Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Paula S. Linden applied for Social Security benefits online in September 2014 at the age of 62, which was before her full retirement age of 66. As a result, she received smaller monthly payments than she would have if she had waited until 66. Linden claimed that she applied early based on misinformation from the Social Security Administration (SSA), which allegedly told her that she would receive the same benefits as if she had applied at 66. She sought to have her benefits recalculated as if she had applied at 66.The SSA denied her request, both initially and upon reconsideration. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) also ruled against her, stating that the statutory provision she cited, 42 U.S.C. § 402(j)(5), only applied to individuals who failed to apply for benefits due to misinformation. The ALJ also found insufficient evidence that Linden received misinformation from the SSA. The Appeals Council denied her request for review. Linden then filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, which granted summary judgment in favor of the SSA and denied Linden’s motion for summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plain text of 42 U.S.C. § 402(j)(5) precluded Linden’s recovery because the statute only applies to individuals who failed to apply for benefits due to misinformation. Since Linden did apply for benefits, she did not meet the statutory requirement. The court also found that the SSA’s regulations supported this interpretation. Additionally, the court noted that even if there was misinformation, it would not change the outcome because Linden did not fail to apply for benefits. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Linden v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

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Gina Burt filed a lawsuit against Playtika, Ltd. and Playtika Holding Corporation in Tennessee state court, seeking to recover alleged gambling losses incurred by Tennessee residents who played Playtika’s online games. Burt's claim was based on Tennessee Code Ann. § 29-19-105, which allows recovery of gambling losses. Playtika removed the case to federal court, invoking jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and traditional diversity jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee remanded the case to state court. The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction because Burt’s suit was not a “class action” under CAFA, and the losses of the Tennessee players could not be aggregated to meet the amount in controversy requirement for traditional diversity jurisdiction. Playtika appealed the remand order under CAFA’s expedited removal appeal provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s remand order. The appellate court held that Burt lacked Article III standing to proceed in federal court because she did not allege that she personally suffered any gambling loss. The court found that Burt’s claim to recover losses on behalf of other Tennessee residents did not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing. Additionally, the court rejected Burt’s argument that she had standing under a qui tam theory, concluding that Tennessee Code Ann. § 29-19-105 is not a qui tam statute. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to remand the case to state court. View "Burt v. Playtika, Ltd." on Justia Law

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In 1979, Karu Gene White, along with two accomplices, committed a brutal home invasion and murder of three elderly individuals in Kentucky. White, who had known the victims, planned the crime to steal money they had saved. The victims were beaten to death with a crowbar and other weapons. White was subsequently arrested and charged with burglary, robbery, and capital murder.At trial, White's defense initially focused on an alibi, but this strategy collapsed when one of his accomplices agreed to testify against him in exchange for immunity. White's counsel then pursued an insanity defense, presenting evidence of White's abusive and traumatic childhood. Despite this, the jury found White guilty on all counts and recommended the death penalty, which the trial judge imposed.White appealed his conviction and sentence, but the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the decision, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. White then sought post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence. The Kentucky Supreme Court ultimately rejected this claim, finding that counsel's performance was reasonable and that additional mitigating evidence would not have changed the jury's decision.White filed for federal habeas relief, which was denied by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The court found that counsel's investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence were reasonable and that the Kentucky Supreme Court's application of Strickland v. Washington was not unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that White's counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and that there was no substantial likelihood that additional mitigating evidence would have changed the jury's recommendation for the death penalty. View "White v. Plappert" on Justia Law

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Bradley Patton was arrested in Rutherford County, Tennessee, and charged with drug and firearm offenses. He posted bail multiple times, but his bail was eventually increased to $126,000. Under local rules, because his bail exceeded $75,000, he had to prove in a hearing that the bail money was not derived from criminal activities. Patton filed a class-action lawsuit in federal court, claiming that this local rule violated his due-process and Eighth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed Patton's claims, ruling that they were moot because he had been released from pretrial custody and there was no ongoing harm. The court also found that Patton could not rely on the putative class's standing to preserve his claims and rejected his argument that the claims were capable of repetition yet evading review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Patton's claims fell within the "inherently transitory" exception to mootness for class-action claims. The court noted that pretrial detention is inherently temporary and that other class members would likely suffer the same injury. The court also found that the district court's decision to reserve the deadline for filing a motion for class certification meant that Patton should not be penalized for not filing such a motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Patton v. Fitzhugh" on Justia Law

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Nuzaira Rahman, a Bangladeshi national, entered the U.S. in 1992 on an H-4 visa and overstayed. She married Abrar Haque, a U.S. citizen, and had five children. Rahman faced removal proceedings after her visa expired and was ordered removed in absentia in 1998. Despite this, she obtained lawful permanent residence in 2000 through a petition by Haque. Rahman was later convicted of using a fraudulent social security number, leading to renewed removal proceedings. In 2019, an immigration judge ordered her removal, citing her inadmissibility due to prior unlawful presence and fraud.The immigration judge denied Rahman's requests for waivers of inadmissibility, finding she failed to prove her removal would cause extreme hardship to her spouse, Haque. The judge also questioned the legitimacy of their marriage and Rahman's credibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the judge's decision, agreeing that Rahman did not demonstrate the required hardship.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Rahman argued that the Board's hardship determination should be reviewable as a mixed question of law and fact. However, the court held that the statutory language "to the satisfaction of the Attorney General" in the waiver provisions made the hardship determination a discretionary decision, not subject to judicial review. The court dismissed Rahman's petition for review, concluding it lacked jurisdiction to review the Board's discretionary hardship determination. View "Rahman v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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The Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (Sault Tribe) objected to the district court’s entry of the 2023 Great Lakes Fishing Decree, which resulted from a three-year negotiation among seven sovereigns, including the United States, the State of Michigan, and several Indian tribes. The 2023 Decree aimed to balance the Tribes’ treaty-reserved fishing rights with the preservation of the fishery waters. The Sault Tribe argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the decree without its consent and failed to evaluate the decree’s tribal fishing regulations based on the standard set out in People v. LeBlanc.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan overruled the Sault Tribe’s objections and entered the 2023 Decree, binding the Sault Tribe to its terms. The court concluded that it had the authority to approve the decree based on its continuing jurisdiction and equitable powers, and that the LeBlanc standard did not apply because the decree was a product of negotiation, not unilateral state regulation. The court also found that the Sault Tribe’s specific objections did not show that the decree was unreasonable or inconsistent with the treaty or the law of the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s entry of the 2023 Decree. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising its continuing jurisdiction and inherent equitable power to enter the decree over the Sault Tribe’s objections. The court found that the district court had followed the appropriate legal standards and provided the Sault Tribe with due process by allowing it to file objections, present evidence, and argue its objections in an oral hearing. The appellate court also dismissed as moot the Sault Tribe’s appeal of the district court’s order extending the 2000 Decree, as the 2000 Decree was no longer in effect. View "United States v. Michigan" on Justia Law

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Kevin Obi provided a 21-year-old woman with a fatal dose of heroin, leading to her death. Obi and the victim, along with friends, returned to his home from a bar, where they snorted heroin and had sex. The victim became unconscious, and Obi later encouraged a friend to have sex with her. The friend realized she was not breathing, and Obi called 911, but the victim was pronounced dead. Obi initially lied to the police about drug use. He eventually pleaded guilty to providing the fatal heroin.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan initially sentenced Obi to 300 months, including a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice and additional criminal history points. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing due to insufficient support for the obstruction enhancement. At resentencing, the district court reaffirmed the 300-month sentence, citing additional evidence and an independent discretionary basis for the sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding any guidelines error harmless due to the district court's discretionary basis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Obi's appeal of his reduced sentence following a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court recalculated Obi's guidelines range, reducing his sentence from 300 to 293 months. Obi challenged this reduction as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding no procedural error in the guidelines calculation and determining that the district court appropriately considered the seriousness of Obi's crime and the applicable sentencing factors. The court held that the 293-month sentence was reasonable and within the amended guidelines range. View "United States v. Obi" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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George Clark and Kevin Harrington were convicted of murder based on the testimony of a single eyewitness, Bearia Stewart, who later claimed she was coerced by detectives to lie. After nearly two decades in prison, the Wayne County Prosecution Integrity Unit found that Clark and Harrington did not receive a fair trial, leading to the dismissal of charges and their release. Clark and Harrington then sued the detectives, alleging constitutional violations.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted in part and denied in part the detectives' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court denied qualified immunity on claims that the detectives fabricated the eyewitness statement, facilitated prosecution without probable cause, and violated the Brady rule by withholding evidence of coercion and benefits offered to key witnesses. The detectives appealed the denial of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity, holding that there was sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the fabrication of evidence and the lack of probable cause. The court also held that the detectives' actions, if proven, violated clearly established constitutional rights. The case was remanded for trial on the merits. View "Clark v. Abdallah" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Rights
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Bhavanaben Patel, her husband Dinesh, and their two sons, natives of India, fled to the United States due to threats from loan sharks in Gujarat, India, after Dinesh accumulated significant debt. The family did not report these threats to local authorities due to a lack of "legal proof." Upon arrival in the U.S. without proper documentation, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. Bhavanaben sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) for her family, arguing they would face harm from the loan sharks if returned to India.An immigration judge denied the family's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The Patels appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed their appeal, leading them to petition the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for review.The Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA's legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. The court found that the BIA's conclusion of no nexus between the Patels' risk of future persecution and their membership in a particular social group was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the threats from the loan sharks were motivated by a desire for financial gain rather than animus toward a protected group. Additionally, the court found that the Patels' failure to report the threats to local authorities undermined their CAT claims, as there was no evidence that Indian officials would acquiesce to the loan sharks' conduct.The Sixth Circuit denied the petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision to reject the Patels' applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. View "Patel v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Misty Coleman alleges that she fell and broke her ankle after slipping on a wet shower floor in a county jail. She pursued constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and negligence claims under Ohio law against the county, corrections officers, and medical personnel. Coleman claimed that the slippery shower violated the Due Process Clause and that a county policy or custom was behind her poor medical care. She also questioned whether the county could invoke state-law immunity from her negligence claim at the pleading stage.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed all claims against all parties. The court found that Coleman failed to allege a plausible constitutional violation regarding the slippery shower and did not connect the inadequate medical care to a county policy or custom. The court also held that Ohio law granted immunity to Hamilton County on the negligence claim. The court allowed Coleman to conduct limited discovery to identify unnamed officers and nurses, but her subsequent amended complaint was dismissed as it was filed outside the statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court's dismissal, holding that Coleman’s claims accrued on the date of her accident and that her amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The court also found that Coleman did not meet the requirements for equitable tolling, as she did not allege facts showing that she was intentionally misled or tricked into missing the deadline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Coleman’s complaint. View "Coleman v. Hamilton County Bd. of County Commissioners" on Justia Law