Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1981 the petitioner killed his wife and mother-in-law. Sentenced to imprisonment for burglary and to death for the murders, he exhausted state court direct appeals. On collateral review, the death penalty was set aside, then reinstated, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. A federal habeas corpus petition was pending for several years while he unsuccessfully pursued additional state remedies. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel claims; an argument that state courts failed to define extreme emotional distress; exclusion of some evidence of extreme emotional distress during the penalty phase; and an argument that the state's murder statute was vague. The court reversed in part and granted the petition based on based on the Kentucky courts’ violation of petitioner’s due process rights by shifting onto petitioner the burden of proof with respect to extreme emotional distress. Proof of the absence of extreme emotional distress was an element of murder under Kentucky law, and the state failed to prove this element. The court also found flagrant prosecutorial misconduct at trial, based on closing argument statements suggesting that the defense manufactured the emotional distress claim.

The Chapter 7 trustee sought to avoid a mortgage with respect to wife's interest in the property because the mortgage did not name or identify her in the body of the mortgage. The wife had signed the mortgage, and a rider that contained a provision for joint and several liability, but not the note. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the trustee. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Relying on 11 U.S.C. 544(a) and Kentucky property law, the court concluded that the identities of both borrowers was readily ascertainable from examination of the entire mortgage, which includes the rider.

In 1994 defendant entered a plea of guilty to unlawfully furnishing a controlled substance. He was sentenced to 220 days in jail and 3 years of probation. In 1998, he violated probation and was sentenced to 365 days, with 234 days of credit for time served. He was subsequently deported from the United States four times. In 2009, he pleaded guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon. Investigation revealed the deportations and 1994 conviction, an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). Defendant pleaded guilty to being present in the United States after being deported for an aggravated felony conviction (8 U.S.C. 1326(a) & (b)(2)). The district court sentenced him to 70 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly calculated the sentence, based on a finding that the 1994 conviction resulted in a sentence of more than 13 months. The sentence of imprisonment for guidelines purposes is the sentence pronounced, not the length of time actually served, with no subtraction of credit for time served.

In 2007, plaintiff, a carpet dealer, settled state law claims against a competing dealer and a manufacturer, alleging slander and refusal to deal arising from a 1998 agreement between the defendants. The federal district court subsequently dismissed claims under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, based on continuing refusal to deal. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The plaintiff adequately alleged an ongoing conspiracy to restrain trade and that the defendants acted on their agreement after the settlement. Although the lawsuit was a plausible alternative reason for refusal to deal, conspiracies are presumed to be ongoing and the allegation was sufficient for the pleadings stage. The 2007 settlement did not bar the claims because it did not effectuate a withdrawal from the conspiracy. The defendants took no actions inconsistent with a continuing conspiracy.

Workers claimed that unions breached their duty of fair representation by favoring certain skilled workers--millwrights and electricians--over machine repairmen. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and, on remand, dismissed again, finding some claims barred by the statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Decisions and layoffs made before February 26, 2002, were discrete and potentially actionable events, not part of a continuing violation, and are barred by the statute of limitations. Because the union was not operating a hiring hall it was not subject to a higher duty of fair representation. Plaintiffs failed to show that union decisions concerning training and lines of demarcation were irrational or made in bad faith.

Plaintiff alleged violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 13(a), prohibition on selling the same product to different buyers at different prices, by a manufacturer of mowing equipment and a distributor/retailer of that equipment. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In light of recent Supreme Court decisions, courts may no longer accept conclusory allegations that do not include specific facts necessary to establish the cause of action. The new "plausibility" standard is particularly difficult for the plaintiff in this case, because only the defendants have access to the pricing information necessary to show discriminatory pricing, but the plaintiff may not use discovery to obtain those facts. The plaintiff did not have sufficient facts to establish the manufacturer's control of the distributor to proceed under the "indirect purchaser" doctrine.

The trustee in Chapter 7 proceedings sought to avoid the mortgage, recorded in 2006, asserting that the words "see EXHIBIT A," in the spot for the legal description on the signature page did not satisfy the statutory requirement found in Ky. Rev. Stat. 440.060(1). The Bankruptcy Court rejected the argument and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the practice of incorporating an exhibit containing the legal description is common and satisfies the statute.

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to three counts sexual abuse of his minor step-daughter (18 U.S.C. 2242) in exchange for dismissal of seven other counts. The district court granted a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, departed upward by one criminal-history category, and varied upward from the 188- to 235- month advisory guidelines range, imposing a 300-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded on grounds of procedural unreasonableness. The district court policy that a defendant who waited until the final pretrial conference to plead guilty could not receive the one-level reduction in offense level described in the guidelines usurped the discretion granted by Congress and was contrary to a policy favoring individual consideration.

The Chapter 7 debtors' federal tax return listed: withholding of $6,777; total tax liability of $2,934, a non-refundable child tax credit of $2,903, an additional child tax credit of $1,097, and a total federal tax refund of $8,542. The credit allows some taxpayers to claim a tax credit of $1,000 for each qualifying child. If the taxpayers have tax liability, the non-refundable portion is applied to satisfy the tax liability. If the taxpayer qualifies, a portion of the refundable amount of the credit, not used to offset tax liability, is sent as an income tax refund. The refundable portion, unlike the non-refundable portion, is treated as an overpayment. The bankruptcy court sustained the trustee's objection that the $2,903 credit was not exempt. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under 26 U.S.C. 24(a) and (d), the non-refundable portion of the credit is not property of the estate cannot be exempted as a payment under Ohio Rev. Code 2329.66(A)(9)(g). The entire tax refund of $8,542 is property of the estate from which the debtors may exempt $1,097 as the refundable portion of the credit.

When the debtors filed for Chapter 7 relief they listed the residence in which they had lived since 1995 as having fair market value of $205,000.00 with secured debt of $164,978.92. Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code 2329.66(A)(1), they claimed a homestead exemption of $40,400.00. They did not disclose a pending contract to sell the house for $205,000. After the sale closed, the debtors moved to an apartment and told creditors that they were using the proceeds for living expenses. The bankruptcy court sustained the trustee's objection to the homestead exemption and ordered turn over of the proceeds. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Exemptions are determined on the date a bankruptcy petition is filed. The debtors were using the property as their principal residence on the date they filed their petition; their intention to leave was irrelevant and does not defeat their claim to the homestead exemption.