Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Based on online conversations with a detective posing as a 14-year-old girl, defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); knowingly using interstate commerce to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense or attempting to do so and attempting to persuade a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing visual depictions (18 U.S.C. 2251) and sentenced to 180 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that an augmented jury instruction was required, so that jurors would have had to agree on which underlying state offenses were committed. The jury instructions posed no risk of confusion and the elements of the federal law do not require proof of underlying state law crimes. The federal laws are not unconstitutionally overbroad: the words "entice" and "persuade" have common meaning and the proscribed activities are not protected by the First Amendment. The sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the crime and did not amount to double jeopardy; the offenses have separate elements.

Garcia became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1995. In 1998 he pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. An immigration judge refused to cancel the Department of Homeland Security's removal proceedings. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Sixth Circuit agreed, reasoning that Garcia was convicted of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(43), which refers to state offenses considered drug-trafficking crimes, defined as state offenses "punishable as a felony." Although 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(4) provides that "distributing a small amount of marihuana for no remuneration" is a misdemeanor, punishable by not more than one year in prison, Michigan law provides that conviction of intent to deliver any amount of marijuana is punishable by up to five years in prison. The state law conviction presumptively corresponds to the federal felony and the government was not required to prove the amount of marijuana or that a remunerative exchange occurred. Because Garcia admitted to intent to deliver, he was not entitled to a waiver available for simple possession. The court declined to consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Whitfield, blind in one eye and suffering cerebral palsy, began working as a secretary with the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities and was fired less than six months later. The trial court dismissed her suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court first held that a claim for reinstatement survived Eleventh Amendment immunity and determined that Whitfield had waived any possible claims under the "public services" provisions of the ADA. The court rejected an argument that the trial court applied incorrect standards with respect to Whitfield's burden of proof under the Act's employment discrimination provisions, finding that Whitfield failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to any disability discrimination. There was overwhelming evidence of poor work and many of Whitfield's failings were unrelated to her disabilities.

The City of Upper Arlington, Ohio, determined that a 40-year-old tree on city property, in front of Brown's house, was dying, posed a hazard, and should be removed. The city's tree commission rejected Brown's claims. Brown obtained a temporary restraining order in state court, which expired before the case was removed to federal court. The federal magistrate declined to rule on state claims, dismissed federal claims, and refused to enter an injunction. Although Brown's attorney stated that the Brown would immediately refile state claims, the city removed the tree the next day. The federal court refused to reconsider its prior order, but entered a finding of contempt, stating that the city had prevented meaningful appeal. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding that the trial court exceeded its authority. The city did not violate any court order. The court had entered its final order and there was no automatic stay. If the city's actions deprived a court of meaningful jurisdiction, it was the state court.

Having consumed alcohol in violation of his parole terms, Murray tried to elude a police cruiser. He parked his truck in an alley and, with his passenger, ducked down to avoid being seen. When officers began to search around the truck, Murray attempted to drive away. The officers filed several shots at the truck. Murray was struck by a bullet and paralyzed. The truck crashed into a ditch and Murray died. The trial court dismissed the passenger's 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 of excessive force. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, rejecting a conclusion that no "seizure" had occurred for Fourth Amendment purposes. The passenger was not a hostage; the officers shot at the truck to stop the truck, not to free the passenger, and effectively seized the truck and all occupants. The passenger was not hit by gunfire, but may have been injured. The passenger's claim was not barred by the decision in an earlier case, brought by Murray's estate and claiming excessive force against Murray. Whether the officer has qualified immunity depends on which version of the facts is accepted by a jury.