Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

From 1998 to 2010, Dimora was one of three elected Cuyaho County commissioners. From 2005 to 2010, Gabor worked for the county weights-and-measures office, which inspects gas pumps, grocery store scanners, truck scales and the like for accuracy. In 2007, the FBI began investigating public corruption in Cuyahoga County and discovered that Dimora handed out public jobs, influenced Cleveland decision-makers and steered public contracts in return for about 100 bribes worth more than $250,000. Gabor bought his job for $5,000 and spent most of his time on errands for Dimora that were unrelated to the job, including acting as a go-between in arranging kickback schemes on county projects. When Gabor learned that the FBI was investigating him, he warned his co-conspirators about the investigation and tried to convince them to lie. After a 37-day trial, they were convicted of 39 violations of anti-corruption laws. The district court sentenced Dimora to 336 months in prison and Gabor to 121 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to a jury instruction for the RICO charge, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), (d); to the sufficiency of the evidence; and to various evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Dimora" on Justia Law

Consumers Energy entered into a Purchase Order, under which DynaSteel, operating in Tennessee and Mississippi, would fabricate ductwork for shipment to an Essexville, Michigan power plant for installation by a third party. The PO contained a Michigan choice-of-law provision. Consumers was to pay $10,634,755. PCI, with locations in Kansas and Tennessee, was to supply the insulation requested by Consumers for $1,842,890. The contract between DynaSteel and PCI contained a Tennessee choice-of-law provision. As the project progressed, Consumers paid DynaSteel $2.9 million, but DynaSteel did not pay PCI $1,542,890 it owed. DynaSteel also owed PCI more than $3.2 million for other projects. DynaSteel allegedly comingled Consumer’s payments with funds from other projects. Under a “Payment Plan Proposal,” DynaSteel was to make payments, which would apply to the unpaid orders in chronological order (the Consumers project came last in this order). The PPP did not contain a choice-of-law provision. DynaSteel paid PCI $2.1 million, which satisfied its obligations concerning the other projects, but did not fulfill its obligation as to the Consumers project. PCI sued in Michigan, alleging that DynaSteel violated the Michigan Builders Trust Fund Act. The district court entered summary judgment for Dynasteel, reasoning that the PO between PCI and DynaSteel was controlling, that the Tennessee choice-of-law provision was binding, and that the Trust Fund Act did not apply extraterritorially by its own force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Performance Contracting Inc. v. Dynasteel Corp." on Justia Law

Sjöstrand graduated magna cum laude from Ohio State University in only two and a half years. She applied to the school’s Ph.D program in School Psychology, where her grade-point average (3.87) was tied for highest in the applicant pool and her GRE scores (combined 1110) exceeded OSU requirements. Sjöstrand suffers from Crohn’s disease. She claims that, in interviews, two of the program’s professors focused on her disease. Of seven applicants interviewed by the school, only Sjöstrand was rejected. She was initially told only that she did “not fit the program.” She sued under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701. The district court granted OSU summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that jury questions remained regarding whether she was rejected because of her disability.View "Sjostrand v. Ohio St. Univ." on Justia Law

Patriot was authorized to issue title policies underwritten by First American in Michigan. In 2007, Patriot closed a transaction and provided title insurance and a closing protection letter (CPL) when which WaMu loaned $4,543,593.07 to Truong for the purchase of property in Grosse Ile. In the CPL, First American agreed to indemnify WaMu for actual losses arising from Patriot’s fraud or dishonesty in connection with the closing. In 2008, First American discovered that the Truong transaction was a sham, orchestrated by Patriot’s owner, and obtained title to the property. During negotiations concerning sale of the property, federal regulators closed WaMu. The FDIC became its receiver and sold most of WaMu’s assets to Chase, including the title insurance commitment issued in connection with the Truong transaction. Attempting to resolve the claim, First American tendered a quitclaim deed. Chase refused to accept that deed. First American sought a declaration that First American had fulfilled its obligations under the commitment by tendering a deed to the property. Chase sought a declaration that the deed was void and requested money damages. The FDIC intervened, alleging breach of contract against First American based on the CPL. After the property was sold, First American and Chase stipulated to dismissal of Chase’s claims against First American and First American’s claims against Chase. Chase and the FDIC entered into a stipulation that Chase did not acquire the CPL claim that the FDIC was pursuing. A jury awarded the FDIC $2,263,510.78. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "JP Morgan Chase Bank NA v. First Am. Title Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Nancy and Lester's Kentucky pain-management clinic closed after the DEA confiscated the doctor’s license for overprescribing narcotics. They then opened two clinics in Ohio. Patients would arrive before they opened, filling the parking lot, where they used drugs and traded prescription forms. Patients often traveled long distances (in groups), although most lived closer to other clinics. After paying their $150 appointment fee (cash only), patients would meet an “assessor” who would review their “day sheet” and provide a completed prescription form for hydrocodone, oxycodone, or other pain medication. Staff completed day sheets and prescription forms in advance. Patients then met the doctor for a minute. About 100 people per day completed this “five minute” process. The clinics also treated phantom patients. Nancy supervised the updating of files for people who had never visited the clinics. The doctor would sign prescriptions for phantom patients, staff would fill the prescriptions, and the pain pills were sold on the street by a Sadler relative. The clinics ordered drugs directly from pharmaceutical companies, but never obtained a license to dispense controlled substances. The Sadlers were convicted of conspiring to distribute controlled substances illegally and maintaining a premises for distributing the substances; Nancy was also convicted of wire fraud and money laundering. The district court sentenced Lester to 151 months and Nancy to 210 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated the wire fraud conviction, but otherwise affirmed. Nancy may have had many bad motives in buying the pills, but unfairly depriving the distributors of their property was not among them; she ordered pills and paid the asking price. View "United States v. Sadler" on Justia Law

In 2003 Harris was hired as a resale buyer at Ford. Throughout her employment Harris suffered from IBS, an illness that causes fecal incontinence. On bad days, Harris was unable to drive to work or stand up from her desk without soiling herself. Harris began to take intermittent FMLA leave. Her absences started to affect her job performance. In 2005 Harris’s then-supervisor allowed her to work on a flex-time telecommuting schedule on a trial basis. The supervisor deemed the trial unsuccessful. Although her next supervisor did not approve remote work, Harris worked from home on an informal basis. The days that she stayed home were marked as absences. When Harris worked nights and weekends, she made mistakes and missed deadlines because she lacked access to suppliers. After Ford declined her request for a formal telecommuting arrangement, Harris complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Harris was terminated in 2009 and the EEOC sued, claiming that Ford discriminated against Harris on the basis of disability and retaliated against her for filing a charge with the EEOC. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ford. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding find evidence that created a genuine dispute as to whether Harris was qualified to work as a resale buyer and whether she was terminated in retaliation for filing an EEOC charge.View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Lucas County has about 440,000 residents and includes Toledo. Two-thirds of the county’s patients have government-provided health insurance, such as Medicare or Medicaid; 29 percent have private insurance, which pays significantly higher rates to hospitals than government-provided insurance. General acute-care (GAC) inpatient services include “primary services,” such as hernia surgeries, radiology services, and most inpatient obstetrical (OB) services. “Secondary services,” such as hip replacements and bariatric surgery, require more specialized resources. “Tertiary services,” such as brain surgery and treatments for severe burns, require even more specialized resources. “Quaternary services,” such as major organ transplants, require the most specialized resources. Different hospitals offer different levels of service. In Lucas County ProMedica has 46.8% of the GAC market and operates three hospitals, which together provide primary (including OB), secondary, and tertiary services. Mercy Health Partners has 28.7% of the GAC market and operates three hospitals in the county, which provide primary (including OB), secondary, and tertiary services. University of Toledo Medical Center (UTMC) has 13% of the GAC market with a single teaching and research hospital, focused on tertiary and quaternary services. It does not offer OB services. St. Luke’s Hospital had 11.5% of the GAC market and offered primary (including OB) and secondary services. In 2010 ProMedica merged with St. Luke’s, creating an entity with 50% of the market in primary and secondary services and 80% of the market for obstetrical services. The FTC challenged the merger under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The Commission found that the merger would adversely affect competition and ordered ProMedica to divest St. Luke’s. The Sixth Circuit upheld the order. View "ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked until 2006, when the plant closed, and retired under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA); that provided that the employer would provide health insurance, either through a self-insured plan or under a group insurance policy and identified the employer’s contribution to the premium. The CBAs provided that the coverage an employee had at the time of retirement or termination at age 65 or older other than a discharge for cause “shall be continued thereafter provided that suitable arrangements for such continuation[] can be made… In the event… benefits … [are] not practicable … the Company in agreement with the Union will provide new benefits and/or coverages as closely related as possible and of equivalent value." In 2011 TRW (the employer’s successor) stated that it would discontinue group health care coverage beginning in 2012, but would be providing “Health Reimbursement Accounts” (HRAs) and would make a one-time contribution of $15,000 for each eligible retiree and eligible spouse in 2012, and in 2013, would provide a $4,800 credit to the HRAs for each eligible party. The HRAs shifted risk, and potentially costs, to plaintiffs. TRW did not commit to funding the HRAs beyond 2013. Plaintiffs sued, claiming that the change breached the CBAs, in violation of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. The district court certified a class and granted summary judgment, ruling that the CBAs established a commitment to lifetime health care benefits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed View "United Steel, Paper, Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union v. Kelsey-Hayes Co." on Justia Law

Kumar was 19 years old and in his first year in the Aviation Technology Program at Bowling Green State University when he was assigned to fly alone from Wood County Airport near Bowling Green to Burke Lakefront Airport in Cleveland, and back, after 10:00 p.m. The flight plan required him to fly over part of Lake Erie. On the return trip, Kumar observed what he believed to be a flare rising from a boat. He reported this sighting to Cleveland Hopkins International Airport and was instructed to fly lower for a closer look. Kumar could not then see a boat. Fearful of hurting his chances of one day becoming a Coast Guard pilot, he reported that he saw additional flares and described a 25-foot fishing vessel with four people aboard wearing life jackets with strobe lights activated. Kumar’s report prompted a massive search and rescue mission by the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Canadian Armed Forces. A month later, Kumar admitted that his report had been false. He pleaded guilty to making a false distress call, a class D felony per 14 U.S.C. 88(c)(1), which imposes liability for all costs the Coast Guard incurs. He was sentenced to a prison term of three months and ordered to pay restitution of $277,257.70 to the Coast Guard, and $211,750.00 to the Canadian Armed Forces. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Kumar" on Justia Law

Cameron returned to Kentucky after serving as a Marine in Iraq and applied for VA Medical Benefits, but did not include verification of service (DD-214). Four months later, the VA verified his service, but its record did not reflect combat service or other eligibility; his status was “Rejected.” A week later, Cameron’s records were updated and he was retroactively enrolled. Cameron had been involved in killing a civilian family. His parents had contacted the Lexington VA mental health department and urged their son to seek help. Tiffany, his wife, told him that she and their baby would not continue to live with him unless he sought help. Days before his enrollment was corrected Cameron went to the Leestown VA. The intake clerk recognized that Cameron was in urgent need of help and talked to him for 40 minutes, despite not finding his enrollment. She concluded that Cameron was suicidal. No mental health professional was available at Leestown. She sent him to Cooper Drive VA. Cameron called his father later, stating that he had been turned away from Cooper Drive because he did not have his DD-214. Cameron drove home. He and Tiffany searched for the form. Cameron became frustrated and threatened Tiffany, who called 911. While on the phone, she heard a shot. Her husband had committed suicide. His family asserted claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court dismissed, holding that it did not have jurisdiction over a “benefits determination,” Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, 38 U.S.C. 511.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Whether the clinics had a duty to care for Cameron is an improper question for this stage. The government failed to show that the actions of the VA employees satisfied the test of the FTCA’s discretionary function exception. View "Anestis v. United States" on Justia Law