Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Demyanovich, an employee of Cadon for more than 20 years, was terminated after he requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act to treat his congestive heart failure. He had previously taken leave and his condition had gotten worse over the course of about 10 years. He claimed that Cadon and his direct supervisor, Ensign, interfered with his exercise of his FMLA rights, retaliated against him for seeking FMLA leave, and discriminated against him on the basis of disability. Ensign denied the FMLA request because he believed that Cadon did not have enough employees to be subject to the Act, but referred to Demyanovich as a “liability” immediately after the request for FMLA leave. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Cadon. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting evidence that establishs a genuine factual dispute as to whether Demyanovich was permanently incapable of working at the time that he was terminated. View "Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & Coating, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Investors filed a securities fraud action, claiming that BioMimetic misled them about Augment Bone Graft’s prospects for FDA approval. The product is designed to encourage bone growth in patients that undergo foot and ankle surgeries without the need to harvest and transplant tissue. They claim that the FDA privately communicated to BioMimetic that the FDA expected the device’s clinical trials to prove that Augment was effective based on an analysis of all study participants. The clinical trials did not achieve those results. But if BioMimetic removed from the analysis study participants that did not actually receive treatment, the data did indicate that the device was effective. Based on these two analyses, BioMimetic expressed optimism about Augment’s chances for approval to investors. The investors claim that those statements were misleading because BioMimetic did not tell them everything it knew about the FDA’s expectations, particularly the FDA’s desire for the trials to show that the device was effective based on an analysis of the entire study population. The district court dismissed, The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The complaint did not plead a strong enough inference of scienter. BioMimetic could legitimately have believed that the statistically significant results it achieved based on an analysis of the population would be sufficient to obtain approval. View "Kuyat v. BioMimetic Therapeutics, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2012, Wright, Baxter, Stevens, and Hayne were arrested after they placed explosives under a bridge on Route 82 in Brecksville, Ohio, and attempted to detonate them. The explosives were actually inert; one of their co-conspirators was an FBI informant. All were involved with the Occupy Cleveland movement, a loose-knit political group protesting economic inequality. They pleaded guilty to conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction, 18 U.S.C. 2332a(a)(2)(B) & (D), attempt to use a weapon of mass destruction, sections 2332a(a)(2)(B) & (D), and aiding and abetting in malicious use of explosives to destroy a structure used in interstate commerce, section 844(i). The district court applied a 12-level terrorism enhancement to each sentence, under U.S.S.G. 3A1.4, which requires that the offense be “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct.” Wright had an enhancement for leadership under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c). Wright was sentenced to 138 months for each offense, significantly below the guidelines range, calculated as 324 to 405 months. Baxter received a sentence of 117 months and Stevens 97 months; their guidelines calculations were 262 to 327 months and 188 to 235 months, respectively. The court acknowledged that a 60-month minimum applied and sentenced Hayne to 72 months, from a guidelines range of 262 to 327 months. All sentences were concurrent, and all defendants were sentenced to lifetime supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentences.View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

Reichert was a forum moderator for Xbox-scene.com, a website dedicated to discussion of installing “modification chips in video game consoles so that they could run software for which the consoles were not originally designed. Reichert sold an undercover agent a modified Nintendo Wii, able to play both legitimate and pirated video games. After obtaining a warrant, agents seized modification chips, a soldering iron, computers, and business cards advertising Reichert’s services. Reichert was convicted under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which gives copyright owners a remedy against those who do not themselves infringe a copyright, but circumvent technological controls and enable others to infringe. The Act establishes circumvention liability for digital trespass, 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1), and trafficking liability, 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(2). Circumventing or trafficking in circumvention tools is a criminal offense if committed “willfully” for financial gain. With a two-point “special skills” enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.3, Reichert’s advisory Guidelines range was 15 to 21 months. The district court imposed a sentence of 12 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the jury received an inaccurate “deliberate ignorance” instruction that negated the “willful” conduct requirement,” that exclusion of certain defense testimony violated Reichert’s constitutional right to present a defense, and that the “special skills” enhancement should not apply to Reichert’s self-taught technical expertise.View "United States v. Reichert" on Justia Law

In 2011, Hilltop hired Huffman and others to review the files of mortgage loans originated by PNC Bank to determine whether lawful procedures were followed during foreclosure and other proceedings. Until the end of their employment in January 2013, they regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but were not compensated at the overtime rate because Hilltop classified them as independent contractors. Each employment relationship was governed by a now-expired contract, including an arbitration clause and a survival clause. The clauses listed in the survival clause correspond to ones detailing services essential to the job, the term of employment, compensation, termination, and confidentiality; it did not list the arbitration clause. The workers filed a purported class action. The district court denied Hilltop’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit reversed, rejecting an argument that omission of the arbitration clause from the survival clause constituted a “clear implication” that the parties intended the arbitration clause to expire with the agreement. Sixth Circuit precedent indicates that the parties must proceed in arbitration on an individual basis. View "Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., LLC" on Justia Law

After 20 years on Ohio’s death row, D’Ambrosio was granted habeas corpus relief on the grounds that the Cuyahoga County prosecutor violated his obligations under Brady v. Maryland. The state attempted to reprosecute him through mid-2009, but continued to fail to disclose exculpatory evidence and failed to alert D’Ambrosio or the court that its key witness had died. Ultimately, the district court granted an unconditional writ of habeas corpus, citing “extraordinary circumstances” and barring Ohio from reprosecuting. The state conviction was never vacated. After his release, D’Ambrosio filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that defendants violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted defendants judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the complaint did not plausibly allege any viable constitutional claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed after rejecting a statute of limitations defense. The prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for the non-disclosure of exculpatory information at trial and the complaint’s allegations were insufficient to plausibly allege the existence of an official county policy of violating criminal defendants’ constitutional rights. View "D'Ambrosio v. Marino" on Justia Law

Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a)(3) a collector must notify the individual from whom it seeks payment that it will assume the validity of the debt unless he disputes it “within thirty days after receipt of the notice.” Diversified wrote to Wallace that it would assume the validity of a debt unless he disputed it “within 30 days of receiving this notice.” Based on the letter’s use of “of” rather than “after,” as in the Act, Wallace sued Diversified. The district court granted the debt collector judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A collector need not parrot the Act to comply with, but only must communicate with enough clarity to convey the required information to a reasonable but unsophisticated consumer. The Act and the letter mean the same thing. View "Wallace v. Diversified Consultants, Inc." on Justia Law

Corning hired Hyundai, an ocean shipper, to transport thin glass sheets for use in televisions and computer monitors from the U.S. to Asia. Although it is not clear when the damage occurred, damage was noted when Hyundai unloaded the containers from flatcars operated by its subcontractors (Norfolk Southern Railway and BNSF, another rail carrier). Corning had no role in selecting and no relationship with the subcontractors. There were opinions that the damage was caused by movement of the railcars, not by packing, but the actual cause was not established. Corning’s insurer paid Corning $664,679.88 and filed suit. The district court held that the case would proceed solely under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 11706, apparently reasoning that the damage undisputedly occurred while the cargo was in the possession of a rail carrier. The court found that a Subcontracting Clause did not immunize the rail carriers from suit, but obligated Corning to indemnify Hyundai for any resultant claims by a subcontractor against Hyundai arising out of the same facts. The court held that a $500-per-package limit of liability did not apply to the rail carriers or Hyundai. After a jury trial, the court found Hyundai and the railroads liable, but denied prejudgment interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment against Hyundai, reversed and vacated judgments against the railroads, and remanded for reconsideration of prejudgment interest.View "CNA Ins. Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

Debtor and his wife sought relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Debtor owns Bradley Machinery, which sells and rents construction equipment. Bradley did not file a bankruptcy petition. Some of Bradley’s equipment was subject to security interests in favor of Lender; Debtor had personally guaranteed payment of the loans. Lender filed an adversary proceeding asserting that Debtor caused Bradley to sell equipment “out of trust,” without remitting the proceeds of the sale of collateral to Lender, constituting embezzlement under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4) and willful and malicious injury under section 523(a)(6). Pursuant to section 523(a)(2)(A). Lender asserted that Debtor obtained an extension of credit through false representations to Lender regarding the status of certain pieces of collateral. The Bankruptcy Court held that Lender had failed to show that the debt was nondischargeable. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed on alternate grounds and remanded for determination of damages. Lender suffered a loss due to Debtor’s misrepresentations regarding the status of the collateral. Debtor’s subjective intent to repay is not a factor under section 523(a)(2)(A) when there is a separate specific false material misrepresentation. Debtor knew that Lender would rely on these misrepresentations when determining whether to continue to extend credit. View "In re: Bradley" on Justia Law

Bray is an antiabortion activist and wrote a book, A Time to Kill. In 1985, Bray was convicted for a felony relating to physical damage to abortion centers. He spent four years in prison. Planned Parenthood (PPCW) was a plaintiff in a 1995 suit against antiabortion activists (including Bray) for intimidation by threat of force under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. 248. In 2005, PPCW sought to collect its $850,000 judgment and obtained a writ of execution authorizing seizure of specified property. The Bray family filed a “Bivens” suit, claiming that U.S. Marshals conspired with PPCW to seize their property in an unconstitutional manner. The complaint alleged that during a “surprise raid” Bray was required to sit on his couch while flak-jacketed Marshals, advocates for political positions that Bray despised, plus unknown persons, seized the books, papers, computers and cameras, of Bray and his family, excepting only children’s books and Bibles. Bray was not allowed to leave the couch or to call his lawyer. Eventually a Marshal called Bray’s lawyer. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Bray had settled with all defendants, except the Marshals, who were entitled to qualified immunity in carrying out a presumptively valid federal court order, even by “highly questionable ways.” The unconstitutionality of certain actions was not then clearly established with sufficient specificity. If the alleged facts are true, the incident was “more like home raids by Red Guards during China’s Cultural Revolution than like what we should expect” in the U.S., even if Bray’s ideas are “repugnant.”View "Bray v. Planned Parenthood Columbia-Willamette, Inc." on Justia Law