Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in November, 2013
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A title services company may not pay a real estate agent a fee in exchange for a referral, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2607(a), with an exemption for “affiliated business arrangements.” The defendants are related title and real estate agency companies and met three prerequisites for the exemption. Home buyers claimed that the defendants fell outside the safe harbor’s coverage because they failed to satisfy a fourth condition announced in a Department of Housing and Urban Development policy statement. The district court held that the policy statement is not binding on the Department, is not otherwise entitled to deference, and does not supplement the Act’s existing safe-harbor conditions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the defendants qualify under the exemption for affiliated businesses. View "Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

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Sections 401 and 402 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. 481, 482, regulate union elections and authorize the Secretary of Labor to bring suit to enforce these provisions, after a union member exhausts or attempts to exhaust internal union remedies and files an administrative complaint with the Secretary. The complaining member has one calendar month to file his administrative complaint, measured from the latest of either the date he “exhausted” his internal union remedies or the date three months after the member invoked internal union remedies “without obtaining a final decision.” In this case, the Secretary argued that a member exhausted the union’s remedies when he received the union’s final decision. The union, representing police officers working for the United States Postal Inspection Service, argued that the member’s one-month limitations period ran from the date the union sent out its final decision. The district court dismissed on the grounds that the complaining member had not filed his administrative complaint within the prescribed time period. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that a member has not “exhausted” his internal union remedies until he receives the union’s final decision. View "Solis v. Postal Police Officers Ass'n" on Justia Law

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In 2006, Plaintiff financed a purchase of residential property. Residential Finance was the lender; Chase serviced the loan. In 2011 Plaintiff sent Chase a “Qualified Written Request” under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2605(e), requesting information about the amount owed on the loan, the identity of the “current holder,” the date Chase began servicing the loan, and a breakdown of accrued charges. Plaintiff disputed late fees and other charges and stated that Chase had refused a loan modification for which she qualified and had failed to provide a copy of the Note as requested. Chase sent some material, but stated that any requested information not included was either unavailable or considered proprietary; the letter did not provide the identity of the loan’s owner or information on the correctness of Plaintiff’s account, and did not provide contact information for obtaining assistance. Plaintiff sued, alleging that she made excess payments that Chase failed to credit, violations of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1641(f)(2), RESPA, the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, and conversion. Chase finally identified the owner of the loan: Fannie Mae. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to TILA, but reversed dismissal of the RESPA claim, finding that Plaintiff adequately alleged causation of damages. View "Marais v. Chase Home Fin., LLC" on Justia Law

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Debtors owed delinquent real estate taxes to Summit County, Ohio, which sells outstanding tax obligations to investors as tax lien certificates. An investor purchasing such a certificate obtains a lien against the property and the right to pursue the taxpayer for the unpaid taxes, O.R.C. 5721.30-43. Plymouth filed a certificate showing its purchase of the Debtors’ tax obligation for $4,083.73 with a negotiated interest rate of 0.25%, “offered, sold, and delivered on November 3, 2010.” On October 3, 2011, Plymouth filed a second certificate, with a price of $2,045.44 and a negotiated interest rate of 18.00%. On April 17, 2012, Summit County filed a tax lien foreclosure complaint against the Debtors pursuant to pursuant to Plymouth's request for foreclosure. In May, 2012, the Debtors filed a chapter 13 plan and petition, proposing to pay interest on the tax certificates at the interest rates listed on the certificates. Plymouth filed a proof of claim based on both certificates in the amount of $10,521.46, including $2,120.00 in fees and the principal balance of $7,781.19 plus 18% interest from June 1, 2012 on both certificates. The Bankruptcy Court held that under Ohio law the appropriate interest rate for Plymouth’s tax claim was 0.25%. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. View "In re: Bowers" on Justia Law

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Marshall pled guilty to receiving child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252(a) and (b)) from the time he was 15 until he was 20 years old. The district court varied downward from the guideline range and sentenced him to five years in prison, the mandatory minimum sentence for the offense, expressing concerns about the perceived harshness of that sentence. Marshall has a rare physiological condition, Human Growth Hormone Deficiency, which he believes entitles him to the Eighth Amendment protections accorded to juveniles. Although diagnosed with an I.Q. score of 87 and a mental age of 15, Marshall attended a community college part-time for four semesters, pursuing a career as a lab technician and paying his own tuition. He worked as a machine operator for a commercial bakery. He owned a car and had a credit card. He claimed that he felt like he was viewing images of his peers and that he often felt like a 15 or 16-year-old individual because of his small frame and stature. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that Marshall was an adult at the time of his crimes. View "United States v. Marshall" on Justia Law

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Volkman, an M.D. and a Ph.D. in pharmacology from University of Chicago, was board-certified in emergency medicine and a “diplomat” of the American Academy of Pain Management. Following lawsuits, he had no malpractice insurance and no job. Hired by Tri-State, a cash-only clinic with 18-20 patients per day, he was paid $5,000 to $5,500 per week. After a few months, pharmacies refused to fill his prescriptions, citing improper dosing. Volkman opened a dispensary in the clinic. The Ohio Board of Pharmacy issued a license, although a Glock was found in the safe where the drugs were stored. Follow-up inspections disclosed poorly maintained dispensary logs; that no licensed physician or pharmacist oversaw the actual dispensing process; and lax security of the drug safe. Patients returned unmarked and intermixed medication. The dispensary did a heavy business in oxycodone. A federal investigation revealed a chaotic environment. Cup filled with urine were scattered on the floor. The clinic lacked essential equipment. Pills were strewn throughout the premises. Months later, the owners fired Volkman, so he opened his own shop. Twelve of Volkman’s patients died. Volkman and the Tri-State owners were charged with conspiring to unlawfully distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); maintaining a drug-involved premises, 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1); unlawful distribution of a controlled substance leading to death, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 24(c)(1) and (2). The owners accepted plea agreements and testified against Volkman, leading to his conviction on most counts, and a sentence of four consecutive terms of life imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Volkman" on Justia Law

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The bankruptcy court held that a district court judgment entered against the Debtor was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6). The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court properly gave the district court’s findings preclusive effect as to whether the judgment was the result of the Debtor’s willful and malicious injury. View "In re: Barlow" on Justia Law

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Defendant, convicted of murder and rape in connection with the 1987 deaths of two officers in the Army Nurse Corps, was sentenced to death in Tennessee state court. After exhausting state remedies, he sought a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The district court denied his petition in its entirety, but granted a certificate of appealability on a claim that the state improperly excluded mitigation evidence at his resentencing hearing. The Sixth Circuit expanded the certificate to cover claims concerning alleged prosecutorial misconduct in rebuttal at resentencing; ineffective assistance of counsel at his resentencing; suppression of favorable, material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, improper review of the exclusion of mitigation evidence at the resentencing; and unconstitutional vagueness in the Tennessee aggravating factor applied at resentencing. The court then affirmed, except with respect to the claim of prosecutorial misconduct. The court granted a conditional writ based on the prosecutor’s statements comparing defendant to two of the most widely despised criminals of the then-recent past, repeated references to defendant as “the evil one,” and reference to the Lord’s Prayer, creating an inference “that the death penalty is mandatory through their appeal to a higher authority.” View "Cauthern v. Bell" on Justia Law

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In 2004, Lampe won a $25,000 judgment against Kash. Kash could not pay his debts and sought bankruptcy protection in 2012. When he submitted a list of creditors, under Bankruptcy Rule 1007(a) Kash omitted Lampe’s residential address, listing her in care of the law firm that represented her eight years earlier. The firm stopped working for Lampe in 2004, and the notice never reached Lampe, who did not participate in the bankruptcy case, which discharged the judgment debt. After the discharge, Lampe returned to the district court, seeking to revive her judgment. The district court rejected her claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A debt is a creditor’s property, and the Due Process Clause entitles her to service of notice “reasonably calculated” to reach her before she is deprived of that property. Notification to a former attorney provides little assurance that the notice will reach the creditor. Lawyers have “no general continuing obligation” to pass information along to people they no longer represent. Nothing in the record suggested that the search for Lampe’s address would have imposed an unreasonable burden on Kash; without further investigation, any belief that the firm still worked for Lampe in 2012 was unreasonable. View "Lampe v. Kash" on Justia Law

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Beginning in 2004, 1st Source Bank entered into secured transactions with the debtors for the sale or lease of tractors and trailers. The agreements granted 1st Source a security interest in the tractors and/or trailers, accounts, and in proceeds from that collateral. 1st Source filed financing statements that identified the collateral as including the specified tractors/and or trailers, and “all proceeds thereof, including rental and/or lease receipts.” The financing statements did not refer to “accounts,” “accounts receivable,” or any similar language. Later, defendant banks also entered into secured transactions with the debtors and filed financing statements that specifically referred to a security interest in “all accounts receivable now outstanding or hereafter arising.” In 2009, the debtors defaulted. 1st Source undertook repossession of the collateral securing the agreements and attempted to claim a perfected security interest and first priority in debtors’ accounts, arguing that the term “and all proceeds thereof” included accounts receivable. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding that 1st Source’s financing statements were not sufficient to put defendants on notice that 1st Source claimed a security interest in accounts receivable, and holding, as a matter of Tennessee law, that “proceeds,” as used in a company’s financing statement, does not include its accounts receivable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "1st Source Bank v. Wilson Bank & Trust" on Justia Law