Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mitchell was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). A Presentence Investigation Report classified Mitchell as an “armed career criminal” under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) on account of having committed three violent felonies: a 1988 conviction for robbery under now-repealed Tenn. Code 39-2-501(a); (2) a 2003 conviction for robbery under Tenn. Code 39-13-401; and a 2003 conviction for intentionally evading arrest in an automobile. The Report assigned Mitchell a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI, which resulted in a Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Mitchell to 300 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the two robbery convictions did not qualify as crimes of violence for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Caspeta, a Mexican citizen born in 1973, attempted to enter the U.S. in 1999, using a border pass issued to another individual, and was sentenced to 90 days of custody and 2 years of supervised release for violating 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(3). The sentence was suspended. He was escorted across a bridge back to Mexico and was given an Order instructing him that he was prohibited from re-entering the U.S. for five years and that if he wished to re-enter the U.S. he would first need to obtain the permission of the Attorney General. The Notice included a warning that violation would be subject to prosecution for a felony. In 2012, Caspeta was convicted of a traffic offense in Detroit and was charged with unlawful reentry under 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). He argued that once more than five years had elapsed since his removal, so that the statute did not require him to obtain consent prior to reentry. He was found guilty. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the statutory scheme does not eliminate the need for consent after five years, but only makes consent possible after five years. View "United States v. Romero-Caspeta" on Justia Law

Elmore pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography and received a below-guidelines sentence of 51 months in prison, followed by 10 years of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence, rejecting arguments that the district judge unfairly treated Elmore’s abusive childhood as an aggravating, rather than mitigating, factor in sentencing; placed unreasonable weight on the need to punish and deter Elmore; and skewed the sentence upward by comparing Elmore’s sentence to a harsher regional subset of cases, rather than looking to sentencing practices nationally, and relying on a “gut feeling,” rather than informed reason. The court properly weighed the various competing sentencing objectives and accorded due weight to factors calling for leniency in Elmore’s case. View "United States v. Elmore" on Justia Law

Foythong, a Thai citizen, came to the U.S. in 2001 as a non-immigrant visitor and did not leave when his visa expired. In 2004, Foythong, still married to his Thai wife, married a U.S. citizen, Langevin, who sought to adjust Foythong’s status to lawful permanent resident based on the marriage. After investigating, DHS issued notice of intent to deny the petition on the ground that the marriage was a sham, based on significant discrepancies in testimony. Langevin withdrew the petition; the marriage ended. In 2010, Foythong married again, 12 days before a scheduled removal hearing. His third wife, Clark, a U.S. citizen, requested a marriage-based visa on his behalf. DHS denied the petition. Michigan does not recognize consular divorces, rendering ineffective Foythong’s effort to divorce his Thai wife through a consulate in Chicago. DHS stated that the fraudulent marriage to Langevin precluded Foythong from any future adjustment of status based on marriage. The immigration judge ordered removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. In 2013, Foythong asked the Board to reopen his case, stating that he had legally divorced his first wife and married Clark. The Board denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit denied review, citing 8 U.S.C. 1154(c), which imposes a one-strike rule, so that, after one prior finding of a sham marriage, immigration authorities must reject all future efforts at adjustment of status based on marriage. View "Foythong v. Holder" on Justia Law

Rorrer worked as a Stow firefighter from 1999 until July, 2008. On July 4, 2008, Rorrer lost all vision in one eye in a bottle-rocket accident unrelated to his work. The city terminated Rorrer because of his monocular vision. In September, 2008, the surgeon who operated on Rorrer’s eye cleared Rorrer to return to work without restriction. Rorrer arranged a return-to-work physical with Dr. Moten, the Department physician. After examining Rorrer, Moten’s colleague, Dr. Henderson, told Rorrer he should be able to return to duty without restriction, but qualified this statement by written cautions about using a self-contained breathing apparatus and driving at high speeds. Fire Chief Kalbaugh took the position that Rorrer was unfit to return to work and told Rorrer to call Moten, who told Rorrer that he “was sorry” for the “confusion” but that Rorrer could not return to work because “fire regs” would not allow it. National Fire Protection Association guidelines state that monocular vision compromises the firefighter’s ability to safely perform an essential Job Task. Rorrer claimed that the city had never adopted or applied those guidelines. The district court granted the city summary judgment on claims of disability discrimination and impermissible retaliation (for Rorrer’s opposition to discipline of another firefighter) under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Ohio law, and the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of First Amendment and ADA retaliation claims, but reversed as to the other ADA and Ohio discrimination claims.View "Rorrer v. City of Stow" on Justia Law

After a fire damaged her house, Lester filed a claim with Allstate. The company asked Lester and her husband to answer questions under oath. Lester responded that they would submit to examinations only if Allstate first showed them its investigative files. Allstate refused to turn over the files, stating that doing so “could jeopardize the integrity” of its inquiry. Allstate eventually gave Lester 10 days to schedule an examination, warning that, if she did not submit to an examination, it would deny the claim. Lester never responded, but sued the company. The district court granted Allstate summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the insurance policy requires Lester to “submit to examinations under oath” at Allstate’s request and that Tennessee law permits denial of a claim when the policyholder refuses to participate in an examination under oath. The company’s refusal to share its investigative files before examining her is reasonable and did not breach a duty of good faith. Tennessee presumes that failure to participate in an examination results in prejudice to the insurer, and makes it the policyholder’s burden to demonstrate that the company suffered no harm. Lester never introduced any evidence to rebut the presumption. View "Lester v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Howard has been involved with the criminal-justice system since he was 11 years old. In 2006, at age 21, he pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) as a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, his attorney objected to several Presentence Investigation Report assignments of criminal-history points for Howard’s juvenile offenses. The district court sustained two objections, leaving Howard in Criminal History Category V, with a guidelines-recommended range of 130 to 162 months of imprisonment. The court sentenced Howard to the statutory maximum of 120 months of imprisonment. Howard later filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255 alleging that his attorney’s representation was constitutionally deficient for failure to object to the PSR’s award of two criminal history points related to his juvenile stay at a school for adjudicated delinquents. The district court denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Howard’s allegations of attorney misconduct and incompetence were troubling, and if proven true, might support a finding of constitutionally deficient performance, but in this case, the attorney’s representation did not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment’s basic protections. An objection would have been futile, and Howard did not explain how his sentence would be different but for the other misconduct he alleged. View "Howard v. United States" on Justia Law

King pled guilty to armed robbery and bank robbery while on parole for a prior felony offense. As part of the plea agreement, the state agreed that consecutive sentencing would not apply and the court imposed concurrent sentences for the armed robbery and bank robbery convictions. As required by Michigan law, the court imposed those sentences consecutive to King’s parole sentence. King sought to withdraw his plea, arguing only that the prosecutor impermissibly reneged on the plea deal by failing to abide by his promise of leniency. The state trial court found that the prosecutor never promised something that was not within his power: having the parole sentence run concurrently with the newly-imposed sentences. King then sought habeas relief. The federal district court denied the claim, finding the state court’s determination that there was no breach of King’s plea agreement was not objectively unreasonable. On appeal, King claimed that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered under the Supreme Court’s holding in Boykin v. Alabama. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that, with respect to this new claim, King failed to exhaust state remedies. View "King v. Berghuis" on Justia Law

PTM provided the services of a CEO to the Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority (SORTA) to control daily operations, while ultimate management authority remained with SORTA’s Board of Trustees. PTM hired Plaintiff as SORTA’s Chief Operating Officer. Plaintiff, an African American woman, a graduate of West Point and University of Michigan Business School, had no prior industry experience. Two years later, PTM changed hands and Plaintiff became CEO on an at-will basis. Within months, PTM began questioning her allegiance to PTM. Plaintiff repeatedly declined to participate in PTM programs. Tensions escalated during negotiations for renewal of PTM’s management contract, which prohibited PTM employees from working for SORTA within a year of its expiration. Plaintiff’s PTM contract contained the same prohibition. PTM suspected that Plaintiff and SORTA were conspiring to have SORTA hire Plaintiff directly. The contract was extended and the one-year hiring prohibition was removed from the contracts. PTM executives continued to regard Plaintiff as a “prima donna” and exchanged several emails critical of Plaintiff. Following a dispute concerning unionization of SORTA workers, PTM fired Plaintiff, purportedly for lying about the dispute. The district court rejected Plaintiff’s discrimination action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding PTM’s investigation inadequate to establish that Plaintiff lied.View "Shazor v. Prof'l Transit Mgmt., Ltd." on Justia Law

Pauline and her doctors were aware of Pauline’s allergy to heparin, an anti-coagulant; she wore a medical bracelet listing her heparin allergy and her medical records noted the allergy. Her estate alleges that on several occasions, the hospital’s medical staff injected Pauline with heparin “in direct contradiction to her specific directive,” which proximately caused her death. The district court dismissed, for failure to comply with the notice and heightened pleading requirements of the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act. The court concluded that under Tennessee law the injections were not “procedures” or “treatments” for the purposes of medical battery, but were only component parts of her treatment process, which did not require consent and could form the basis for medical malpractice but not medical battery. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the complaint plausibly alleged medical battery, which is not subject to the Act. View "Shuler v. Garrett" on Justia Law