Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in May, 2014
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The flea-and-tick “spot-on products” at issue claim that their active ingredient works by topical application to a pet’s skin rather than through the pet’s bloodstream. According to the manufacturers, after the product is applied to one area, it disperses over the rest of the pet’s body within one day because it collects in the oil glands and natural oils spread the product over the surface of the pet’s skin and “wick” the product over the hair. The plaintiffs alleged false advertising based on statements that the products are self-dispersing and cover the entire surface of the pet’s body when applied in a single spot; that they are effective for one month and require monthly applications to continue to work; that they do not enter the bloodstream; and that they are waterproof and effective after shampooing, swimming, and exposure to rain or sunlight. The district court repeatedly referred to a one-issue case: whether the product covers the pet’s entire body with a single application. The case management order stated that the manufacturers would bear the initial burden to produce studies that substantiated their claims; the plaintiffs would then have to refute the studies, “or these cases will be dismissed.” The manufacturers objected. The plaintiffs argued that the plan would save time, effort, and money. The manufacturers submitted studies. The plaintiffs’ response included information provided by one plaintiff and his adolescent son and an independent examination of whether translocation occurred that detected the product’s active ingredient in a dog’s bloodstream. The district court concluded that the manufacturers’ studies substantiated their claims and denied all of plaintiffs’ discovery requests, except a request for consumer complaints, then granted the manufacturers summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The doctrines of waiver and invited error precluded challenges to the case management plan. View "Simms v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law

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Davis pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) and two counts of possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B). The presentence report (PSR) found that defendant had “two or more separate instances of sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of a minor” and recommended a five-level enhancement for engaging in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor (U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(5)). The PSR also concluded that Davis was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years on the distribution count and to a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years on the possession counts. The district court concluded that a 1989 sexual battery conviction did not trigger the mandatory minimums, but that the 2002 attempted pandering conviction did. Regarding a 1989 sexual battery conviction, the district court noted that none of the documents it was permitted to examine contained the victim’s age, nor was the court convinced that it was permitted to take judicial notice of the victim’s birth certificate. The court imposed a sentence of 262 months. The Sixth Circuit remanded, agreeing that the district court erred with regard to the statutory mandatory minimums. The court did not err in imposing the pattern-of-activity enhancement.View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

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At Harris's state court trial, the court accepted the prosecution’s rationale that Juror 49 was struck “because she had difficulty following questions ... was joking with a neighboring juror who was subsequently struck for cause, and had a grandson who was convicted for his involvement in a shooting.” It was later discovered that a videotape system, reactivated during a trial recess, had recorded a conversation during which a prosecutor commented, “We’ve got ... 49, she’s the old lady, the black lady. The other one is already off.” The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected a direct appeal. Sixth Circuit remanded Harris’s 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for a hearing to determine whether the prosecutors at his state trial had exercised peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. The district court held a reconstructed Batson hearing and concluded that the strikes at issue were not motivated by purposeful racial discrimination. Harris appealed with respect to the strike of Juror 49. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in concluding that it could hold a meaningful Batson hearing more than 11 years after his state trial and that the prosecution’s strike of Juror 49 was not improperly motivated by racial considerations. View "Harris v. Haeberlin" on Justia Law

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An investigation of the Mansfield, Ohio, drug trade involved the Richland County Sheriff’s Office (RCSO) using a confidential informant it had used once before (Bray) to make controlled buys. In 2005, the U.S. DEA joined the Investigation. Bray was registered as a DEA informant. All targets of the Mansfield controlled buys were selected either by Bray or RCSO. The controlled buys resulted in numerous arrests and indictments. The case agent who testified before the grand jury identified multiple corroborative measures generally used to substantiate Bray’s information and to supervise controlled purchases, including: criminal history and driver’s license checks; searches of Bray’s person and vehicle prior to and after a controlled purchase; tape-recorded phone calls to the suspects; copies of serial numbers of buy money; audio and visual surveillance; and, in certain cases, undercover participation by agents. Corruption pervaded the Investigation. Bray, in jail for an unrelated homicide, disclosed that he had framed innocent individuals, stolen money and drugs, and dealt drugs on side. There was evidence that, as to some arrestees, law enforcement knew of, and participated in, Bray’s misdeeds. The investigation fell apart. Bray pled guilty to perjury and deprivation of civil rights. Agents were also indicted. The district court rejected claims by the Investigation’s targets under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and “Bivens,” citing qualified immunity; held that judicial estoppel barred false arrest claims; and held that because the named individuals had not committed constitutional violations, plaintiffs could not prevail on their Monell claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Spires v. Lucas" on Justia Law

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In 1999, Phillips was convicted of a third-degree felony for burglary of a structure. The Florida statute defined burglary in the third degree as burglary in which the offender does not commit assault or battery, does not become armed with a dangerous weapon, and required that the structure be unoccupied. In 2012 Phillips pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court determined that Phillips qualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), based in part on the Florida conviction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that under Florida’s burglary statute attempted burglary is a violent felony within the meaning of the ACCA’s residual clause in part because of the potential risk of violent confrontation with passersby. The court reaffirmed that the ACCA’s residual clause is not unconstitutional.View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

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Officers of the Internet Crimes Against Children task force, browsing Craigslist, saw Babcock’s ads in offering money for sex with someone of any age. An officer responded by e-mail, as 14-year-old “Amber.” Babcock steered the discussion toward sexual topics and arranged a meeting in Columbus, Ohio. He pled guilty to attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). Babcock had been the victim of physical and sexual abuse as a child, and claimed to have been diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. His father was absent and his mother was a substance abuser. His criminal history began at age 12, with juvenile adjudications for breaking and entering, assault, theft, and burglary. He had 17 adult convictions, most related to narcotics, but had pleaded no contest to three counts of corruption of a minor, based on allegedly engaging in consensual sex with 14-to-15-year-old girls. He was convicted of providing a pornographic video to an eight-year-old and for failing to register or verify his address as required by his status as a sex offender. This history resulted in a Guidelines sentencing range of 120–150 months, but the probation office concluded that the repeat child sex offender enhancement of U.S.S.G. 4B1.5(a) should apply, which increased his range to 235–293 months. The court sentenced Babcock to 190 months’ imprisonment and a life term of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Babcock" on Justia Law

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Lubrizol, a chemical manufacturer, produces petroleum wax-based oxidates, used in anti-corrosion products. In 2007, Lubrizol acquired Lockhart’s oxidate business and assets, leaving Lockhart’s Flint, Michigan oxidate production facility partially unused. The purchase agreement “prohibited Lockhart, for a period of five years from the date of the purchase agreement, from directly or indirectly engaging in any business competitive with the assets it sold to Lubrizol.” Lubrizol allegedly later employed the clause to prevent the use or re-lease of the plant to another oxidates manufacturer.” The purchase gave Lubrizol a 98% market share monopoly in the oxidate market. Lubrizol subsequently increased prices by 70%. In 2009, the FTC alleged violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. In a consent agreement, Lubrizol promised: to divest the Lockhart oxidates assets to Additives Int'l; to rescind any prohibition or restraint including noncompete agreements, on the sale or use of the Flint plant for the manufacture and sale of products by Additives or others; and to lease the Flint plant to Additives. Z Technologies, a purchaser of oxidates that makes anti-corrosion products for cars, filed suit in 2012, alleging violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts and Michigan antitrust laws. The district court dismissed, determining that the claims were time-barred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a continuing-violations argument. Lubrizol’s price increases and alleged implementation of the non-compete clause did not constitute a “new and independent” injury. The court also found a hold-and-use argument inapplicable because the alleged implementation of a non-compete clause was not a “new use” of an “asset.”View "Z Techs. Corp. v. Lubrizol Corp." on Justia Law

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The Energy Policy Act of 2005 directs the Department of Energy (DOE) to fund alternative energy projects called “biorefinery demonstration projects,” 42 U.S.C. 16232(d), to develop ways to convert trees, crops and agricultural waste into energy. Frontier sought a grant to construct a plant in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula that would use about 770 tons of wood chips per day to produce 20 million gallons of ethanol per year. As required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), DOE prepared a draft environmental assessment. After receiving input, DOE issued a final environmental assessment that proposed changes, including use of a biomass boiler instead of natural gas boilers to generate power for the plant. DOE issued a finding of “no significant impact” and awarded $100 million toward construction of the plant, about 34% of its total cost. Opponents sued, alleging violation of the NEPA. The district court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the claims also failed on the merits. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to standing, holding that the opponents did show injury subject to redress, but affirmed on the merits, stating that DOE completed a thorough environmental assessment and reasonably described the environmental impacts identified as not significant. View "Klein v. U.S. Dep't of Energy" on Justia Law

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A video recording taken from Ohio Trooper Kline’s cruiser shows Kinlan's Nissan move into a narrow space between cars in the left lane of the four-lane street. Kline followed for about 30 seconds until its driver signaled a turn. Kline activated his lights and siren and pulled the Nissan over. Kline approached and informed Kinlin that he had nearly cut off the car behind him and had “cut left of center” before the intersection. Kline asked how much alcohol Kinlin had consumed. Kinlin answered: “two beers.” Kinlin exited the car and appeared disheveled, but not off-balance. Kline ushered Kinlin out of camera range for a field sobriety test. Kinlin said: “I’m not doing a test…. I’m not drunk.” Kline informed Kinlin that he was under arrest. Kinlin replied: “You’re kidding.” Kline said: “One more chance … take my test?” Kinlin again refused. Kline responded that he could smell alcohol and that Kinlin’s eyes were glassy. While Kline was patting him down, Kinlin agreed to submit to a test. The test, administered later, indicated a blood-alcohol content of .012%, below Ohio’s limit of .08%. Kinlin sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court found that Kline had probable cause to stop Kinlin and probable cause for arrest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Kinlin v. Kline" on Justia Law

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J.H. has known Reid, an acquaintance of her family, since early childhood. In 2011, Reid (age 48) began to send J.H. (age 13) text messages and phone calls that led her to think of him as her boyfriend. He eventually had sex with her, first in Memphis, Tennessee, then in a hotel across the Mississippi border. J.H. told Reid that she wanted to run away from home. Reid encouraged her to leave, picked her up on her way to school, and headed to Las Vegas, having sex along the way. When they reached Las Vegas, J.H. called her family, who had been searching for her. Reid was convicted of violating the Mann Act, which prohibits knowingly transporting a minor in interstate commerce with intent that the minor engage in illegal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a) and sentenced to 198 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges concerning being allowed only nine peremptory challenges in the selection of the jury that convicted him; to the admission of evidence concerning his in-state sexual encounters with J.H.; in the application of an “undue influence” enhancement at his sentencing; and in the calculation of his criminal history score. View "United States v. Reid" on Justia Law