Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a challenge to Ohio’s Parental Notification by Social Media Operators Act, which requires operators of certain social media platforms to obtain verifiable parental consent before unemancipated children under sixteen can enter into contracts to use their services. The Act defines covered operators based on features such as enabling social interaction, profile creation, and content sharing, and details factors to determine whether a site targets or is likely to be accessed by minors. The law imposes civil penalties for non-compliance and grants enforcement authority to the Ohio Attorney General.When the Act was set to take effect, NetChoice, LLC—a trade association representing major online platforms—sued the Ohio Attorney General in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. NetChoice argued the Act was unconstitutional on First Amendment and vagueness grounds, asserting that it would chill protected speech and was impermissibly vague about which platforms were covered. The district court agreed, finding that NetChoice had standing, that the Act was a facially unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech that failed strict scrutiny, and that it was unconstitutionally vague. The court permanently enjoined enforcement of the Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that NetChoice lacked third-party standing to assert the First Amendment rights of its members’ minor users due to a conflict of interest between the trade group and the affected minors. The court further found that, even considering NetChoice’s own First Amendment and vagueness claims, NetChoice failed to show the Act was facially unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit held that the Act, while content-based and subject to strict scrutiny, was narrowly tailored to compelling state interests in protecting children and was not impermissibly vague in all its applications. The case was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the Attorney General. View "NetChoice, LLC v. Yost" on Justia Law

A Michigan-based real estate developer and related parties sought to redevelop a commercial property in the City of Pontiac to include medical marijuana cultivation and processing facilities. After purchasing the property in 2019, the developer obtained rezoning approval from the city, but the process of securing required permits and special exceptions for tenants became protracted. The city clerk cited deficiencies in tenant applications and, at one point, argued that the project violated city ordinances regarding overlay districts for marijuana businesses. Despite eventual approvals—including a court order requiring the city to issue permits—the tenants withdrew due to the delays, and the project collapsed. Subsequently, the developer’s affiliate lost another business opportunity, which plaintiffs attributed to city officials’ retaliation.The plaintiffs filed suit in Oakland County Circuit Court, seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, and later brought civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The district court granted summary judgment for the city and the city clerk, finding insufficient evidence of constitutional violations and concluding that the delays and alleged retaliation did not violate the plaintiffs’ rights.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked a cognizable property interest under the Due Process Clause because city approval for marijuana facilities was discretionary, not a matter of right. The court also found that the delays did not constitute a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment, as the length and nature of the delays were not extraordinary. The equal protection claim failed for lack of evidence that similarly situated applicants were treated more favorably. Finally, the court determined that the plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim could not proceed against the city because the mayor lacked final policymaking authority over zoning and no municipal policy or custom was established. View "Rubicon Real Estate Holdings v. City of Pontiac" on Justia Law

Samuel Harris established a medical marketing company, Secure Health, to promote cancer-screening tests to Medicare and Medicaid recipients. The company sent salespeople door-to-door, paid telemedicine providers and employees on a per-patient basis, and referred patients to a laboratory, Crestar, which compensated Secure Health per referral. Crestar billed federal healthcare programs, generating substantial income. Harris sought legal advice regarding the business model; his attorney, Christopher Esseltine, provided a compliance memorandum premised on the belief that employees were paid a flat salary, not per patient. Despite this, Harris paid employees and doctors per patient, raising concerns under the Anti-Kickback Statute, which prohibits remuneration for patient referrals in federally funded healthcare programs.After federal agents investigated Secure Health, Harris was indicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee on several counts, including conspiring to violate the Anti-Kickback Statute and receiving kickbacks for patient referrals. Following a lengthy trial, the jury convicted Harris on counts related to the Anti-Kickback Statute and acquitted him of healthcare fraud charges. The district court sentenced Harris to 30 months, below the guideline range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Harris’s appeal, focusing on three main issues: the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury on an advice-of-counsel defense, denial of a mistrial following a prosecutorial remark, and exclusion of a full recording as hearsay evidence. The Sixth Circuit held that Harris failed to fully disclose pertinent facts to his attorney, specifically the per-patient payment structure, and thus was not entitled to the advice-of-counsel instruction. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial or in the evidentiary ruling. The convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Several Michigan residents purchased expensive solar-panel systems from a company that promised substantial reductions in their electricity bills. The company’s advertising, prepared in part by entities connected to Trivest Partners, promoted significant savings and government payments, but the plaintiffs experienced little to no reduction in their bills and, in some cases, saw increases. The company, which operated in both Michigan and Florida, later went bankrupt. Alleging fraud and racketeering violations, the plaintiffs brought a civil RICO action and a Michigan Consumer Protection Act claim against Trivest Partners, its affiliates (all Florida entities), and the company founder.In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the two Florida-based Trivest defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that the civil RICO statute did not allow them to be sued in Michigan, as a court in Florida could exercise jurisdiction over all defendants. The district court denied the motion, holding that several practical factors—including the pending status of the case in Michigan, local counsel, and comparative convenience—favored retaining jurisdiction. The plaintiffs later added additional Trivest-related defendants, also Florida citizens, with the court again finding personal jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) de novo. The appellate court held that the district court’s reasons, grounded in convenience and practical considerations, were insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the “ends of justice require” standard under § 1965(b). The Sixth Circuit concluded that interests of convenience alone cannot justify asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants with no minimum contacts to the forum. The court reversed the district court’s order denying dismissal and vacated the order denying the Trivest defendants’ motions to compel arbitration. View "Hall v. Trivest Partners L.P." on Justia Law

The petitioner, a native of Guinea, entered the United States in 2015 after suffering severe abuse in her home country, including female genital mutilation and physical violence from an arranged marriage. She overstayed her nonimmigrant visa due to credible threats from her ex-husband if she returned. In 2022, she was charged as removable for overstaying her visa. She applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, but an immigration judge denied all relief. The judge found her asylum claim untimely, determined her abuse was not on account of a protected ground for withholding, and ruled she did not establish government acquiescence to torture.After the immigration judge’s denial in June 2024, the petitioner was promptly informed of her right to appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which required filing within 30 days. She sought new counsel but was hospitalized for several days due to a severe sickle-cell crisis and remained in pain for months. She did not attempt to appeal until she began feeling better in September 2024, eventually retaining new counsel in late October. The appeal was not filed until December 2024, over five months after the deadline. The BIA denied her motion for equitable tolling, concluding she failed to show extraordinary circumstances or due diligence, particularly because she offered insufficient medical documentation for her incapacity and delayed further even after retaining counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the 30-day deadline for appealing to the BIA is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional bar. The court further held that the BIA’s equitable tolling decision is subject to deferential review and that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding a lack of due diligence. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Baro v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Three physicians—Evann Herrell, Mark Grenkoski, and Keri McFarlane—worked at Express Health Care, a clinic claiming to treat opioid addiction but operating as a pill mill. The clinic prescribed controlled substances in high volumes for cash, disregarding legitimate medical standards. Doctors spent minimal time with patients, ignored signs of diversion, and falsified records. EHC also submitted fraudulent Medicare claims by ordering unnecessary drug tests. McFarlane eventually cooperated with the FBI. Herrell, Grenkoski, and McFarlane were among the few who went to trial after most other clinic staff pleaded guilty.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky conducted a 30-day jury trial, resulting in convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, falsifying medical records, wire and health care fraud, and money laundering. The defendants filed post-trial motions for acquittal and new trials, which the district court denied. Each defendant was sentenced to prison and filed timely appeals, raising challenges related to sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, trial severance, and sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the appropriate standards of review—including abuse of discretion for evidentiary and severance decisions and de novo review for legal questions—the court found sufficient evidence to support all convictions. It held the challenged evidentiary rulings were either correct or harmless. The jury instructions appropriately conveyed the required mens rea under Supreme Court precedent. The court determined that denial of severance for McFarlane was not an abuse of discretion and that cumulative error did not warrant reversal. Grenkoski’s challenge to sentencing correction was rejected due to jurisdictional limits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed all convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Herrell" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was involved in a car accident in the early morning hours, after which a witness observed him exiting the overturned vehicle with a bag containing drugs and a firearm. When the witness refused to take the bag, the defendant hid it by the roadside and left the scene in another vehicle. Police later recovered the bag, which contained cocaine, a loaded revolver, and ammunition. The vehicle was registered to the defendant. The government’s key witness at trial testified about the defendant’s actions, and his testimony was the only direct evidence linking the defendant to the bag.After the first trial, the defendant was convicted on all counts: possession with intent to distribute cocaine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed those convictions, finding that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky had improperly limited the defendant’s ability to cross-examine the witness about matters relevant to his bias and motivation. A retrial followed, during which the defendant sought to obtain more information about the witness’s criminal history and potential benefits received for his testimony, but was unable to secure expunged records from state court officials.Upon appeal after the second trial, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether the District Court’s refusal to compel production of the witness’s criminal file and its limitations on cross-examination violated the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. The Sixth Circuit held that the Confrontation Clause does not grant a defendant a pretrial right to compelled discovery of documents for cross-examination purposes, and that the District Court allowed sufficient latitude for cross-examination to satisfy constitutional requirements. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

A lawyer and parents’ rights activist assisted her client in evading a Tennessee juvenile court’s order that awarded temporary custody of the client’s child to the Department of Children’s Services. The client, a single mother, fled with her daughter after being investigated for suspected child neglect. The lawyer joined the client and child at a hotel, and when they received a missing child alert, they disabled their phones and went to the lawyer’s home to avoid authorities. The police located them the following day, and the state took custody of the children. After an extended custody dispute, the state returned the children and dismissed its petition.While the custody case was ongoing, the Department of Children’s Services and local police investigated and eventually indicted both the lawyer and her client on charges related to custodial interference. Both were convicted by juries, but on appeal, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals vacated the convictions. The appellate court concluded that the statute at issue required proof that the alleged interference occurred after a period of lawful visitation, an element not present in this case.The lawyer and her client then filed a federal suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, alleging malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and other claims against various officials and the City of Brentwood. The district court dismissed all claims, holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified or absolute immunity and that the Monell claim against the city failed because the officers lacked final policymaking authority.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Sixth Circuit held that the individual defendants were entitled to immunity and that the Monell claim failed as a matter of law. The court confirmed that the law provides no recourse against prosecutors and officers acting within their respective protected functions under these circumstances. View "Reguli v. Hetzel" on Justia Law

Karl White operated a significant drug trafficking organization in Kalamazoo, Michigan, amassing substantial wealth and repeatedly evading law enforcement until his arrest following a sting operation. He was charged with multiple drug and firearm offenses, with evidence at trial including witness testimony of violence and intimidation against those who cooperated with authorities. The jury convicted him on all counts, and after a resentencing prompted by an earlier appeal correcting the drug quantity attributed to him, he received a 35-year prison sentence.Following his incarceration, White developed severe medical issues, including paralysis and blindness resulting from meningitis, and later experienced mental health challenges. Despite these conditions, he was reported to have verbally abused prison staff. In 2025, White sought compassionate release from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, arguing that his deteriorated health constituted an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for sentence reduction. The district court agreed that his condition was extraordinary but denied release, reasoning that the seriousness of his crimes, the need to deter similar conduct, and the ongoing risk he posed to the public outweighed his medical hardships.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion. The court found that the district court had properly considered the relevant sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), sufficiently addressed White’s arguments regarding his health and risk to the public, and provided a reasoned explanation for its decision. The appellate court held that disagreement with how the district court balanced these factors did not warrant reversal and that the district court had acted within its wide discretion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of compassionate release. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Superintendent of Hamtramck Public Schools took voluntary medical leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). When she prepared to return, the school district placed her on paid administrative leave pending an investigation into alleged misconduct. While on leave, she filed charges of discrimination with government agencies and was not allowed to return to her duties for over a year. She alleged that these actions were the result of retaliation and discrimination after she had involuntarily reassigned several teachers, which had sparked conflict with the school board and teachers’ union.While still on paid leave, the Superintendent filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the school district, several board members, and the teachers’ union, alleging multiple claims including discrimination based on disability, sex, and national origin, as well as retaliation. She attempted to amend her complaint multiple times. The district court denied her motion to file a Fourth Amended Complaint, holding that the proposed amendments were futile, and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the original complaint with prejudice. She then appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of leave to amend de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in finding that her proposed claims for FMLA retaliation and Title IX sex discrimination were futile. The Sixth Circuit concluded that her allegations plausibly stated claims under both statutes, applying the correct legal standards. The appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal, reversed its futility determination, and remanded the case so the plaintiff could proceed with her amended complaint. View "Ahmed v. Hamtramck Public Schools" on Justia Law