Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During a late-night traffic stop in Grand Rapids, Michigan, officers pulled over a vehicle for a traffic violation. The driver consented to a search of the car. Officers asked passenger Fahirri Dannah to exit the vehicle and attempted to frisk him for weapons. Despite repeated commands to place his hands on his head, Dannah moved his hands toward his waist and disregarded officers’ instructions. As the frisk began, Dannah pulled away and attempted to flee. Officers tackled him, and during a prolonged struggle marked by Dannah’s resistance, they used physical force, including punching and restraining him, until he was handcuffed. Dannah was arrested for assault, battery, and resisting a police officer.Dannah subsequently filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers and the City of Grand Rapids, alleging unlawful search, seizure, and excessive force. The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted summary judgment to Officer Kaiser on the search and seizure claims and to the City on the Monell claim, but denied summary judgment to several officers on the excessive force claims, rejecting their qualified immunity defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity. The court held that, even taking the facts in Dannah’s favor, precedent did not clearly establish that the officers’ use of force in response to Dannah’s active, physical resistance during an interrupted frisk was excessive under the Fourth Amendment. The court distinguished prior cases cited by Dannah and concluded that the officers did not violate any clearly established law. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the officers on the excessive force claims. View "Dannah v. City of Grand Rapids" on Justia Law

A fire destroyed the home of Julie and Matthew Halbower in Michigan, resulting in the loss of five valuable artworks held by the Halbower Legacy Trust. Three of the paintings were acknowledged as covered under an insurance policy procured through a Lloyd’s Broker, with Hiscox Syndicate 33 listed as the underwriter. Hiscox paid for those three but denied coverage for two others, claiming they were not included in the insurance schedule held by the Lloyd’s Broker. Julie, as trustee, then sued Hiscox for breach of contract and declaratory judgment in Michigan state court, seeking the value of the two denied paintings.After removal to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Hiscox moved to dismiss the action. The district court granted the motion, finding that the insurance policy only covered works listed in the schedule maintained by the Lloyd’s Broker, and thus the denied paintings were not covered. Julie appealed that decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether diversity jurisdiction was properly established. The court explained that the citizenship of the Lloyd’s Syndicate for jurisdictional purposes depends on the citizenship of each underwriting member (known as "Names"), not just the Managing Agent. The district court had relied only on the Managing Agent’s citizenship, which was insufficient. The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, including discovery to establish the citizenship of each underwriting Name of Hiscox Syndicate 33, as required for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). View "Halbower v. Hiscox Syndicate 33 of Lloyd's of London" on Justia Law

A Nigerian citizen entered the United States in 2002 on a business visa, which expired the following year. He remained in the country, married, later separated, and began living with a new partner, a U.S. citizen, with whom he has three children. The government initiated removal proceedings against him in 2010. He conceded removability but sought withholding of removal, alleging he would face danger in Nigeria due to his father’s kidnapping in 2004, and applied for cancellation of removal based on the potential hardship to his children if he were deported.An immigration judge denied both forms of relief. For withholding of removal, the judge found the petitioner credible but ruled that he failed to sufficiently corroborate his testimony about his father’s kidnapping, as he did not provide police, court records, or affidavits from family members that would support his claims. For cancellation of removal, the judge determined the petitioner had not shown that his removal would impose the required “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” on his children, noting that the children would remain in the U.S., are healthy, and that their mother works full-time as a nurse. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge's decision on both grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision, applying a highly deferential standard for factual findings. The court held that a reasonable factfinder could require corroborating evidence for the kidnapping claim and that the petitioner had adequate opportunity to explain its absence. Regarding cancellation of removal, the court found that the evidence did not compel a finding of the requisite hardship to the petitioner’s children. The court denied the petition for review, upholding the decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the immigration judge. View "Nwosu v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Between 2007 and 2016, a group operating from Romania, including the defendant, engaged in a range of cybercrimes targeting U.S. victims. Their activities included an eBay auction fraud scheme, cryptocurrency mining, and identity theft, which together infected tens of thousands of computers and resulted in millions of dollars in losses. The defendant, along with two co-conspirators, was indicted on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and money laundering. One co-conspirator pleaded guilty, while the defendant and another went to trial and were convicted on all counts except for a sentencing enhancement.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio initially sentenced the defendant to 216 months' imprisonment and did not impose restitution, after the government stated it was not seeking restitution at that time. In contrast, the co-conspirator who pleaded guilty was ordered to pay substantial restitution. The defendant appealed certain sentencing enhancements, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed some enhancements, reversed others, and remanded the case for resentencing. On remand, the district court treated the remand as a general one, held a de novo resentencing, and imposed restitution for the first time in the amount of $853,651.99, to be shared jointly and severally with co-defendants. The defendant did not object to restitution at resentencing but subsequently appealed, arguing that restitution had been waived, that he was denied access to the underlying restitution information, and that the imposition of restitution was vindictive.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that, under its precedent, a general remand permits the government to seek restitution even if it was previously waived, and that restitution was mandatory under the relevant statute. However, the court found plain error in the process used, as the defendant was not provided with the underlying restitution information as required. The court affirmed the imposition of restitution but vacated and remanded for resentencing on the restitution amount. View "United States v. Miclaus" on Justia Law

Flight Options, a company providing fractional-share private jet services, charged its clients both fixed monthly management fees (covering overhead, maintenance, and administrative costs) and usage fees based on actual flight time. For years, Flight Options, consistent with industry practice and IRS guidance, collected federal excise tax only on the usage fees, not the fixed fees. This approach was based on the understanding that the excise tax under 26 U.S.C. § 4261 applied only to payments for actual air transportation, not general overhead.The Internal Revenue Service later changed its position and assessed approximately $39 million in taxes, interest, and penalties against Flight Options for the period between 2009 and 2012, claiming the excise tax should also have been collected on the fixed management fees. Flight Options challenged the assessment in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The magistrate judge ruled in favor of the government, holding that the fixed fees were subject to the excise tax and imposing penalties for failure to collect.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the statutory language, context, and relevant regulations. The court found that the excise tax applies only to amounts paid for specific flights (usage fees) and not to fixed overhead or management charges. The court emphasized the need for "precise and not speculative" notice to third-party tax collectors before imposing withholding obligations, which the IRS had not provided regarding fixed fees. The court also rejected the government's argument that informal IRS guidance or internal memoranda could create such an obligation. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court, holding that Flight Options was not liable for the assessed taxes, interest, or penalties on the fixed fees. View "Flight Options, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

A property owner in Bay County, Michigan, failed to pay property taxes in 2019, resulting in the county initiating a foreclosure process under Michigan’s General Property Tax Act (GPTA). After a three-year timeline, a Michigan circuit court entered a foreclosure judgment in February 2022, which would vest absolute title in the county treasurer if the tax debt was not paid by March 31, 2022. The owner did not pay, and the county received title. Shortly after, the owner filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and sought to avoid the transfer of title as a preferential transfer under the Bankruptcy Code. The county treasurer withdrew the property from auction due to the bankruptcy filing. The parties stipulated to key facts, including the amount of debt, estimated property value, and minimum bid, but disputed whether the transfer met the requirements for avoidance under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the county treasurer, finding that although the transfer occurred within the 90-day lookback period, the owner failed to satisfy the "more than" test under § 547(b)(5). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan affirmed, agreeing that the owner could not show the transfer enabled the treasurer to receive more than he would in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The Sixth Circuit held that the transfer occurred within the 90-day lookback period, and that the owner established the transfer was preferential under § 547(b)(4) and § 547(b)(5), specifically because the treasurer would receive a 5% sales commission not available in Chapter 7 liquidation. The district court’s judgment was reversed. View "Reinhardt v. Prince" on Justia Law

George Bernard Worrell, Jr., a foundational member and arranger for the musical group Parliament-Funkadelic, collaborated with George Clinton and Thang, Inc. from 1969 to 1981. In 1976, Worrell was presented with a contract (the “1976 Agreement”) by Thang, Inc., which purported to grant Thang full ownership of sound recordings Worrell contributed to, in exchange for royalties. Over the years, Worrell and his estate asserted that Thang and Clinton failed to pay royalties due under this agreement. Worrell died in 2016, and his estate became the plaintiff in subsequent litigation.After Worrell’s estate sued Thang and Clinton in New York state court for breach of contract related to the 1976 Agreement, the New York Supreme Court dismissed the suit. The court found that the agreement was not enforceable because it had not been signed by Thang, and the estate did not refute this. Subsequently, the estate filed a new action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking a declaration of joint copyright ownership in the sound recordings and an accounting of royalties. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on statute of limitations grounds, holding that the estate’s copyright claims were untimely.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment. The court held that, given the unique circumstances—including the parties’ decades-long conduct in apparent reliance on the 1976 Agreement—there was a factual question as to whether Clinton and Thang had “plainly and expressly repudiated” Worrell’s copyright co-ownership before 2020. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that part of the estate’s copyright-ownership claim is timely. The court also found genuine disputes of material fact as to Worrell’s status as a co-author of the recordings. View "Estate of Worrell v. Thang, Inc." on Justia Law

Two men were convicted of murder in Michigan in 2001, based on eyewitness identification and the testimony of a jailhouse informant. Years later, new evidence emerged suggesting that key witness testimony was fabricated, critical exculpatory evidence was withheld, and that two police officers were involved in this misconduct. The plaintiffs’ convictions were vacated in 2020 after nearly two decades of imprisonment, following an investigation by the Wayne County Conviction Integrity Unit, which found the original trials fundamentally unfair.After their release, the men filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging violations of their constitutional rights. They asserted claims under Brady v. Maryland for suppression of favorable evidence, malicious prosecution, and fabrication of evidence under both federal and state law. The two defendant officers sought summary judgment, arguing for qualified immunity, statutory immunity, and invoking the Heck doctrine and collateral estoppel. The district court granted summary judgment on some claims but denied it on others, finding genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment for several claims, including some Brady, malicious prosecution, and fabrication of evidence claims. The officers appealed the partial denial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the appeal in part for lack of interlocutory jurisdiction over certain issues, such as those involving factual disputes and the Heck doctrine. For the claims over which it had jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment. The court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity or collateral estoppel on the remaining Brady, malicious prosecution, and fabrication of evidence claims, allowing those claims to proceed to trial. The disposition was thus affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "Cotton v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against GateHouse Media in Ohio state court, alleging claims that met the requirements for federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). GateHouse timely removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, where the parties litigated for several years. The district court eventually denied class certification and, based on that denial, remanded the case to state court, concluding it could no longer exercise jurisdiction and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining claims.After the case returned to state court, it remained inactive until plaintiffs renewed their motion for class certification. GateHouse then removed the case to federal court a second time, asserting that this renewed motion provided a new basis for removal under CAFA. Plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing the removal was untimely. The district court denied the remand motion, finding that its earlier remand order had created ambiguity about federal jurisdiction and, under principles of equity, tolled the 30-day removal deadline. Plaintiffs sought and were granted interlocutory review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the 30-day deadline for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) is strict and cannot be equitably tolled, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel ex rel. Michigan. The Sixth Circuit concluded that GateHouse’s second removal was untimely because the original complaint had already triggered the removal clock, and subsequent events, including renewed class certification efforts, did not restart it. The appellate court reversed the district court’s order and instructed that the case be remanded to state court. View "Ewalt v. GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc." on Justia Law

After a fire destroyed a Michigan home in 2017, investigators determined it was intentionally set, focusing their investigation on the homeowner, Steve Karacson. Evidence included the smell of gasoline, multiple fire origins, cell phone location data placing Karacson near the house just before the fire, and a receipt for gas and gloves purchased hours before the incident. Karacson, who had fire insurance, claimed he was out of state but evidence contradicted this. He was subsequently charged with arson and insurance fraud.Following his plea of not guilty, Karacson sought to replace his court-appointed attorney due to disagreements and grievances. The trial court initially denied his request, but his attorney withdrew, and a second attorney was appointed. This relationship also deteriorated, leading Karacson to request self-representation. On the day of jury selection, after warnings from the court about the risks and complexities of self-representation, Karacson affirmed his desire to proceed pro se, with standby counsel available. After a lunch break, he again requested new counsel, which the court denied due to the timing. Karacson proceeded to represent himself, and a jury convicted him on all counts. He received a seven-year sentence.Karacson appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, alleging deprivation of counsel, among other claims. The court rejected his arguments, finding that he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and was not entitled to substitute counsel at trial. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal and reconsideration. Karacson then petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for habeas relief, claiming a Sixth Amendment violation. The district court denied relief, finding the state court’s determination reasonable, but granted a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. The court held that under AEDPA’s highly deferential standard, the Michigan appellate court reasonably found Karacson’s waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court also determined that Karacson was not faced with a choice between unprepared counsel and no counsel, and thus was not deprived of a voluntary waiver. View "Karacson v. Shaver" on Justia Law