Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, an incarcerated individual at Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility in Michigan, sought to challenge the withholding of a book authored by his sister from his mail. The book, which addressed childhood sexual assault, was rejected by a mailroom clerk on the grounds that it allegedly encouraged or provided instruction in criminal activity. After receiving notice of the rejection, the plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. There was a dispute between the parties regarding the timing and number of hearings, but ultimately, the plaintiff claimed he did not receive the hearing report detailing the final decision until May 9, 2022. He then filed a grievance that same day, alleging unjust censorship and procedural due process violations.The Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) maintains a multi-step grievance process for prisoner complaints, and under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), prisoners must exhaust these remedies before filing suit. The plaintiff’s grievances were denied at each step by MDOC as untimely, based on the department’s interpretation that the grievance should have been filed within five business days of the April 5, 2022, hearing. After exhausting the MDOC process, the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff had not properly exhausted his administrative remedies due to untimeliness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and applied de novo review. The court held that the defendant, as the party asserting the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust, did not meet the burden of proving that no genuine dispute existed regarding when the plaintiff received notice of the final decision. The court found that a genuine dispute of material fact remained about the timing of the plaintiff’s awareness of the unresolved issue. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tubbs v. Payton" on Justia Law

A Michigan marijuana grower entered into a contract with two subsidiaries of a larger company to supply all marijuana grown in its 2020 and 2021 harvests. At the time of contracting, the grower was licensed by Michigan to produce medical marijuana, while the buyers held both medical and recreational licenses. The contract required the marijuana to meet recreational testing standards, and the buyers paid a deposit. After the initial shipment, the buyers refused further deliveries due to a price drop, prompting the grower to sell the remaining harvests to other entities at lower prices.The grower sued the buyers for breach of contract in Michigan state court, seeking lost profits. The buyers removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, raised counterclaims, and asserted that the contract was unenforceable due to federal illegality. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court denied the buyers’ illegality defense and allowed the case to proceed to trial. A jury found the buyers liable and awarded substantial damages to the grower. The buyers renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law and requested a new trial, again arguing federal illegality.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial de novo. The Sixth Circuit held that federal courts cannot enforce contracts founded on agreements to commit conduct that is explicitly prohibited by federal law, such as distribution and possession of marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act. Because the contract was not limited to medical use and encompassed conduct criminalized under federal law, the court found the contract unenforceable. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the buyers’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. View "Hello Farms Licensing MI, LLC v. GR Vending MI, LLC" on Justia Law

Kevin Lackey was convicted in 1993 by a Michigan jury of criminal sexual conduct and breaking and entering after he was accused of sexually assaulting an eleven-year-old girl in her home. The incident involved an assailant who allegedly entered through a window, abducted the victim from her bedroom, and assaulted her on the back porch before fleeing. Police quickly responded, gathered statements, and relied on a police dog that tracked from the crime scene to Lackey’s nearby residence. Lackey matched the physical description given by the victim and her mother. After serving 22 years in prison, his convictions were vacated due to significant issues with the dog-tracking evidence, and the prosecutor chose not to retry the case.Following the vacatur of his convictions, Lackey filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. He alleged that several investigating officers fabricated evidence, maliciously prosecuted him, and suppressed exculpatory material, thereby violating his constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, finding them entitled to qualified immunity, and Lackey settled his remaining claims against another defendant before final judgment was entered.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Lackey failed to show the officers violated clearly established constitutional rights. The court found no genuine dispute as to material fact that would defeat qualified immunity on claims of fabrication of evidence, malicious prosecution, or suppression of exculpatory evidence. Specifically, the court concluded there was probable cause supporting Lackey’s arrest and prosecution, and no evidence that the officers withheld material information or fabricated evidence in a way that affected the outcome of the trial. The judgment in favor of the officers was therefore affirmed. View "Lackey v. Hurley" on Justia Law

A seven-year-old child named J.T. died after being physically restrained by care workers at a behavioral care center in Kentucky. The restraint, described as a “kneeling cradle,” was performed by employees of the center’s management company, Seven Counties Services, Inc. Following J.T.’s death, his estate filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the care center, Seven Counties, and other parties. Seven Counties sought defense and indemnity from its insurers, Mental Health Risk Retention Group (MHRRG) and Scottsdale Insurance Company, under its insurance policies, but both insurers denied coverage, citing exclusions for “professional services.”After the underlying wrongful death suit was filed, Hanover Insurance Group, which insured Uspiritus (the center’s operator), agreed to defend Uspiritus but declined coverage for Seven Counties, arguing that Seven Counties was not named as an additional insured after a written agreement expired. MHRRG and Scottsdale continued to deny coverage for Seven Counties, asserting that the restraint was a professional service excluded from coverage. The insurers then filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The district court granted summary judgment for Seven Counties as to the duty to defend but granted summary judgment for the insurers as to the duty to indemnify, finding the restraint was a professional service and thus excluded from indemnification.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the act of restraining J.T. constituted a professional service under Kentucky law, given the specialized training, required judgment, and regulatory oversight involved. Thus, the professional services exclusion in the insurance policy applied, and the insurers had no duty to indemnify Seven Counties for liability arising from the underlying wrongful death action. View "Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Seven Cntys. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

A Kentucky resident developed malignant mesothelioma, which is linked to asbestos exposure. He had worked for over a decade as a millwright at General Electric’s Appliance Park in Louisville and had also been exposed to asbestos dust from his father’s clothes as a child. After his diagnosis, he and his wife filed suit in Kentucky state court against General Electric and other defendants, alleging injuries from asbestos exposure that occurred during his civilian employment.During discovery, General Electric learned that the decedent had served in the U.S. Navy and had filed a Veterans Affairs claim for asbestos-related injuries from his military service. GE asserted that it could raise a federal-contractor defense related to its provision of turbines to the Navy and removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442. In response, the plaintiffs submitted an affidavit and later an amended complaint, explicitly disclaiming any claims arising from military service or exposure to asbestos during that time. The plaintiffs then moved to remand the case back to state court.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky granted the motion to remand, finding GE could not assert a colorable federal defense given the amended complaint’s explicit disclaimers. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Sixth Circuit held that, following Supreme Court precedent, federal jurisdiction must be determined based on the operative complaint. Since the amended complaint disclaimed all claims related to federal conduct, GE no longer had a colorable federal defense, and the federal court lacked jurisdiction under § 1442. Thus, remand to state court was proper. View "Horton v. General Electric" on Justia Law

A company engaged in outdoor advertising sought to erect a large billboard in a business district of Bath Township, Ohio. The local zoning inspector denied its application, citing a categorical ban on “off-premises” signs under the township’s zoning resolution. The company’s proposed billboard would have been a two-sided structure, 30 feet tall and 360 square feet per side. Notably, the company did not challenge other relevant provisions of the zoning resolution, such as the bans on “pole signs” and “high-rise” signs, which also would have prohibited the proposed billboard.The company, joined by a related entity, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, asserting that the off-premises sign ban violated the First Amendment and conflicted with Ohio law. The defendants, Bath Township’s board of trustees and zoning officials, moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing because even if the off-premises ban were invalidated, other unchallenged provisions would still bar the billboard. The district court agreed and dismissed the case, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because invalidating the off-premises sign ban would not redress their injury, as the bans on pole and high-rise signs would independently prohibit the billboard. The court found that this reasoning was controlled by its prior decision in Midwest Media Property, L.L.C. v. Symmes Township. The Sixth Circuit also found that the plaintiffs had forfeited any alternative standing theories, such as those based on the permitting process or application fees, by not properly raising them. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Summit Locations, LLC v. Bd. of Trustees, Bath Township" on Justia Law

Israel Bo Sword worked as a heavy equipment operator for VNS Federal Services, LLC at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Ohio, where he and co-workers were represented by the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18. VNS was bound by the General Presidents’ Project Maintenance Agreement (GPPMA) in its dealings with the Union. In February 2020, Sword complained to his supervisor that a side agreement guaranteeing another operator 40 hours per week violated the collective bargaining agreement, and he later sought assistance from his union representative to address his concerns. Shortly after the union meeting with management about Sword’s complaint, Sword was permanently laid off, while other operators returned to work.Sword filed unfair labor practice charges against VNS with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging unlawful discharge in retaliation for engaging in protected concerted activity. After a hearing, an administrative law judge found that VNS violated Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). VNS filed exceptions, but the NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s findings and issued an order requiring VNS to offer Sword reinstatement, provide backpay, and post remedial notices. The NLRB declined to resolve disputes over remedies at that stage, following its practice of deferring such issues to compliance proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the NLRB’s petition to enforce its order. The court found substantial evidence supporting the NLRB’s determination that Sword engaged in protected concerted activity, that VNS discharged him because of animus toward that activity, and that VNS’s justification for the layoff was pretextual. The Sixth Circuit granted enforcement of the NLRB’s order in full, declining to address challenges to the scope of remedies until compliance proceedings are completed. View "NLRB v. VNS Fed. Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

While serving a sentence for manslaughter and assault in a South Carolina prison, the defendant used a contraband cell phone to pose as an underage girl on a dating app. He initiated contact with a 22-year-old Michigan man, referred to as B.G., and exchanged sexually explicit messages and images. After revealing (falsely) that the girl was underage, the defendant, posing as the girl’s grandparent, threatened to expose B.G. to his family and law enforcement unless B.G. sent money. The defendant then sent explicit messages to B.G.’s ex-fiancée and her mother and publicly posted accusations of pedophilia on social media. Shortly after these threats and exposures, B.G. died by suicide.A federal grand jury indicted the defendant on charges including attempted extortion under the Hobbs Act, stalking with intent to harass and intimidate, and multiple counts of wire fraud. A jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan found him guilty on all counts. At sentencing, the district court applied the Sentencing Guideline for extortion by force or threat of injury or serious damage (U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2), and added enhancements for discharge of a firearm and for the victim sustaining life-threatening injury, resulting in a total sentence of 272 months’ imprisonment. The defendant objected to the choice of Guideline, the enhancements, and the consecutive nature of the sentences, but the district court overruled these objections.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the district court correctly used the extortion Guideline rather than the blackmail Guideline. However, the appellate court concluded that the enhancements for firearm discharge and life-threatening injury were procedurally unreasonable, as there was no evidence the defendant willfully caused B.G.’s suicide. The court affirmed the application of the correct Guideline but reversed the application of the enhancements, remanding for resentencing without them. View "United States v. Boyd" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Both offenses carried statutory mandatory minimum sentences of 60 months, with the firearm sentence required to run consecutively. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee calculated the defendant’s Guidelines range as 120 to 131 months and imposed a 120-month sentence. Later, after the defendant provided substantial assistance to the government, the court granted a Rule 35(b) motion and reduced the sentence to 100 months.Following her resentencing, the United States Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 821, which changed how criminal-history points are calculated and was made retroactive. Under the new calculation, the defendant’s criminal-history category would have been lower, resulting in a reduced Guidelines range. The defendant moved pro se for a further sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), arguing that Amendment 821 lowered her sentencing range. The district court denied the motion, finding her sentence was not “based on” a Guidelines range but on statutory minimums, and denied a subsequent motion for reconsideration. The defendant appealed both orders, resulting in two consolidated appeals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s eligibility determination de novo. It held that the defendant’s sentence was indeed “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered” by the Sentencing Commission, specifically Amendment 821. The court found that the relevant Guidelines range, excluding mandatory minimums due to the prior substantial-assistance reduction, had been lowered. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying the initial motion and remanded for further proceedings to consider other eligibility requirements. The second appeal was dismissed as moot. View "United States v. Hilton" on Justia Law

The case concerns Michael C. Hoffpowier, who was investigated after his estranged wife, B.H., reported to law enforcement that he had scheduled an appointment at her workplace under a false name and had a history of harassing her across multiple states. Officers responding to the scene located Hoffpowier’s vehicle in a nearby parking lot. Upon approaching, they observed behavior they interpreted as a potential flight risk, including the vehicle being put in reverse. Hoffpowier was handcuffed after failing to comply with commands to approach an officer. While detained, officers reviewed text messages between Hoffpowier and B.H. and, with his consent, observed binoculars and a gun magazine in his vehicle. A search of the vehicle revealed firearms and a silencer.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee denied Hoffpowier’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, concluding that the handcuffing did not constitute an arrest and that there was a reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contained evidence related to stalking. The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to deny suppression was adopted after Hoffpowier’s objections were overruled, in part because he did not update his arguments in light of the report’s analysis. Hoffpowier subsequently pleaded guilty to possession of an unregistered silencer.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the officers’ use of handcuffs during the investigatory stop was reasonable given the circumstances and did not convert the stop into an arrest. It further held that the presence of binoculars visible in the vehicle provided a reasonable basis to believe that the vehicle contained evidence pertinent to the stalking offense, justifying the warrantless search under the search-incident-to-arrest exception. View "United States v. Hoffpowier" on Justia Law