Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1957, the FDA approved propoxyphene for the treatment of mild to moderate pain, under the trade name Darvon. In 1972, the manufacturer obtained FDA approval to market another product combining propoxyphene with acetaminophen, under the name Darvocet. Because the new drug application (NDA) process is onerous, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, (Hatch-Waxman Act) to make available more low cost generic drugs. Generic drugs require an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) showing that the drug is equivalent to and that labeling proposed is the same approved for the brand-name drug. Several companies obtained approval to market generic versions of Darvon and Darvocet. Complaints about perceived risks associated with propoxyphene began in 1978; eventually the United Kingdom withdrew it from the market. Two FDA advisory committees recommended withdrawal from the market, but the FDA ordered the NDA holder to change the label to include “Black Box” warnings and to undertake a clinical trial to assess the risks of a particular cardiac complication. In 2010, the FDA determined that the risks of propoxyphene outweighed its benefits and ordered its removal from the market. Plaintiffs in 68 consolidated cases alleged that they ingested propoxyphene products prior to its withdrawal and that manufacturers continued marketing propoxyphene after they knew or should have known that risks exceeded benefits. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, except with respect to one plaintiff.View "Germain v. Teva Pharm, USA, Inc" on Justia Law

Daily Services, owned by Mason, provided short-term temporary employment services. Mason also owned I-Force, which provided longer-term temporary employment services. After losing coverage under the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation group insurance rating plan, I-Force unsuccessfully applied for self-insurance status. I-Force owed $3 million in premiums. Unable to make payments, I-Force closed. Daily acquired some of its customers and began offering longer-term temporary employment services. Ohio law provides the employer with notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Bureau may file a judgment or lien against it and allows the Bureau to deem one company the successor of another for purposes of an experience rating to calculate premiums, and, if an employer “wholly succeeds another in the operation of a business,” to transfer the obligation to pay unpaid premiums. The Bureau decided that Daily wholly succeeded I-Force, but did not provide notice of its assessment or an opportunity to be heard before it filed judgments and liens against Daily for more than $54 million. A state court vacated the judgments. The Bureau tried again and provided prior notice, but filed a lien before hearing an appeal. The court again vacated. The Bureau’s efforts to recover continue. Daily sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of procedural due process. The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, recognizing that under the Supreme Court decision Parratt v. Taylor, a state may sometimes satisfy due process without providing notice or an opportunity to be heard pre-deprivation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Parratt doctrine does apply, and Daily did not plead that Ohio provided inadequate post- deprivation remedies . View "Daily Services, LLC v. Valentino" on Justia Law

Irwin and Fannin owned Portsmouth Ambulance, and Urgent Care Transports. In 2000, 2002, and 2005, they failed to pay federal employment and corporate income taxes for Urgent Care; the IRS recorded tax liens. Irwin and Fannin entered into a stock-purchase- agreement in 2006 and transferred 86% of the Portsmouth stock to new owners. The agreement gave the new owners an option to purchase the stock of Urgent Care. Portsmouth exercised the option and Urgent Care became its wholly-owned subsidiary. Irwin and Fannin notified the IRS of the change. Because of its outstanding tax liability, the IRS ordered a sale of Urgent Care’s assets. The sale did not raise sufficient funds. The new owners failed to pay federal employment taxes for 2008, and notice of tax liens was recorded. The IRS also filed a notice of federal tax lien against Portsmouth Ambulance as the alter ego of Urgent Care. A creditor bank sold the company’s assets and Portsmouth ceased operations. From sales proceeds, $333,769.24 was applied to Urgent Care’s tax liabilities and $302,818.16 was used to reduce Portsmouth’s tax liability. Portsmouth objected, arguing that it was not the alter ego of Urgent Care and filed refund claims, which the IRS either did not address or denied. The district court dismissed a suit, holding that 26 U.S.C. 6325(b)(4) and 7426(a)(4), established an exclusive procedure to seek refunds for satisfaction of a tax lien by a property owner with respect to another party’s tax liability and that a request for damages for allegedly unauthorized collection action was time-barred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Portsmouth Ambulance, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2001, ASC and Paragon entered into a contract to develop and support computer software for the Chicago Tribune. This software, called the “Single Copy Distribution System” (SCDS) would allow the Tribune to manage and track newspaper deliveries and subscriptions. Tensions emerged and Paragon terminated the contract in 2003. ASC successfully sued Paragon in Ohio state court, obtaining a declaration that ASC was the sole owner of the SCDS. In federal court, ASC alleged copyright infringement, trademark infringement, breach of contract, conversion, tortious interference with a business relationship, unjust enrichment, and unfair competition based on Paragon’s alleged copying of the SCDS software to use in its DRACI software, developed in 2004 for another newspaper. After eight years of litigation, the district court granted summary judgment to Paragon on all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that ASC had never submitted any evidence identifying the unique protectable elements of SCDS, and that there was insufficient evidence to generate even an implication that DRACI is substantially similar to SCDS. View "Automated Solutions Corp. v. Paragon Data Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Under investigation for drug trafficking, Kennedy learned from his attorney that he might be able to reduce his sentencing exposure by pleading guilty to an information. He consulted a second attorney, who promised to beat the case. Kennedy switched attorneys, heard from his new attorney the government might be bluffing, and decided not to negotiate a plea. The government indicted him on multiple drug-trafficking, firearms, and money-laundering charges and then caught him accepting a marijuana shipment. After changing attorneys twice more, Kennedy pleaded guilty and received a below-guidelines sentence of 180 months. Kennedy later moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that he would have negotiated a pre-indictment plea and received a lower sentence but for the ineffective assistance of his second attorney. The district court denied the motion based on precedent holding that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in pre-indictment plea negotiations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel at critical stages of a criminal proceeding, including some pretrial proceedings, such as post-indictment interrogations, post-indictment identifications, and post-indictment plea negotiations, but the Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel “does not attach until the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings.” View "Kennedy v. United States" on Justia Law

Mazzio, a federal prisoner serving two concurrent 240-month prison sentences for drug distribution, sought to file a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, relying on the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Alleyne v. United States, and claiming that he is entitled to relief because the factual basis on which his mandatory-minimum, 20-year sentence was imposed was not found by a jury. The Sixth Circuit denied his petition. To secure review of the substantive claim, “[a] second or successive motion must . . . contain . . . a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” 28 U.S.C. 2255(h)(2). Alleyne has not been made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. View "In re: Mazzio" on Justia Law

In 2002, after buying crack cocaine from Liles, Cunningham and his brother, went to rob Liles at his Lima home. After visiting with the occupants, Cunningham produced a gun. Several adults and children were gathered in the kitchen. Cunningham held the group at gunpoint while Jackson used a second gun to force Liles upstairs, where he robbed him of drugs and money. They returned to the kitchen. The group was ordered to hand over their valuables. Jackson and Cunningham shot every occupant of the house. Liles and five others survived. Two children died of their wounds. The police did not recover either gun. Based on an accomplice-liability theory, a jury found Cunningham guilty of two counts of aggravated murder with death-penalty specifications: committing murder during an aggravated robbery and engaging in conduct involving the purposeful killing of multiple people. He was sentenced to death. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected a direct appeal. In an unsuccessful state petition for post-conviction relief he claimed that a juror obtained negative information about him from colleagues where she worked. The federal district court denied Cunningham’s habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, juror bias, voir dire error, erroneous jury instructions, a Brady violation, and prosecutorial misconduct. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded a claim that the jury foreperson had a relationship with the victims’ families that impacted her impartiality. The claim was not exhausted nor procedurally defaulted and is “not plainly meritless.” View "Cunningham v. Hudson" on Justia Law

Various Community Groups and the Detroit International Bridge Company sued the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), challenging the Record of Decision (ROD) issued in 2009, selecting the Delray neighborhood of Detroit as the preferred location alternative for a new international bridge crossing between the U.S. and Canada. The Bridge Company owns and operates the existing Ambassador Bridge, about two miles from the proposed new crossing. The Bridge Company also owns property in the Delray neighborhood. The complaint alleged that selecting the Delray neighborhood as the preferred alternative violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act; Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA); and “applicable legal authorities” on environmental justice, essentially because the decision was arbitrary and capricious.” The district court held that the Bridge Company had prudential standing to challenge the ROD and affirmed the ROD. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting extensive study of the project. View "Latin Ams. for Social & Econ. Dev. v. Adm'r of Fed. Highway Admin." on Justia Law

Sheya and Mtandazo Mandebvu are school teachers who spoke out criticizing Robert Mugabe’s violent and corrupt Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party and government. Sheva came to the U.S. in 1999 and earned two masters’ degrees by 2006, never returning to Zimbabwe. Mtandazo came to the U.S. with their two children in 2000 after being forced into hiding for her political activities in Zimbabwe. Other family members have also been beaten, detained, or threatened. As they grew more concerned with deteriorating conditions in Zimbabwe, Sheya and Mtandazo became politically active with ZANU-PF’s opposition in the U.S. They attempted to file for asylum in 2005 but, through no fault of their own, the applications were never filed. They were served with notices that they were subject to removal in 2007 and filed applications for asylum and withholding of removal in 2008. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed an Immigration Judge’s denial of the Mandebvus’ applications The Sixth Circuit remanded, finding that the decision that the asylum applications were untimely was infected by legal error and that the evidence showed that it is likely that the Mandebvus will be persecuted for their political opinion or tortured if returned to Zimbabwe.View "Mandebvu v. Holder" on Justia Law

The Dirty World website enables users to anonymously upload comments, photographs, and video, which Richie selects and publishes along with his own editorial comments. Jones is a Kentucky high school teacher and a member of the cheerleading squad for the Cincinnati Bengals football team. She was the subject of several submissions posted by anonymous users and of editorial remarks posted by Richie, including photographs of Jones and a statement that she “slept with every other Bengal Football player.” Jones requested that the post be removed. Richie declined. A subsequent post alleged that her former boyfriend “tested positive for Chlamydia Infection and Gonorrhea ... sure Sarah also has both ... he brags about doing sarah in … her class room at the school she teaches at DIXIE Heights." Richie's responded to the post: “Why are all high school teachers freaks in the sack?” Jones brought claims of defamation, libel per se, false light, and intentional inflection of emotional distress. The district court rejected arguments that the claims were barred by the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C. 230. A second trial resulted in a verdict for $38,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Under the CDA, Richie and Dirty World were neither creators nor developers of the challenged content. Jones’s tort claims are grounded on the statements of another content provider, but sought to impose liability on Dirty World and Richie as if they were the publishers or speakers of those statements. Section 230(c)(1) bars those claims. View "Jones v. Dirty World Entm't" on Justia Law