Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A 16-year-old girl (SW) ran away from her foster home with only her purse. A friend introduced her to Willoughby, 34-year-old, 360-pound a crack dealer and Toledo pimp. Willoughby told SW that she could live with him and his eight-year-old daughter. SW had no money or driver’s license. Willoughby began having sex with SW. SW felt that she had no choice but to comply with his request that she engage in prostitution, because she was “scared of him.” He instructed her, provided her with various sex trade items, and drove her to customers’ houses, waiting outside. When SW returned to Willoughby’s car, he took the money. Willoughby also took SW to a notorious prostitution “track,” and left her alone, with instructions to “walk” for johns. Willoughby began beating SW. To convince Willoughby to let her leave, SW bit her lip hard enough to draw blood, and made herself vomit, “[t]o make him think I was throwing up blood, I was sick.” Willoughby returned SW to her foster home. SW’s foster parents called the police. The next day, officers obtained a search warrant for Willoughby’s home, where they found evidence of SW’s prostitution. Convicted of sex trafficking a minor through force, fraud, or coercion (18 U.S.C. 1591(a), (b)), Willoughby was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Willoughby" on Justia Law

Slyusar worked as a social worker in Ukraine. She joined a private organization and agreed to record unlawful non-cash pensions distributed by her office. She reported pension fraud, identifying officials by name. Slyusar took the report to a radio station. After it broadcasted the report, Slyusar received threats to her life and her children’s lives. She claimed that at one point, she was taken to a police station, where people screamed at her and ordered her to sign papers confessing to slander, then disrobed and beat her. They allegedly placed Slyusar in a cell, where she was raped by three men. She claims she was poisoned during her week in prison. Slyusar’s husband was living in the U.S., caring for his grandmother. Although she claims to have been in hiding, she divorced her husband after her release. She claims a second detention and beating, after which she was hospitalized. She fled to the U.S., using a Russian passport as Julia Pusharova. She married a citizen and applied for adjustment of status; DHS initiated removal. An IJ denied asylum and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture, finding discrepancies between her testimony and the evidence. Slyusar’s asylum application was not timely filed and she failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied review. View "Slyusar v. Holder" on Justia Law

The dismembered remains of Abby’s friend were found in plastic bags on a lawn in Buena Vista. Technicians found Abby’s fingerprints on the bag and bits of the victim’s flesh on a saw that Abby had borrowed. The police charged Abby with murder. Abby retained attorney Gust. Gust entered his appearance on Abby’s behalf. Abby retained another attorney, Piazza, weeks later. Both appeared on Abby’s behalf, sometimes separately and sometimes together. Only Gust was present when Abby’s trial began. After jury selection, Abby objected to proceeding without Piazza. The court indicated that it was inclined to proceed without Piazza. The next morning, both Gust and Piazza appeared. Piazza indicated that Gust was “lead counsel” but that “Abby is on a different plane with that.” The prosecutor rejected a proposal that he lead with less significant witnesses to accommodate Piazza’s schedule. Abby’s conviction was affirmed. The district court rejected a habeas petition in which Abby argued that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and that Gust was ineffective. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court has not held that a defendant’s right to counsel of choice is necessarily violated when his secondary retained counsel has a scheduling conflict precluding attendance at trial. Abby was not prejudices by Gust’s performance. View "Abby v. Howe" on Justia Law

As an assembler with Eaton Corporation, McClain purchased the highest level of long-term disability insurance, which was “designed to replace ... 70 percent of [her] monthly base pay.” She stopped working in January 2008, due to a back injury she suffered on the job in June 2007. She received benefits during the first 24 months under the First Tier of the Plan’s coverage, which defined disability as being “totally and continuously unable to perform the essential duties of your regular position with the Company, or the duties of any suitable alternative position with the Company.” After 24 months, the Plan to an “any occupation” standard, providing Second Tier coverage if “you are totally and continuously unable to engage in any occupation or perform any work for compensation or profit for which you are, or may become, reasonably well fit by reason of education, training or experience--at Eaton or elsewhere.” The Plan denied her claim for benefits because her treating physician opined McClain could work part-time, and a market study identified various part-time positions in the area for which she was qualified. The district court rejected her suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the determination was not arbitrary.View "McClain v. Eaton Corp. Disability Plan" on Justia Law

Officers Hampton and Lyons received a radio communication of a report of an ongoing breaking-and-entering. The caller, Mays, was home and people were attempting to break through her front window. The officers arrived about 10 minutes later, parked their marked cruiser a few houses away, and approached on foot. They noticed McMullin standing close to the caller’s home, then walking toward the officers. Hampton advised McMullin to stop and show his hands. McMullin complied, stating that he was “here for [his] people.” Concerned for their safety and believing that McMullin might be a suspect, the officers frisked McMullin. Mays and her boyfriend, testified that they attempted to tell the officers before the search that McMullin was not the perpetrator. Officer Hampton testified that he had no contact with them before searching McMullin. During the search, Hampton felt a gun in McMullin’s waistband and recovered a revolver. McMullin admitted that he did not have a gun permit and was arrested. Lyons then approached the home and that Mays believed that the perpetrator was her landlord. McMullin was not charged with breaking-and-entering, but was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, under 28 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). After the district court denied his motion to suppress, McMullin conditionally pleaded guilty. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The officers’ reasonable suspicion that McMullin was involved in the crime justified their stop and frisk. View "United States v. McMullin" on Justia Law

Mylan manufactures generic Duragesic, a drug to treat pain. It consists of fentanyl (active ingredient) and a “transdermal system” (patch that delivers the drug). Kelly’s estate claimed that the patch caused Kelly’s death by delivering an excessive amount of fentanyl, alleging strict products liability, negligence, misrepresentation, fraud, warranty, and violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act. The district court dismissed, based on Mich. Comp. Laws 600.2946(5), which provides that “drug” manufacturers are immune from suit. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Michigan defines “drug” using the federal definition, 21 U.S.C. 321: (A) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, official Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; and (B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and (C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles intended for use as a component of any article specified in clause (A), (B), or (C). Michigan’s definition provides that a “drug” is not a “medical appliance or device.” Immunity might not apply to a product, like the patch, that has mechanical (rather than chemical) effect on the body. Under the federal definition a product might be neither “drug” nor “device” but a “combination product.” Whether a combination product is regulated as a drug or a device is left to the Secretary’s discretion. View "Miller v. Mylan, Inc." on Justia Law

Hanna, born in 1979, is a citizen of Iraq. Hanna and his family left Iraq in 1990, moving to Canada, with permission to live and work in that country. In 1993 Hanna’s parents obtained U.S. permanent resident status through Hanna’s sister, a citizen. In 1993, Hanna entered the U.S. as a nonimmigrant. Hanna’s parents sought permanent resident status for Hanna. While the petition was pending, Hanna attended school in Canada. By overstaying his visitor’s visas, Hanna attended a U.S. high school, worked at the family business, and obtained a Michigan driver’s license. Hanna was admitted as a lawful permanent U.S. resident in1998. His Canadian permanent resident status expired. In 1996, Hanna, then 17 years old, was arrested for threatening a man with a three-inch folding knife during an argument. Charges were twice dropped, but the state reinstated charges of felonious assault and driving with a suspended license. The court sentenced him to 30 days in jail and two years of probation. The government commenced removal proceedings, charging him as having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), with Iraq as the country of removal. Hanna sought asylum and withholding of removal, claiming that being a Chaldean Christian placed him at risk in Iraq. After reopening, an IJ stated that an alien who “firmly resettled” in another country before arriving is not eligible for asylum and that Hanna was bound to his first attorney’s concession of removability. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit reversed the holding that Hanna’s admission-concession was binding and remanded for determination of whether Hanna’s offense was a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Hanna v. Holder" on Justia Law

Kentucky law prohibits businesses that sell substantial amounts of staple groceries or gasoline from applying for a license to sell wine and liquor, Ky. Rev. Stat. 243.230(7). A regulation applies the prohibition to retailers that sell those items at a rate of at least 10% of gross monthly sales. A group of grocers sued the Kentucky Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, alleging that the law irrationally discriminated against them in violation of state and federal equal-protection rights; that it violated state separation-of-powers principles by granting the administrative board unfettered discretion to define the law; and that it violated state and federal due process rights by vaguely defining its terms. A liquor store intervened as a defendant. The district court granted summary judgment to the grocers on the federal equal-protection claim but rejected the other claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, upholding the statute. Applying the rational basis test, the court reasoned that the statute conceivably seeks to reduce access to high-alcohol products, and offends neither separation of powers nor due process principles. View "Maxwell's Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner" on Justia Law

Elyria Detective Welsh asked Powell, a confidential informant and Defendant’s cousin, if he knew of anyone illegally trying to sell guns. Powell called to report that Defendant was trying to sell a handgun and identified a location. Welsh, with officers Fairbanks and Lantz, caught up with Defendant and Powell minutes later at a gas station-convenience store, where Powell was pumping gas while Defendant sat in the passenger seat. When Powell left the gas station, the detectives followed in a marked cruiser. Powell immediately made two left turns without signaling. The detectives attempted to pull the car over. The detectives could see and hear Defendant telling Powell to keep driving. Powell eventually pulled over, but Defendant jumped out of the car and tried to escape on foot. Welsh was right behind Defendant and saw Defendant digging into his waist band. A few seconds later, Welsh saw a handgun in Defendant’s hand. Fairbanks tackled Defendant, sending the loaded gun flying. The detectives searched Defendant and found 2.4 grams of crack cocaine and five hydrocodone pills. Convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Defendant was sentenced to 100 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of his motions for discovery and to suppress, but remanded for resentencing bases on the court’s application of the four-point firearm enhancement of U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). View "United States v. Seymour" on Justia Law

Black was arrested for driving without a license. He had a starter pistol in his waistband and a live 7.62 caliber round in his pocket. A search of the car revealed five loaded firearms in its trunk. Black was convicted of three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e). Because he had three prior convictions for violent crimes, Black was subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and the National Firearms Act (NFA), 26 U.S.C. 5845(e), resulting in a Sentencing Guidelines base offense level of 34 and a range of 262-327 months. The district court sentenced Black to 300 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings relating to the issue of whether Black suffered from a severe mental disease or defect; to the judge’s refusal to instruct the jury on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity; and to the validity of the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Black also argued that the district court improperly construed the National Firearms Act, which raised his base offense level based on the type of firearm he possessed. See USSG § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A). View "Black v. United States" on Justia Law