Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A social worker employed by the Department was the primary case worker for plaintiffâs son, who was removed from his motherâs custody by the Department. After boy was adjudicated neglected by the juvenile court, custody was granted to his maternal great aunt and uncle. Plaintiff, who wished to take custody, claimed that the social worker misrepresented his desire and ability to parent and impeded his ability to participate in custody proceedings. The district court denied the social worker's motion for summary judgment on claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the social worker is absolutely immune from suit for her participation in juvenile court proceedings, regardless of whether she conducted an inadequate investigation or knowingly made false statements. Because the social worker's conduct neither caused any deprivation of the plaintiff's interest in family integrity, nor interfered with the process, qualified immunity barred remaining claims. The juvenile court was responsible for the "deprivation" and the plaintiff had notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Petitioner was removed from the United States in 1987, returned and served four years in the Oregon penitentiary for rape, and was deported again in 1994. He returned and used various aliases until, in 2001, after pleading guilty to a felony in Michigan, an immigration judge entered an order of voluntary departure. He failed to depart and was apprehended in 2008. After stating that he would review the presentence report before deciding whether to accept the unconditional guilty plea to illegal reentry after previous deportation following an aggravated felony conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326 (a), the district judge denied a motion to withdraw the unaccepted plea and to dismiss the indictment as barred by the statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. Under Federal Rule 11 (d) the reason or motive for the motion to withdraw could not be questioned; the court lacked discretion to deny the motion. The motion to withdraw the plea was not conditioned on the outcome of the motion to dismiss.

Convicted of killing a Detroit police officer in 1993 and sentenced as a habitual offender to consecutive terms of 40-80 years in prison for murder and five years for a felony firearm conviction, the defendant exhausted his opportunities for relief in state court. Following a remand from appeal of a dismissal for untimely filing, the district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit remanded. Reversal is required because defense counsel faile to file a timely brief in the direct state court appeal and that court denied direct appeal. Review of denial of collateral relief, which does not involve the same rights as direct appeal, is not an adequate substitute. Defendant is not entitled to habeas relief on his jury coercion claim, which was based on the trial judge's urging that the jury continue deliberations. In light of the entire supplemental instruction, the trial courtâs determination that the Allen charge was not coercive was not an unreasonable application of federal law.

Husband and wife, citizens of Ukraine, entered the United States in 1994. When their visas expired they conceded removability and applied for asylum. While proceedings were pending, husband's employer filed an I-140 petition for alien workers; the notice of approval indicated that husband was not eligible for adjustment of status. An immigration judge denied asylum. The BIA dismissed an appeal, subsequently denied adjustment of status, and refused to reopen removal proceedings. The Sixth Circuit denied petitions for review. The petitioners failed to establish that they maintained lawful status under either INA 245(c)(2) or (k) as required for an application for adjustment under INA 245(a).

The government introduced evidence of defendant's prior sale of cocaine during his trial on charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, (18 U.S.C. 922(g)), possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)), and possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in holding that the prior acts evidence was admitted for the proper purpose of establishing specific intent; determined that its probative value was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect, based on the evidence and the defense; and gave two strong cautionary instructions to the jury. Any error would be harmless in light of the "wealth" of alternative evidence, including defendant's own statements. The sentence of 420 months was appropriate, in light of the defendant's history.

A member of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community was convicted of destroying trees on the Ontonagon Reservation (18 U.S.C. 1853) and stealing tribal property for his own use (18 U.S.C. 1163). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the defendant had a right to use the land as chief of the Ontonagon Band and that his sentence was improper because he did not receive an acceptance of responsibility reduction. Federal law does not recognize a separate Ontonagon Band; the land is held by the government in trust for the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community. Merely expressing regret for the consequences of criminal conduct, without admitting wrongful intent, does not constitute acceptance of responsibility within the meaning of the Guidelines. The court acted within its discretion in imposing a restitution requirement of $47,200.

Defendant, convicted of murder and aggravated murder in 1984 and scheduled to be executed on May 17, 2011, obtained a stay for additional time to prove that he is incompetent to be executed and additional time to obtain review of the state trial courtâs ruling against him. The Sixth Circuit vacated the stay, holding that the defendant waited too long to file his claim and has no chance of success on the merits. More than a year has passed since the Supreme Court denied certiorari from denial of a habeas corpus petition; despite numerous filings seeking relief, the defendant did not challenge his competency to be executed until a few days before the scheduled execution. The state court reasonably rejected his claims concerning competency.

Plaintiff, an attorney who handled Chapter 11 proceedings for a client, submitted a petition for fees after the case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding. The bankruptcy court denied the petition because of the attorney's failure to comply with disclosure rules, abusive conduct toward others involved in the case, excessive or incomplete billing, and disruptive behavior. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the attorney's "flagrant" disregard of deadlines and the rules for appeal.

Plaintiff and defendant, investment trusts that specialize in healthcare-related properties, participated in a two-step auction to purchase the assets of a Canadian company. The defendant's efforts derailed. Plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase the assets, but before the agreement was approved by shareholders, the defendant made a higher bid and made a public announcement. After a flurry of press releases and a ruling by a Canadian court concerning a confidentiality clause that was part of the bidding process, the defendant revoked its bid. The stockholders rejected the agreement with the plaintiff; the deal closed after plaintiff increased its bid. The district court awarded the plaintiff $101,672,807 for tortious interference with contract and with prospective advantage. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, but remanded for consideration of punitive damages. The declaratory proceedings in Canada did not preclude the claims at issue. Jury instructions concerning tortious interference involving competitors, motive, causation, and breach of the confidentiality agreement as wrongful conduct were appropriate.

Defendant, convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)), argued that a prior conviction for solicitation to commit aggravated assault should not qualify as a âviolent felonyâ under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)and that the district court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea to pursue a suppression hearing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The 93-day period between the plea and the motion to withdraw it, with no valid excuse or assertion of actual innocence, justified denial. The defendant relied on a Supreme Court holding, entered two months before his plea, that police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupantâs arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. The Tennessee offense of solicitation to commit aggravated assault involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another and involves the same kind of purposeful, violent and oppressive conduct as the enumerated offenses and qualifies as a violent felony.