Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, sitting in a parked car, was arrested on a warrant for carrying a concealed weapon. He set off the metal detector, but officers were unable to locate the source. After defendant used a toilet, officers found a gun near the toilet, obtained a warrant and matched defendant's DNA to that on the gun. Defendant, having waived Miranda rights, admitted that he had left the gun. The district court denied a motion to suppress. Defendant pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922 (g)) and was sentenced to 180 months incarceration under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the DNA and confession, but remanded on suppression of the gun. In blocking defendant's car, the officer conducted a "Terry" stop without objective reason to suspect defendant of criminal activity. Subsequent discovery of an open container and an outstanding warrant did not remove the taint of illegal seizure, but the DNA and confession did not retain the taint. Significant time passed between arrest and defendant's voluntary confession while lawfully in custody; there were intervening circumstances in discovery of the gun and the DNA test, done pursuant to a warrant. Because the details of a prior conviction for escape were unknown, the court remanded for reconsideration of sentencing.

Petitioner was awarded disability insurance benefits for a period beginning in 1983. In 2002 the Social Security Administration produced evidence he had engaged in substantial gainful employment; the Appeals Council accordingly reopened and remanded to an administrative law judge, who determined that petitioner was not entitled to disability benefits. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. Petitioner's subsequent application for supplemental security income benefits was denied; the district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. The petitioner then sought a writ of mandamus to compel the SSA to reopen his case and reinstate benefits. The Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to issue a writ directly to the agency.

Plaintiffs filed suit under the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, and 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that personal information, as defined by the DPPA, was disclosed by individual defendants while acting as agents of the Ohio Department of Public Safety or the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV). The BMV apparently made bulk disclosures of personal information from motor vehicle records to a company, for an asserted permissible purpose, and the company resold or redisclosed the information. The district court determined that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. On interlocutory appeal. the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. The DPPA is not a strict liability statute and the defendants made the disclosures for a purportedly permitted purpose; they did not violate plaintiffs' "clearly established" rights. The DPPA does not impose a duty to investigate requests for disclosure nor does it clearly prohibit bulk disclosures.

Defendant, convicted of a 1984 rape and murder, was sentenced to death and exhausted state appeals. While a habeas proceeding was pending, the Ohio Supreme Court ordered the City of Cleveland to release certain documents relating to its investigation of the murder. Without addressing whether the new evidence supported a Brady claim and should be included in the record, the district court dismissed the habeas petition in 1993. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by not expanding the record to include the new evidence and that defendant had established that the prosecution had withheld favorable evidence; the court ordered consideration of newly-available DNA evidence. After considering DNA test results, the district court again dismissed the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court's consideration of the DNA test in analyzing Brady claims was improper, but those claims were properly rejected because the exculpatory evidence that was withheld would have been of little value to the defense.

The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus by the defendant, convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a fellow inmate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Rejecting a claim based on trial counsel's failure to object to the presence of 10 uniformed guards (seven armed) in the court room, the court noted legitimate security concerns and that the guards were not overly conspicuous. The court similarly rejected a claim based on the reactions of counsel and the guards when the murder weapons (shanks) were placed within defendant's reach. Certain closing argument statements by the prosecutor were improper, but not prejudicial. Given the aggravating circumstances of the crime, only evidence with an overwhelming net mitigating value could have produced a reasonable probability of a life sentence; information about defendant's background or prison conditions was not of such an overwhelming nature that its omission likely made a difference.

The defendant entered a guilty plea as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and was sentenced to 120 months incarceration. The Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). After a Michigan state court amended the judgment of one of defendant’s predicate convictions for the ACCA enhancement, the district court reimposed the same 120-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. The resentencing preceded the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Pepper v. United States, in which the court invalidated 18 U.S.C. 3742(g)(2), the subsection that prohibits the district court from resentencing a defendant outside the applicable guidelines range except in two narrow circumstances. The court rejected a challenge to 3742(g)(1), which states that the court should use guidelines in effect at the time of original sentencing, but held that the district court erred in refusing to consider subsequent amendments to the sentencing guidelines under the section 3553(a) factors. Consideration of amendments that benefit the government is subject to ex post facto limitations.

Mother, a native of Russia, first entered the U.S. in 1999 to seek a doctor for her son and left without seeking asylum. Mother and son returned and overstayed their visitors' visas. When the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal, they sought asylum based on fear of persecution for their political belief in a fee economy and refusal to make mafia payments. An immigration judge denied withholding of removal and the BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit dismissed appeal of the petition for asylum for lack of jurisdiction. The immigration judge correctly found the petition untimely, based on a factual finding that nothing prevented petitioner from applying within a year of entering the country. Affirming denial of withholding removal, the court stated that the petitioner did not establish that she would more likely than not suffer persecution if returned to Russia. The court noted several inconsistencies in her claims.

After receiving assurance that her 72-acre farm operation complied with Michigan Agriculture Environmental Assurance Program cropping system requirements and with cost-effective pollution prevention practices and environmental regulations, which provides protection against nuisance suits, plaintiff planned a composting operation. State litigation concerning the plan was pending and a stop-work order was in place when neighbors started to complain about odors. After various inspections and orders, the owner received notice that the MAEAP certification was being withdrawn and filed claims against the township, its supervisor, state officials, and citizens. The district court dismissed claims against state officials, except an equal protection claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the officials were shielded by qualified immunity. An allegation that the plaintiff is a woman and that a man was treated more favorably was insufficient to state an equal protection claim; there was a basis for each of the state's actions with respect to the plaintiff's operation and no evidence that the same facts applied to the man's operation. Nothing suggested that the defendantsâ actions were not taken in good faith and pursuant to applicable statutes.

Responding to an assault call, Memphis police located the victim's boyfriend (defendant) near the scene with a semi-automatic pistol. Defendant claimed to have taken the gun from his girlfriend during the fight. Indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g), defendant was diagnosed with mild mental retardation, but found competent to stand trial. He entered a guilty plea and, based on a presentence report showing prior serious drug and violent felonies, was classified as an armed career criminal with enhancement for being a felon in possession of a firearm in connection with another felony, aggravated assault. His guideline range was 188-235 months. Unable to locate the victim for confirmation of his use of the gun, the government agreed to a reduction, with a new corresponding guideline range of 151-188 months, but the mandatory minimum sentence still stood at 180 months. The district court imposed a 180-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an Eighth Amendment argument. The sentence did account for defendant's disability; the defendant is an adult and the sentence is not grossly disproportionate to his culpability.