Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was in a work-related vehicle accident that injured his back in 1994. He worked on and off until 2000 when back pain prevented him from continuing as a truck driver. A 2001 claim for social security disability benefits was denied. Plaintiff had some relief following surgery in 2001 and was released to work in 2002. When the pain increased he began mental health treatment. In 2004 an ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. In 2007, following remand, an ALJ again denied benefits. The appeals council denied jurisdiction. The district court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to properly apply the treating physician rule and the good reasons rule in disregarding the conclusion of a treating psychiatrist and testimony of a treating counselor. Agency procedural rules require that the ALJ balance factors to determine what weight to give a treating source and to give good reasons for the weight actually assigned.

Petitioner worked as an underground surveyor for a coal company for more than 22 years. He filed an unsuccessful claim for black lung benefits (30 U.S.C. 901) about a year after being laid off. He filed a second claim 10 years later, accompanied by medical opinions and x-ray interpretations. The DOL provided a pulmonary examination for each claim. The first diagnosed shortness of breath of unknown etiology but opined that petitioner suffered no impairment. The second resulted in diagnosis of restrictive lung disease, right mid lung density, bilateral hilar adenopathy and concluded that there was no impairment. An ALJ rejected the second claim. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit vacated for consideration under an amendment to the Act, under which a miner who worked underground for at least 15 years and who demonstrates that he suffers from a total respiratory disability is presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis (30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4)). Rebuttal requires an affirmative showing; it is not enough to show that medical evidence does not include a well documented opinion of pneumoconiosis. The ALJ failed to consider all evidence relevant to the issue of disability.

After a chapter 11 case was converted to a chapter 7 case, the bankruptcy court entered orders granting fees for the chapter 7 trustee's counsel, denying fees requested by chapter 11 counsel, and requiring chapter 11 counsel to disgorge its pre-petition retainer so that administrative expenses from the chapter 7 case could be paid. The Sixth Circuit vacated the denial of fees and disgorgement order and remanded for determination of whether a pre-petition retention letter between the firm and the debtor established a valid lien under Ohio law, securing payment of fees for necessary and reasonable services provided while the firm served as counsel to the debtor as debtor in possession. The bankruptcy court erred in basing its denial on 11 U.S.C. 726, which is a priority scheme for distribution on allowed claims; 11 U.S.C. 330 governs analysis of whether to allow compensation.

Plaintiff, employed by a company contracted to do grounds maintenance, was injured while mowing grass at an Army base. A deteriorating steam pipe fell, striking him in the head. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States, reasoning that under the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Law, the United States was an up-the-ladder contractor, or statutory employer, so that plaintiff's only remedy was the workers' compensation benefits he received from his direct employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the U.S. government is a "person" entitled to the up-the-ladder defense and that the waiver of immunity under the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, provides for claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual. The government "secured the payment of compensation" by hiring a contractor and, therefore, cannot be treated as an employer that did not secure benefits. The work performed by plaintiff was a "regular and recurrent" part of work at the facility and the government was entitled to contractor immunity.

Defendant, a pawn shop operator, entered a guilty plea to unlawful receipt and possession of a firearm (26 U.S.C. 5861(d)) and unlawful transfer of a firearm (26 U.S.C. 5861(e)) and was sentenced to 37 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. In a habeas corpus petition, defendant argued that his offenses were incorrectly classified as crimes of violence so that 18 U.S.C. 4042(b) requires written notice to state and local law enforcement prior to his release and, during supervised release, a probation officer must provide notice prior to a change in residence. Section 4042(b) defines crime of violence by reference to 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3). The district court rejected the petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed, after holding that the claims were not rendered moot by defendant's release. Adopting a categorical approach, rather than examination of the facts, the court held that violation of 5861(d) is not a crime of violence under 924(c)(3). Illegal possession may occur under a variety of circumstances; use of physical force is not an element of the crime and there is no inherent risk of force.

Defendant, hired by a landlord to collect overdue rent, was convicted of rape, aggravated burglary, and felonious assault, stemming from incidents involving forcible entry into apartments. Without a pre-sentence report, the trial court imposed a sentence of nine years. On remand, after obtaining a report, the court imposed a sentence of 16 years. Another remand resulted in a 13-year sentence. After exhausting state appeals, defendant filed a successful federal petition for habeas corpus. The district court held that the process by which defendant was resentenced, resulting in a sentence longer than the original sentence, created a presumption of vindictiveness that was not rebutted. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Ohio Court of Appeals' determination that the presumption of vindictiveness does not apply in this case is consonant with federal law; the harsher sentence was imposed by a new judge, who thoroughly explained his reasoning. There was no evidence of actual vindictiveness.

The trust was created by the Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of a corporation that, from 1965 to 1981, manufactured and sold automotive products containing asbestos. Numerous suits were filed concerning those products. Coverage through one primary insurer has been exhausted; two primary insurers are defending. The trust holds an umbrella insurance policy issued by defendant, which contends that it is not required to defend the claims. The district court agreed and dismissed the trust's complaint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although the umbrella policy schedule of primary carriers only lists the policy that has been exhausted, the umbrella policy applies, by its unambiguous terms, the umbrella policy applies only where an occurrence is not covered by the underlying insurance listed in the schedule, "or any other underlying insurance collectible by the insured."

In 2006 the claimant sought disability benefits, alleging injury in a construction accident. An ALJ denied the claim and the appeals council denied review. The district court upheld the denial. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The ALJ's decision was incomplete and improperly gave greatest weight to the opinion of a non-treating state agency physician, rather than to the opinion of a treating physician. The ALJ mischaracterized the treating physician's treatment notes.

Plaintiff filed several suits against healthcare groups on behalf of the United States, claiming violation of the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395y(b). No court has ever found that the MSP is a qui tam statute, permitting private attorneys general to sue on behalf of the United States. The Sixth Circuit found plaintiff was on notice of the frivolous nature of his filings from their inception in the Tennessee district courts and remanded for a show-cause hearing on why sanctions should not issue. The district court awarded sanctions to two defendants in amounts of $131,158.50 and $145,431.19. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, but denied an award for the appeal.

Defendant, known as "Motor City Mink," ran a prostitution operation that involved teen-agers. He was convicted of engaging in a child exploitation enterprise (18 U.S.C. 2252A(g)(2)), manufacturing and distributing child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and 2252A(a)(2)), transporting a minor for purposes of prostitution (18 U.S.C. 2423(a)), and sex trafficking of children (18 U.S.C. 1591(a)), and was sentenced to multiple concurrent terms, the longest of which was 420 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on other counts, but reversed with respect to the child exploitation enterprise count. Known as the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, the statute requires that the government present sufficient evidence that a total of at least three other persons acted in concert with defendant to commit one or more of the counts. Defendant was not prejudiced by evidence introduced under that count.