Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant escaped a halfway house where he was serving time for armed robbery and was sentenced an additional 46 months in prison, to be served consecutively with his robbery sentence, with another supervised-release term of three years, to run concurrently with the previously-imposed five-year term of release. The defendant later violated the terms of that supervised release and was sentenced, in the robbery case, to seven months in prison with no supervised release and, in the escape case, to a consecutive eight-month prison term with three years of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit remanded with respect to supervised release; the issue of the prison term is moot because the defendant has been released. The statute, 18 U.S.C. 3583(h), provides that the term of supervised release shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized for the offense that resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of release; the court was required to deduct the eight months served for escape from 36 months of supervised release, leaving a maximum supervised-release sentence of 28 months.

In the first lawsuit, retirees, funded by the union, obtained a preliminary injunction preventing plaintiff from terminating their healthcare benefits. The case is still pending. In the second lawsuit, the plaintiff claims that the union's participation in the first lawsuit violated a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and that the union, during negotiation of the CBA, committed breach of an implied warranty of authority, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation. The district court dismissed the second suit, holding that the union did not breach the CBA and that federal law preempted the state law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the union did not breach the CBA, which did not include a covenant not to sue, as claimed by the plaintiff. The court reversed with respect to preemption of the tort claims, which are "analytically distinct, but of a piece for purposes of" jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. 185(a).

The first plaintiffs alleged that Fidelity failed to provide a discount, required by its filed rates, when issuing title insurance to homeowners who had purchased a title insurance policy for the same property from any other insurer within the previous 10 years. The second plaintiff brought the same claims against First American. The district court denied their motion to certify a class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although the claims involve small amounts, so that the plaintiffs are likely unable to recover except by class action, the plaintiffs did not establish that issues subject to generalized proof and applicable to the whole class predominate over issues subject to individualized proof. The need to establish entitlement to join the class and the need to prove individual damages are not fatal to class certification, but the Ohio insurance rate structure would necessitate individual inquiries on the issue of liability. The plaintiffs phrased their claims in a way that would require examination of individual policies and whether the company received the requisite documentation for the discount.

During 10 years in a 12-year period the defendant, an Ohio physician, filed federal income tax returns that showed she owed taxes â but she failed to pay them. The United States brought an action for judgment and to foreclose on its tax liens on defendant's real property. Defendant argued that her Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition discharged her tax liabilities for some of the years preceding the filing. The district court disagreed and entered a $319,698 judgment in favor of the United States, finding that she had willfully attempted to evade paying taxes for those years, preventing discharge of the obligations through her bankruptcy filing. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the government did not establish willfulness as required by 11 U.S.C. 523(a). There was no evidence that the defendant lived lavishly; the district court incorrectly applied the test applicable only to student loans and made assumptions about her ability to earn more money and her husband's failure to contribute.

Petitioners, husband and wife citizens of Guatemala, were eligible for suspension of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997, 111 Stat. 2160, but their lawyer never cited NACARA during removal proceedings before the immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals and failed to notify the couple of the decisions. After the husband was taken into custody they learned of their eligibility and moved to reopen their case. The Board denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. The Board retains jurisdiction, although the husband has been deported, and the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to the wife's petition. The couple was diligent in pursuing their rights after learning of their lawyer's ineffective assistance; the Board can explore the issue of their diligence prior to revocation of their work permits.

The Georgia animal-rendering operation was investigated under the Clean Water Act. Felony charges were dismissed and the company entered a plea of guilty to misdemeanor negligent discharge of waste water. The EPA subsequently received FOIA requests from outside parties, requesting documents it had obtained from the company. The EPA determined that documents obtained pursuant to search warrant or grand jury subpoena were exempt from disclosure, that other material had to be reviewed to determine whether exemptions applied, and that documents obtained from court dockets and state agencies are publicly available and not exempt from disclosure. The company sought a temporary restraining order, claiming that it was entitled to review the files before release of any information, and that confidential business information contained in the publicly available documents is exempt from disclosure. After three years, the district court ruled in favor of the company and awarded $116,038 in attorney fees. The Sixth Circuit reversed because the district court did not make a finding, and the record would not support a finding, of bad faith, necessary to support the award under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412.

An underground pipeline leaked gasoline five times between 1948 and 1962. After tests revealed benzene in wells, not including the plaintiffs' well, the company conducted remediation and monitoring and purchased the property now owned by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs bought the property and a low level of benzene was detected in the well in 1996. The company installed a new well, which tested free of benzene 22 times between 1997 and 2002. Benzene was detected at a very low level in 2003 and the plaintiffs moved in 2005. In 2002 one of the plaintiffs was diagnosed, at age 48, with non-Hodgkins lymphoma. The district court entered summary judgment for the company. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in excluding, as unreliable under the Daubert standard, an expert's specific-causation opinion. The expert did not ascertain the level of plaintiff's exposure and the level of benzene in the well never exceeded the EPA's standard; the expert did not rule out other possible causes, such as the plaintiff's smoking.

Defendant entered a guilty plea to knowingly receiving child pornography and knowingly possessing the same child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252A) and was sentenced to consecutive terms of 120 and 240 months imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded, first holding that a double jeopardy claim was not waived by the plea agreement. The offense of knowingly receiving child pornography includes all of the elements of the lesser-included offense of possessing the same child pornography and Congress did not explicitly require multiple punishments. Simply ordering that the sentences run concurrently would be an insufficient remedy.

Petitioner-Appellant Arthur Vanwinkle pled guilty to federal theft and conspiracy charges in exchange for the government dismissal of more serious offenses. The district court sentenced Petitioner to over 120 months' imprisonment. Instead of appealing his plea or sentence, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate his sentence, challenging the plea and sentence on constitutional grounds. A federal magistrate denied his motion, holding that Petitioner had no bases to challenge his plea or sentence. The district court adopted the magistrate's findings in their entirety, but noted that "reasonable jurists could disagree" with how the court handled Petitioner's legal sufficiency claim. The court granted Petitioner a Certificate of Appealability on that one claim, and the Sixth Circuit granted this review. The Court found that Petitioner's plea "serve[d] as an admission that he is not innocent of the crimes charged." The Court reasoned that because Petitioner's argument that the same evidence he failed to object to at trial was now legally insufficient he could not challenge his sentence and plea now. The Court affirmed the district court's denial of Petitioner's motion.

While serving a sentence for planting a pipe-bomb that killed his stepfather, the defendant mailed a letter containing a substance purported to be anthrax to the judge who denied his habeas corpus petition. After representing himself at trial, he was convicted of mailing a threatening communication to a federal judge (18 U.S.C. 876). The district court did not obtain a presentence report and conducted the sentencing hearing by video conference because of concerns that the defendant would be difficult to control. The defendant and his appointed counsel did not object. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction, stating that the letter amounted to a threat even though the danger from anthrax is immediate, not in the future, but vacated the sentence. Although the video conference worked well, it is not a substitute for physical presence; the government did not establish that the error was harmless. The district court also erred in relying on the defendantâs waiver of a presentence report, absent a finding that a report was not necessary. The record indicated that the defendant knowingly waived the right to counsel at trial and the court was not required to provide him with funds to purchase non-prison clothing for trial.