “ridiculous” her assertion that she was an “occupant” of the car, as that term is defined by State Farm’s policy, at the time she was on the vehicle’s hood. The district court granted summary judgment to State Farm. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The policy defines “occupying” as “in, on, entering or alighting from.” The court stated that “we have no reason to explore Bennett’s relationship with the car… the policy marks out its zone of coverage in primary colors.” View "Bennett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins." on Justia Law

Youngstown Police receiced a call reporting that a man driving a black Jeep Cherokee was attempting to sell firearms at an auto parts store. The caller identified himself as a store employee and provided the vehicle’s Pennsylvania license plate number. A few hours later, officers encountered a Jeep with a license plate number matching the earlier report. Seeing it turn without signaling, they initiated a felony traffic stop, drawing their weapons, and patting down the occupants. Gray was driving. The vehicle was registered to passenger Hockenberry; neither had a valid driver’s license. There were active arrest warrants for occupant Hunt. The officers did not allow Hockenberry to call someone to retrieve the vehicle before having it towed; the officers performed an inventory search, pursuant to policy. They saw a handgun case and the barrels of long guns. The vehicle also contained tools and drug paraphernalia. An officer admitted there were items in the vehicle that were not inventoried. One week later the officer obtained a warrant and conducted another search, stating that he had received information that there might be stolen property in the vehicle. He found a crow bar and bolt cutters. After denial of a motion to suppress, Hockenberry and Gray pleaded guilty as felons in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Finding that both were armed career criminals,r 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the district court sentenced Hockenberry to 204 months imprisonment and Gray to 216 months imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, but remanded Hockenberry’s sentence. View "United States v. Gray" on Justia Law

Lukas owns stock in Miller, a publicly owned corporation engaged in production of oil and natural gas. In 2009, Miller announced that it had acquired the “Alaska assets,” worth $325 million for only $2.25 million. Miller announced several increases in the value of the Alaska assets over the following months, causing increases in its stock price. In 2010, Miller amended its employment agreement with its CEO (Boruff), substantially increasing his compensation and giving him stock options. The Compensation Committee (McPeak, Stivers, and Gettelfinger) recommended the amendment and the Board, composed of those four and five others, approved it. In 2011 a website published a report claiming that the Alaska assets were worth only $25 to $30 million and offset by $40 million in liabilities. In SEC filings, Miller acknowledged “errors in . . . financial statements” and “computational errors.” The stock price decreased., Lukas filed suit against Miller and its Board members, alleging: breach of fiduciary duty and disseminating materially false and misleading information; breach of fiduciary duties for failing to properly manage the company; unjust enrichment; abuse of control; gross mismanagement; and waste of corporate assets. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Lukas brought suit without first making a demand on the Miller Board of Directors to pursue this action, as required by Tennessee law, and did not establish futility. View "Lukas v. McPeak" on Justia Law

AmEx is the world’s largest issuer of traveler’s checks, which never expire. AmEx and third-party vendors sell the checks at face value, and AmEx profits by investing the funds until the TC is redeemed. Although most are cashed within a year, AmEx uses the remaining uncashed checks for long-term, high-yield investments. Until recently, every state’s abandoned property laws presumed abandonment of uncashed traveler’s checks 15 years after issuance. This presumption requires the issuer to transfer possession of the funds to the state. In 2008 Kentucky amended KRS 393.060(2) to change thes abandonment period from to seven years. AmEx claims violation of the Due Process Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Takings Clause. Following a remand and amendment of the complaint to add a dormant Commerce Clause argument and a claim that the legislation did not apply retroactively to checks that were issued and outstanding prior to the effective date, the district court granted the state summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the amendment applies only prospectively and does not violate the Commerce Clause. View "Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc. v. Hollenbach" on Justia Law

Kennedy family members own a controlling interest in corporate entities that comprise Autocam. John Kennedy is Autocam’s CEO. The companies are for-profit manufacturers in the automotive and medical industries and have 661 employees in the U.S. The Kennedys are practicing Roman Catholics and profess to “believe that they are called to live out the teachings of Christ in their daily activity and witness to the truth of the Gospel,” which includes their business dealings. Regulations under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), 124 Stat. 119, require that Autocam’s health care plan cover, without cost-sharing, all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization, and patient education and counseling for enrolled female employees. Autocam and the Kennedys claim that compliance with the mandate will force them to violate their religious beliefs, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb. The district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed for lack of standing. Recognition of rights for corporations under the Free Speech Clause 20 years after RFRA’s enactment does not require the conclusion that Autocam is a “person” that can exercise religion for purposes of RFRA. View "Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

McCloud pled guilty to distributing 19.4 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841,was released on bond, and failed to appear for sentencing. After evading law enforcement for more than three years, McCloud was captured and sentenced to 140 months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release. Between McCloud’s plea and sentencing, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) was enacted, reducing the statutory sentencing range applicable to McCloud from 5–40 years to 0–20 years. McCloud’s counsel did not object to use of the pre-FSA range at sentencing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence as reasonable. Although the court erred in using the pre-FSA statutory range, that error did not affect McCloud’s substantial rights because it is highly unlikely that a proper statutory range with no effect on the Guidelines range would have changed the imposition of a within-Guidelines sentence. View "United States v. McCloud" on Justia Law