Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Left Fork’s Straight Creek underground coal mine is subject to inspections under the Federal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. 801, enforced by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). During a 2011 inspection, MSHA inspector Middleton noted elevated methane gas readings and issued a No Access Order that closed the mine, except for ventilation, required examinations, re-energizing of power, monitoring seals, and de-watering. Left Fork proposed an investigation, but, because of the No Access Order, was required to submit an abatement plan, which it did the next day. MSHA did not respond, but issued an order alleging failure to submit a plan. Left Fork submitted another plan, which was denied in writing. Negotiations failed. On January 11, 2012, MSHA ordered that Left Fork de-energize all power and withdraw all miners. Underground pumps shut down; the mine flooded. On January 17, Left Fork sought a hearing before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, which was held on January 30-31. It did not request temporary interim relief. On April 3, an ALJ invalidated the abatement orders. Neither party appealed. Left Fork had experienced flood damage and sought compensation for MHSA’s “malicious and retaliatory” actions. The court found that it did not satisfy requirements of the Federal Torts Claims Act for state common-law claims against MSHA employees and was precluded by the Mine Act from a remedy under Bivens. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the existence of an alternate statutory remedial scheme precluded a judicially-created damages remedy. View "Left Fork Mining Co., Inc. v. Hooker" on Justia Law

In 1983, Clifton was convicted of grand larceny, found to be a habitual criminal, and sentenced to life in prison. In 2010, Clifton was paroled. Tennessee’s Court Cost Center sent Clifton an invoice for $124 in outstanding court costs. Clifton attempted to pay and contacted the Center to establish a payment plan. Months later, the Board of Probation and Parole issued an arrest warrant, alleging that Clifton had engaged in “intimidating and threatening behavior.” After a hearing, the board recommended parole revocation. His appeal was denied. Although his certiorari petition was timely, the court clerk refused it because Clifton had unpaid court costs. A notice of appeal was returned unfiled for the same reason, referring to costs totaling $1,449; the decision complied with a chancery court Standing Order, which refers to Tenn. Code 41-21-812. Clifton filed a pro se habeas corpus petition. The district court acknowledged Clifton’s contention that he was unfairly prevented from filing his state appeal, but concluded that the claims were procedurally defaulted and that Clifton had not established “cause” and “prejudice” to overcome that default. The Eighth Circuit held that Tennessee may not constitutionally require that prior expenses be paid in full before permitting a prisoner to file a habeas petition challenging the constitutionality of probation revocation. View "Clifton v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

The FAA may “delegate to a qualified private person . . . the examination, testing, and inspection necessary to issue a certificate … and … issuing the certificate,” 49 U.S.C. 44702(d)(1), and may rescind delegation “at any time for any reason.” Airworthiness Representative-Maintenance (DAR-T) authorization to conduct aircraft inspections and issue airworthiness certificates has no expiration. Burdue was appointed as a DAR-T in 2001. In 2013, Burdue’s supervisors were informed of issues related to Burdue’s export certifications. The FAA’s Special Emphasis Investigations Team (SEIT) concluded that Burdue performed multiple aircraft inspections out of his assigned geographic area without authorization and had issued export certificates to aircraft owned by his wife, a conflict of interest. After review of Burdue’s response, Burdue’s certificate was revoked, both “for cause,” 14 C.F.R. 183.15(b)(4) and under the discretionary-revocation provision, 14 C.F.R. 183.15(b)(6). An Appeal Panel affirmed. Burdue brought a Bivens action, claiming due process violations and wrongful termination, then filed statutory claims in the Sixth Circuit. The district court stayed the Bivens proceedings. The Sixth Circuit declined to review the statutory claims because the FAA’s decision is committed to agency discretion and declined to review the constitutional claims that belong in the district court View "Burdue v. Fed. Aviation Admin." on Justia Law

Based on his sexual relationship with a 16-yar-old boy, which included nude photographs and a trip to Florida, the district court found Wright (then age 60) guilty on five counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), (e), and one count each of transporting images of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1) & (b)(1) (count 6), and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A (count 7). He was sentenced to concurrent 15-year terms. Wright stated to the Probation Officer who prepared the PSR that because the age of consent in Michigan is 16, Wright did not believe that photographing the boy in the nude was illegal. Wright told the Probation Officer who prepared the PSR that because the age of consent in Michigan is 16, Wright did not believe that photographing the boy in the nude was illegal. Wright appealed his convictions on counts 1 through 6. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the “use” element of the sexual exploitation statute is satisfied if a minor is photographed in order to create pornography. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

A confidential informant told DHS that Garcia and Villegas were selling crystal meth in Michigan; he arranged a meeting between an undercover officer posing as a meth dealer and Garcia. The officer offered to purchase 20 pounds of crystal methamphetamine, which Garcia promised to provide. After they completed a smaller transaction, Garcia became suspicious, and, via the CI, asked to delay the transaction. The conspirators ultimately called off the deal, packed cash and methamphetamine into the wheel wells of a vehicle that Kellerman drove toward Kansas City. He was pulled over by police, who conducted discovered the meth. Garcia gave his wife $10,000 cash to buy Villegas a car to return to Kansas City. The cash included marked bills from the controlled buy. While looking at a vehicle, Villegas was arrested. The others were arrested and searches of their property revealed crystal meth, assault rifles, ammunition, cash, and other evidence. They pled guilty and testified against Villegas. Villegas received a 325-month sentence for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims based on denial of his motion to compel disclosure of the informant’s name on the record and allow the informant to testify and sentencing enhancements for leadership, firearms possession, and obstruction of justice. View "United States v. Sierra-Villegas" on Justia Law

Gumm is mentally retarded, with an IQ of approximately 70. He was convicted of the kidnapping, attempted rape, and murder of a 10-year-old and was sentenced to death. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal, and his post-conviction petition was found to lack merit by the Ohio state courts. After he sought federal habeas corpus, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) that persons who are mentally retarded cannot be executed. In a post-Atkins petition, Ohio courts adjudicated Gumm mentally retarded and reduced his sentence to 30 years to life in prison, but rejected non-Atkins claims. On federal habeas review, the court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus on claims that the government failed to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland; that Gumm received an unfair trial due to improper admission of incendiary prior bad acts evidence; that admission of a psychiatric report violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause; and that the prosecutor’s elicitation of inflammatory testimony and admission of psychiatric reports constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the grant of the conditional writ of habeas corpus based on Gumm’s Brady and prosecutorial misconduct claims. View "Gumm v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Yoder hosts auctions for used construction equipment. Its largest annual auction is in Florida. Efacts, owned by Garafola, provides auctioneers with online bidding platforms. In 2003, Yoder began accepting live Internet bids during the Florida auction. Efacts provided services. Efacts received and maintained confidential customer information relating to Yoder’s auctions. In 2008 the companies had a falling out. Yoder terminated the contract and hired RTB, another online bidding services company. On February 7-9, 2010, Efacts accessed the RTB bidding platform without authorization, using an RTB administrative username and password. Garafola was aware of the username and password combination from Efacts’ prior relationship with Yoder and submitted winning bids with a combined price of $41,000 for which it did not pay. On February 10- 11, an Efacts employee gained unauthorized access to the RTB platform, posing as a Yoder customer, and placed 18 winning bids with a combined price of $1,212,074 which were not paid. The Sixth Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Yoder, rejecting claims based on denial of spoliation sanctions; denial of hearsay objections to documents produced by internet service providers; denial of summary judgment on Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim; and imposition of sanctions under FRCP 37. View "Yoder & Frey Auctioneers, Inc v. EquipmentFacts, LLC" on Justia Law

Despite the complete absence of physical evidence and Bies’ repeated proclamations of innocence, Bies was convicted and sentenced to death in Ohio state court in 1992 for the kidnapping, assault, and urder of a 10-year-old boy. The case against Bies rested almost entirely upon an unrecorded statement that Bies allegedly made to the police following a prolonged and highly suggestive custodial interrogation. The Ohio courts upheld Bies’ convictions on direct appeal and in post-conviction proceedings, but vacated Bies’ death sentence after determining that he is intellectually disabled, and that his execution is barred by the Eighth Amendment. In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, Bies challenged his convictions and sought a new trial. He claims that the government withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady; that the trial court improperly allowed Bies’ custodial statements to be admitted at trial; and that Bies’ attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus based on the Brady violation, and denied relief on the remaining claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the Brady claim, and declined to consider the remaining claims. View "Bies v. Sheldon" on Justia Law

Elvira was driving a car, owned by Mullalli, when she hit ice and collided with a negligently parked vehicle. Elvira, who suffered a traumatic brain injury, acute cervical and lumbar sprains, bulging discs, and other injuries, sued in federal court to recover under Mullalli’s no-fault State Farm automobile insurance policy,. Elvira and Mullalli are citizens of Michigan; State Farm is an Illinois citizen. The district court dismissed for lack of diversity jurisdiction, reasoning that the suit was a “direct action” under 28 U.S.C. 1332(c)(1), requiring Mullalli’s Michigan citizenship to be imputed to State Farm. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Because the direct action proviso does not apply to suits brought against the insurer by insured persons identifiable before the accident occurs, this suit was not a direct action and Mullalli’s citizenship should not have been imputed to State Farm. The court distinguished between the personal protection provisions of Michigan’s no-fault law that require coverage of an identifiable group of individuals: the named insured, a spouse, any relatives living with them, and any occupant of a car they own and the property protection provision of the statute, which states simply that “an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental damage.” View "Ljuljdjuraj v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Greco drank wine, drove her car into a ditch, and walked to a nearby gas station where she met EMTs refueling their ambulance. They smelled alcohol on her breath and called the police. Greco ran behind the station. Deputy Clayton arrived with his canine, Diago, other officers, and civilian “ride along,” Stuart. Clayton instructed Diago to track Greco. Clayton claims he was concerned about Greco’s well-being because, despite cold and wet weather, Greco was wearing sandals and a short-sleeved shirt. Clayton thought she might be injured. He announced their presence and entered a “swamp area,” slipped and fell, looked up and heard screaming as Diago bit Greco’s leg. Clayton waited for Greco to stop moving so he could ensure she was weaponless. After “10 to 20 seconds,” Clayton released Diago and summoned the EMTs. Greco claims she ran to “bushes” scared, alone, and needing to pee and was squatting when men approached with a dog, shouting “put your hands on your head.” Clayton “sicked the dog.” She dropped to protect herself, but the dog held on. Stuart agrees that the “woods” were slippery and that Greco was belligerent and on her back kicking the dog. Greco had a thigh injury and filed suit. The district court denied the defendants summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, holding that a jury could reasonably believe that Clayton intentionally detained Greco with an unconstitutional level of force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the conflicting claims. View "Greco v. Cnty. of Livingston" on Justia Law