Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

McGuire was convicted of the kidnaping, rape, and aggravated murder of Joy Stewart and was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court summarized the evidence presented in mitigation and determined that the aggravating factors carried sufficient weight to support the sentence. Following sentencing, McGuire’s appellate counsel, which had not represented him at trial or at sentencing, did not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the state appellate court affirmed the sentence of death. The Ohio Supreme Court deemed the claim forfeited. A federal district court denied a habeas petition and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. In a motion under FRCP 60(b), McGuire sought to re-open a claim asserting the ineffectiveness of trial counsel arising from their failure to adequately investigate and present mitigation evidence at the penalty phase of trial, relying upon the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Martinez v. Ryan, and arguing that the procedural default for this claim should be excused because his counsel on state post-conviction review was ineffective. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial. McGuire did not demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances required to justify relief from final judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).View "McGuire v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

The Fillers planned to demolish an unused Chattanooga factory. They knew the site contained asbestos, a hazardous pollutant under the Clean Air Act. Environmental Protection Agency regulations require removal of all asbestos before any demolition. Asbestos materials must be wetted, lowered to the ground, not dropped, labeled, and disposed of at an authorized site. Fillers hired AA, a certified asbestos surveying company, which estimated that it would cost $214,650 to remove the material safely. Fillers hired Mathis to demolish the factory in exchange for salvageable materials. Mathis was required to use a certified asbestos contractor. Mathis applied for an EPA demolition permit, showing an estimated amount of asbestos far less than in the AA survey. The agency’s asbestos coordinator contacted Fillers to verify the amount of asbestos. Fillers did not send the survey, but provided a revised estimate, far less than the survey’s estimate. After the permit issued, the asbestos contractor removed “[m]aybe, like, 1/100th” of the asbestos listed in the AA survey. Temporary laborers were hired, not equipped with protective gear or trained to remove asbestos. Fillers supervised. The work dispersed dust throughout the neighborhood. An employee of a daycare facility testified that the children were unable to play outside. Eventually, the EPA sent out an emergency response coordinator and declared the site an imminent threat. Mathis and Fillers were convicted of conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, and violations of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7413(c). Fillers was also convicted of making a false statement, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2), and obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C.1519. The district court sentenced Mathis to 18 months’ imprisonment and Fillers to 44 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Mathis" on Justia Law

Individual plaintiffs alleged that they were illegally stopped, searched, or detained by the U.S. Border Patrol for the Sandusky Bay Ohio Station, based upon their Hispanic appearance, race and ethnicity. They claimed that in the three years the station has been open, 61.8% to 85.6% of those apprehended have been Hispanic, and use of racial slurs by agents. Plaintiffs sought equitable relief and monetary damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents and 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1986, and claimed that agents had violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101, and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The complaint alleged conspiracy between the Border Patrol and municipalities, police chiefs and individual officers, to violate the civil rights of Hispanics. An amended complaint added the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 702, as a source of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs settled their claims with local agencies. The district court denied plaintiffs’ request to add claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671 and dismissed, determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs had failed to establish waiver of sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The APA section 702 waiver of sovereign immunity extends to all non-monetary claims against federal agencies and their officers sued in their official capacity, regardless of whether plaintiff seeks review of “agency action” or “final agency action” as set forth in section 704.View "Muniz-Muniz v. U.S. Border Patrol" on Justia Law

The Tribe bought land from the City of Lansing to build a class III gaming facility, using funds appropriated by Congress for the benefit of certain Michigan tribes. The Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act provides that land acquired with the income on these funds shall be held in trust by the federal government. Michigan obtained an injunction to prevent the Tribe from applying to have land taken into trust by the Secretary of the Interior, on the ground that the submission would violate a compact between the state and the Tribe. That compact requires that a tribe seeking to have land taken into trust for gaming purposes under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2703(4)(B), secure a revenue-sharing agreement with other tribes. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The state did not seek to enjoin a class III gaming activity, but instead a trust submission under MILCSA, so IGRA does not abrogate the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, and the district court lacked jurisdiction. The issue of whether class III gaming on the property at issue will violate IGRA if the Tribe’s MILCSA trust submission is successful is not ripe. View "Michigan v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe" on Justia Law

Plambeck owned two Kentucky chiropractic clinics that treated patients injured in car accidents, including some State Farm customers. All of the treating chiropractors were licensed to practice in Kentucky. Plambeck was not, although he was licensed elsewhere, and did not treat any patients in Kentucky. State Farm assumed that Plambeck had a license because Kentucky law requires chiropractic practitioners and owners of chiropractic clinics to hold one. When State Farm discovered that Plambeck lacked a state license, it stopped paying the clinics and sued Plambeck to recover all payments since 2000. The district court granted summary judgment to State Farm and awarded $557,124.78 in damages. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Kentucky common law claims for recovery of funds mistakenly paid are based on unjust enrichment. Because State Farm and the clinics never had a contractual relationship, the only applicable theory would require State Farm to show that it paid money to the clinics not due “either in law or conscience.” State Farm did not offer such proof. View "State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Newburg Chiropractic" on Justia Law

Ogle, born in 1954, worked in underground coal mines for 21 years, most recently in 1996 in Kentucky. Ogle smoked since age 12. He sought black lung benefits in 2007. After the record closed but before the ALJ issued a decision, Congress revived a rebuttable statutory presumption that a coal miner who worked in an underground mine for at least 15 years and suffers from a total respiratory or pulmonary disability is presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, 30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4). The ALJ awarded benefits, finding that Ogle suffered from totally disabling respiratory impairment, a conclusion with which all medical opinions agreed. The ALJ stated that the presumption shifts the burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that either the miner’s disability does not, or did not, arise out of coal mine employment or the miner did not, suffer from pneumoconiosis. The Fund demonstrated that Ogle did not suffer from clinical pneumoconiosis, but failed to rebut the presumption that Ogle suffers from legal pneumoconiosis. The Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, finding no evidence that the ALJ improperly restricted the Fund’s ability to rebut the 15-year presumption or that the ALJ applied the wrong standard. View "Big Branch Res., Inc. v. Ogle" on Justia Law

Hocker drank a six-pack of beer and drove to the home of his sometimes-girlfriend. A protective order directed Hocker not to go to her house. The woman called 911, reporting that Hocker was “highly intoxicated” and “suicidal” and that he had just left her home in a red Honda. Officers saw a red Honda with its headlights off speed past their police cruisers. They gave chase, using lights and sirens. Hocker denies seeing or hearing the officers during the seven-mile pursuit. After Hocker pulled off the road into a gravel driveway and stopped, the officers exited their cruisers with guns drawn and ordered Hocker to show his hands and turn off his car. Hocker put his vehicle in reverse, accelerating, and rammed a cruiser, moving it 30 feet. The officers opened fire on Hocker’s vehicle and forcibly removed a severely wounded Hocker from his car. After pleading guilty to wanton endangerment, fleeing or evading police, and driving under the influence, Hocker sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming excessive force. The district court rejected the claims on grounds of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Hocker v. Pikeville City Police Dep't" on Justia Law

McKenzie’s creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in 2008. McKenzie filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition a month later. The cases were consolidated and converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Several weeks before the involuntary petition was filed, McKenzie executed a promissory note and a pledge in favor of GKH for unpaid legal fees. The pledge listed several entities in which McKenzie held an interest, ranging from an “auto mall” to a farm. GKH filed a proof of claim for $750,000, describing the collateral as “Real Estate” and “Other” and sought relief from the automatic stay. The Trustee opposed relief on the ground that the pledge constituted a preferential transfer. The bankruptcy court granted relief with respect to certain real estate, but denied relief as to equity interests. The bankruptcy court held that McKenzie had not validly conveyed his equity interests in certain entities to GKH, that the Trustee could use his hypothetical lien-creditor status and avoidance powers defensively to defeat GKH’s security interest, and that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled because of GKH’s conduct. The district court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that GKH had the burden of establishing the validity of its claimed security interest and that a trustee may use his hypothetical lien-creditor status and avoidance powers to oppose relief from the automatic stay after expiration of the statutory limitation on avoidance actions under 11 U.S.C. 546(a)(1)(A).View "In re: Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison v. Still" on Justia Law

Ramage, born in 1933, worked for Island Creek for 28 years, five years underground and 23 years on the surface. In 2007 he sought black lung benefits. While the claim was pending, Congress revived a statutory rebuttable presumption that a coal miner who worked in an underground coal mine for 15 years and suffers from a total respiratory or pulmonary disability is presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, 30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4), applicable to pending claims filed after January 1, 2005. The ALJ noted that x-rays did not show pneumoconiosis, that Ramage could not complete a pulmonary function test due to a tracheostomy, and that arterial blood-gas studies were qualifying under the federal standards. The ALJ summarized the medical opinions of five doctors, including one who emphasized that it was impossible to distinguish between the damage due to coal dust as opposed to the damage due to smoking. The ALJ awarded benefits and the Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, holding that the ALJ’s determinations were reasoned and reasonable and that the legislative provisions creating the presumption are self-executing.View "Island Creek KY Mining v. Ramage" on Justia Law

The FBI investigated Alwan, an Iraqi living in Bowling Green, after his fingerprints appeared on an improvised explosive device in Iraq, and introduced Alwan to a confidential source (CHS), who recorded their conversations. CHS convinced Alwan that he was part of a group supporting Jihad. Alwan assisted in sending what he believed to be money and weapons to the Mujahidin several times and eventually asked to lead the fictional terrorist cell. CHS instructed Alwan to recruit others. Hammadi agreed to join, stating that he had participated in IED attacks on American troops and had been arrested, but bribed his way free and fled to Syria. In Syria, he applied for refugee status to immigrate to the U.S. and answered “no” when asked if he had engaged in terrorist activity. Hammadi had moved to Bowling Green on the recommendation of Alwan, whose family he knew from Iraq and whom he had met in Syria. The two transported $100,000 from CHS to a truck, believing that it would find its way to Iraq, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339A. They hid rocket-propelled grenade launchers, machine guns, plastic explosives, and sniper rifles in another truck, for transport to terrorists, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B. They loaded Stinger missiles into another truck and plotted to murder a U.S. Army Captain. Hammadi pleaded guilty to 10 terrorism and two immigration offenses. Rejecting claims of entrapment and sentencing manipulation, the district court imposed a life sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Hammadi would not qualify for a departure under either theory.View "United States v. Hammadi" on Justia Law