Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tillman filed suit pro se, alleging that Macy’s discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of Title VII when it terminated her employment in 2009. Macy’s filed a motion to compel arbitration, based on a claimed agreement between the parties to participate in a dispute-resolution program called Solutions. The Solutions process had four steps, the last of which is binding arbitration. After the May’s store at which she had worked since 2001 was acquired by Macy’s, Tillman received a document describing the Solutions process and noting that employees were automatically “covered” by arbitration by virtue of continuing employment, but could opt out of binding arbitration. Tillman’s packet was mailed and was not returned as undeliverable. Tillman stated that she did not receive it. In 2006, Tillman attended a mandatory video describing the Solutions Program. Tillman does not deny receiving a brochure distributed at the meeting. In 2007, Macy’s sent another brochure that stated that she had the entire Solutions program, specifically including Step 4 Arbitration. Tillman stated that she did not receive this mailing. Macy’s sent another Election Form and brochure. Tillman did not return the form; again claiming that she did not receive it. The district court denied Macy’s motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Macy’s provided sufficient notice of its offer to enter into an arbitration agreement, and Tillman accepted by continuing her employment and not returning either opt-out form. Arbitration should be required, notwithstanding the absence of an employee-signed agreement. View "Tillman v. Macy's Inc." on Justia Law

Selby is serving a life sentence for murder, a two-year sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and a sentence for attempted escape from prison. Michigan prison authorities confined Selby in administrative segregation for almost 13 years based on a determination that he posed a serious escape risk. Selby served most of those years in a maximum security facility. Correction officials released Selby into the general prison population about 18 months after he filed a pro se suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he had been confined in segregation and denied access to worship services without meaningful review and in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the RLUIPA claim, but held that summary judgment was not appropriate on the due process claim. There were material disputes of fact, including whether Selby’s four misconduct reports over 10 years supported the decision to retain him in administrative segregation, whether the decision to override his qualification for a lower security classification in 2010 was warranted, and whether the aging escape history justified continued restraint in administrative segregation. View "Selby v. Caruso" on Justia Law

In 1997, the Miami Township police department fired Sergeant Young for allegedly forcing sex on a woman while on the job; the termination was overturned by an arbitrator. The arbitrator concluded that the department had not proven its allegations, noting that DNA samples from the scene did not match Young, that Young and his accuser had been in a relationship, and that the accuser had a history that cast doubt on her credibility. In 2010, the newspaper published the statement “Young had sex with a woman while on the job” in an article about the suspension of another officer. Young sued for defamation and obtained a $100,000 verdict. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence for a jury to decide that the editor knew that the accusation was probably false and published it regardless. View "Young v. Gannett Satellite Info.Network, Inc." on Justia Law

The Youth Re-Entry Program helps young people re-enter society after foster care or juvenile detention. About 80 percent of its members are black. The program moved to the Cleveland suburb, Lakewood, to house clients in apartments in Hidden Village. Lakewood’s building commissioner (Barrett) took the position that this was a prohibited institutional use. The program nonetheless moved into Hidden Village. Barrett ordered removal, but the planning commission reversed his decision. The police department sent officers a memo stating that “[c]itations and arrests are the preferred course of action for violations ... in the vicinity of [Hidden Village].” Program participants began complaining about harassment, such as tickets and astronomical fines for jaywalking, failure to attach a license plate to a bicycle, and walking on railroad tracks. The mayor stated that he intended to remove the program. Police, an officer in SWAT attire, a canine unit, and fire and health department workers visited Hidden Village, unannounced and without a warrant, to conduct a “joint inspection.” Another fire inspection followed a week later. Hidden Village sued, 42 U.S.C. 1981-1983. The Youth Program did not participate. The district court denied the defendants summary judgment and held that individual defendants did not enjoy qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Hidden Village produced evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that defendants discriminated on the basis of race. View "Hidden Village, LLC v. City of Lakewood, OH" on Justia Law

Clark was shot and killed outside of his Detroit home. Months later, Peoples, Powell, and Harris, were arrested after leading police on a chase in a stolen Jaguar. According to the report written by an officer who witnessed the crash that ended the chase, Harris was the driver. Police found the gun used to kill Clark on the driver’s side floor of the Jaguar. Only Peoples was tried for murder. The only evidence connecting him to the crime was the gun and the testimony of Powell and Harris, that Peoples was the driver and was sitting closest to the gun, which Peoples owned, and that Peoples told them about killing Clark. Both received lower sentences on car theft charges because of their cooperation. Defense counsel did not cross-examine them on those points and did not call police officers to testify about who was driving the car. Peoples received a sentence of life imprisonment. He exhausted state remedies. The district court denied his habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit partially reversed, holding that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to impeach the credibility of the witnesses based on known false testimony; the state court’s determination to the contrary was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.View "Peoples v. Lafler" on Justia Law

Allied, a union contractor, sued local unions, claiming that the unions colluded to withhold otherwise available job-targeting funds from Allied. The job-targeting-fund program provided union contractors with money to enable the employers to lower bids on certain jobs so that union contractors could have a competitive advantage over non-union contractors. Under the program, Local 7 collected dues from its members, including Allied employees, to subsidize union contractors who were part of the program. In 1998, Local 7 made job-targeting funds available for a job for the Kalamazoo Red Cross. Although Allied had previously received job-targeting funds from Local 7, the union did not allow Allied to receive funds for the Red Cross job and for other projects. Allied believed that it was denied funds because it had not signed a collective-bargaining agreement with the plumbers and pipe-fitters union. The district court dismissed and the NLRB later determined that bringing the federal suit constituted an unfair labor practice that interfered with employees in the exercise of rights to organize and engage in collective bargaining. The Sixth Circuit denied the NLRB’s petition for enforcement, rejecting an argument that Allied lack an objective basis for the suit. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Allied Mech. Serv." on Justia Law

Miller and his pastor Wellons wanted to buy investment land for $790,000. Miller formed Fellowship, with eight investment units valued at $112,500 each, to purchase the land and recruited investors. Miller and Wellons did not purchase units, but Miller obtained a 19.5% interest as Fellowship’s manager and Wellons obtained a 4.5% interest as secretary. Miller secured $675,000 in investments before closing and obtained a loan from First Bank, representing that DEMCO, one of Miller’s development companies, needed a $337,500 loan that would be paid within six months. Because DEMCO pledged Fellowship’s property, First Bank required a written resolution. The resolution contained false statements that all Fellowship members were present at a meeting, and that, at this nonexistent meeting, they unanimously voted to pledge the property as collateral. Fellowship’s members, other than Miller and Wellons, believed that the property was being purchased free of encumbrances. After the closing, $146,956.75 remained in Fellowship’s account. Miller then exchanged his ownership in Fellowship for satisfactions of debts. Despite having no ownership interest, Miller modified and renewed the loan. Later Miller told Fellowship members the truth. Miller was convicted of two counts of making false statements to a bank, 18 U.S.C. 1014, and two counts of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A. The Sixth Circuit affirmed conviction on one count of false statements, but vacated and remanded the other convictions. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

After Page and SNAP sued Owl for breach of contract, Owl counterclaimed for breach of the same contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Owl on all claims and the counterclaim. Owl elected not to pursue damages on its counterclaim at that time. The court dismissed with a condition that if any aspect of the rulings are reversed or modified, by any appellate court, Owl can reassert the counterclaim following remand. The plaintiffs agreed not to assert any defense based on the passage of time.” The parties appealed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the conditional dismissal did not create a final order under 28 U.S.C. 1291. An appellate court must be able to determine at the time of appeal whether a final, litigation-ending decision has been entered. View "Page Plus of Atlanta, Inc. v. Owl Wireless, LLC" on Justia Law

Bowers joined Ophthalmology Group as an employee in 1999 and, in 2002, became one of six partners. In November 2009, Bowers tendered a resignation letter to her partners. Although she did not give a date of departure, the partnership agreement required a one-year notice. In March, 2010, the partners voted to expel Bowers from the partnership, stating that her Chapter 7 bankruptcy and creditors’ proceedings and other personal conduct were detrimental to the Partnership.” After exhausting administrative remedies, Bowers filed suit, alleging: gender discrimination under Title VII; wrongful termination in breach of contract or in violation of public policy under Kentucky common law; gender discrimination under Kentucky statutes; retaliation for complaining about gender discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. and the state law; and misappropriation of name for commercial advantage. Bowers moved to disqualify defendant’s counsel because another attorney at the firm previously represented Bowers in a substantially related matter. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant because Bowers, as a former partner, was not an “employee” under Title VII and denied the motion to disqualify “as moot.” The Sixth Circuit vacated summary judgment and granted the motion to disqualify.View "Bowers v. Ophthalmology Grp." on Justia Law

A nursing home resident and her community spouse (husband) were penalized based on husband’s purchase of an annuity for himself using funds from his IRA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the director of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, holding that 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(f)(1) precluded the transfer of assets because it exceeded husband’s community spouse resource allowance. Section 1396p(c) requires a state to impose a transfer penalty (a period of restricted coverage) if either spouse disposed of assets for less than fair market value during the look-back period. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the transfer occurred before the Ohio agency determined that wife was eligible for Medicaid coverage and section 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i) permits an unlimited transfer of assets “to another for the sole benefit of the individual’s spouse.” View "Hughes v. Colbert" on Justia Law