Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After pleading guilty to the manufacture of 1,000 or more marijuana plants, the defendant was sentenced to 180 months, based on sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Noting that the court had numerous other justifications for upward variance under the sentencing guidelines, the court stated that the defendant's substantial rights were not compromised by consideration of his use of a friend as a "straw man" to purchase real estate and his pressure on that friend to "take the Fifth" as part of his criminal history. The sentence was not unreasonable for a defendant with a history of violent crime and almost no work history.

Officers responding to an accident smelled raw marijuana and were told that occupants of the vehicle had removed items and carried them up the off-ramp, showing no concern for the driver. The officers observed that the items were being placed into a vehicle owned by the defendant. A canine unit was called and alerted to the defendant's car, at the top of the ramp. The defendant stated that the officers could search the car, helped them open the hood, then grabbed a towel-wrapped gun from under the hood and ran. The Sixth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, holding that the district court properly refused to suppress the gun. There was no detention before the dog sniffed the car, which was in a public place, so there was no need for reasonable suspicion to justify use of the canine, although the officers did have reasonable bases for suspicion. The court refused to vacate a portion of the plea agreement under which the defendant waived his interest in the gun, the car, and a computer in the car; the defendant did not establish improper coercion.

The former mayor of Seven Hills, Ohio sued for defamation, based on publication of a statement that he "routinely tries to pull off stunts like limiting residentsâ feedback at meetings and barring government employees from running for officeâ and an article that, he claimed, falsely implied that he sought personal information about constituents, including young women, for illicit purposes. The court denied an extension, struck the complaint for failure to prosecute, and entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the articles constituted protected opinion, as a matter of law. The article concerning the mayor's letter to young residents does not expressly state or clearly imply illicit motive. The statement about limiting feedback appears to be a statement of objective, verifiable fact, but in the context of an article that contains statements like âpolitical IQ of Quiznosâ lettuce,â it would be unreasonable to read it as impartial reporting. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sanction for failure to prosecute.

The defendant pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 180 months in prison as an armed career criminal. The classification was based on two prior convictions for sale of cocaine and one for facilitation of burglary. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court subsequently altered the test for determining whether a prior state law conviction constitutes a violent felony and vacated the sentence. On remand the district court again classified the defendant as an armed career criminal. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the Tennessee offense of facilitation of burglary does not qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924. The elements do not include use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another, as described in the Act. The Act also includes an offense that "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another;" while facilitation of burglary does involve such a risk, it is not like the other acts specified in the statute as it does not necessarily involve an act that is "purposeful, violent, and aggressive."

The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony for the 1993 shooting death of an undercover Detroit police officer who had been investigating another murder near the body shop where the defendant worked. He was sentenced to 40-80 years as a habitual offender. State courts rejected direct appeal for failure to timely file a brief. The state supreme court declined to review denial of motions for post-trial relief. The federal district court first dismissed a habeas corpus petition as untimely, then rejected it on the merits. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. The defense lawyer's failure to timely file an appellate brief constituted deficient performance and prejudiced the defendant's rights; the state court's one-line rejection of the denial of collateral relief was not a sufficient substitute. The defendant had no right to oral argument or to appointed counsel and the court did not explain the basis of its decision. The state court made a ruling that was reasonable under federal law on a jury coercion claim, based on the judge's encouragement to continue deliberations after the jury stated that it was deadlocked.

Despite the presence of a "do not disturb" sign, a maid entered the defendant's hotel room after check-out time but before defendant's key was deactivated. While cleaning the room, which contained clothing, she saw what she believed to be drugs. Police found a scale and cocaine and arrested the defendant when he returned to the hotel. The defendant accepted a conditional plea and, after the district court rejected a motion to suppress, was sentenced to 40 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The defendant's subjective expectation of privacy in the room was not objectively reasonable; he had not asked for an extension of his stay. The defendant's use of a keycard to enter a near-empty hotel and the maid's statement indicating that the defendant had arrived supplied probable cause for arrest.

The defendant, a Tennessee state senator for more than 30 years, was convicted of bribery (the subject of a separate appeal), âhonest servicesâ wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343, 1346), and concealing a material fact regarding a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of the United States (18 U.S.C. 1001) for failing to disclose his relationship with a company that dealt with a state agency providing health care to citizens not covered by Medicaid, pursuant to a waiver from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The defendant's actions did not violate Section 1001; the disclosures were required to be made to state, not federal, agencies and the defendant had no duty to an entity directly contracted with a federal agency. Wire fraud convictions based on failure to make those disclosures were also reversed; the statute applies only to wire fraud involving bribes or kickbacks.

The city amended its code to prohibit sexually-oriented businesses in downtown and planned development districts and later published notice of intent to prohibit such uses in a development authority district and imposed a temporary ban on issuance of new licenses. While the ban was in place, the owner sought permission to operate a topless bar in the area. The ordinance requires the clerk to act within 20 days; the clerk rejected the application after 24 days. The amendment prohibiting the use was enacted about two weeks later. The district court rejected the owner's civil rights claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The city's evidence showed that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to deal with secondary effects, blight and deterioration of property values, and leaves open reasonable opportunity to operate an adult business. Even if only 27 sites are available, rather than 39 as the district court concluded, the number is adequate in a city that had only two applications in five years. The 24-day decision period did not amount to an unconstitutional prior restraint; prompt judicial review was available.

A death-row inmate sought federal funds, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3599, for state court representation on a writ of error coram nobis, reopening post-trial proceedings, a clemency petition, and a hearing on competency for execution. The district court granted the petition only with respect to clemency proceedings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that state law provides adequate counsel so that the inmate was not entitled to funds under the federal law. In addition, the law does not provide funding for state habeas corpus proceedings or for proceedings that are not subsequent to federal habeas corpus; that the defendant's federal habeas counsel may be more qualified than state-appointed attorneys is irrelevant.

The IRS auctioned the taxpayer's property for back taxes. Letters sent by the taxpayer, in an attempt to resolve or appeal the decision, were incorrectly addressed. The district court dismissed a suit for damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, but held that failure to exhaust administrative remedies (26 U.S.C. 7433)did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. What is mandatory is not necessarily jurisdictional; the context shows that the requirement is a limit on relief.