Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The executor of the estate's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims that decedent was killed while riding a motorcycle across an empty field, in the middle of the night, after a low-speed chase, when a deputy intentionally rammed that motorcycle. The district court held that the deputy's actions, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, violated decedent's clearly established constitutional rights, precluding qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. If a suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.

Petitioner, convicted of 1986 Ohio murders and sentenced to death, obtained a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 on the ground that an exculpatory pretrial police report, in which witnesses claimed to have seen one of the victims alive several days after her alleged murder, violated the Brady rule. The Sixth Circuit reversed the issuance of the writ and rejected petitioner's other arguments, including those based retention of a juror undergoing psychiatric treatment, denial of a venue change in light of negative pretrial publicity. In light of all of the evidence, the Ohio court did not unreasonably apply Brady when it rejected a claim based upon the undisclosed police report, which would not have created a reasonable probability of a different result.

In 2005 petitioner was convicted, under Michigan law, of felony murder for his role in the robbery, fire, and homicide at a gun shop. He had initially invoked his right to counsel, after which an officer made a remark about the possibility of the death penalty. A day later, petitioner stated that he had planned the crime. The trial court refused to suppress the statement. After exhausting state appeals, petitioner was denied habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254) by the district court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The state court decision, that the death penalty statement did amount to an impermissible interrogation and that the coercive effect of this interrogation had subsided by the next morning, so that petitioner had validly waived his right to counsel before giving his statement, did not reflect an unreasonable application of relevant Supreme Court precedent. The court noted that it is not clear that the death-penalty comment qualified as the functional equivalent of interrogation, as opposed to a type of "subtle compulsion" to cooperate that is not foreclosed by precedent.

In 1991, Carpenter pled guilty to aggravated theft and bank fraud. He served jail time and was disbarred. Between 1998 and 2000, he ran a Ponzi scheme, selling investments in sham companies, promising a guaranteed return. A class action resulted in a judgment of $15,644,384 against Carpenter. Plaintiffs then sued drawee banks, alleging that they violated the UCC "properly payable rule" by paying checks plaintiffs wrote to sham corporations, and depositary banks, alleging that they violated the UCC and committed fraud by depositing checks into accounts for fraudulent companies. The district court dismissed some claims as time-barred and some for failure to state a claim. After denying class certification, the court granted defendant summary judgment on the conspiracy claim, based on release of Carpenter in earlier litigation; a jury ruled in favor of defendant on aiding and abetting. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Claims by makers of the checks are time-barred; the "discovery" rule does not apply and would not save the claims. Ohio "Blue Sky" laws provide the limitations period for fraud claims, but those claims would also be barred by the common law limitations period. The district court retained subject matter jurisdiction to rule on other claims, following denial of class certification under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d).

The Medicare program pays teaching hospitals to cover "direct" and "indirect costs of medical education," 42 U.S.C. 1395ww(d)(5)(B), (h). Direct costs include expenses such as residents' salaries. Indirect costs are incurred due to "general inefficiencies" and "extra demands placed on other staff." Congress created a formula for calculating indirect expenses based on full-time equivalency interns; an HHS regulation referred to time residents spend in the "portion of the hospital subject to the prospective payment system or in the outpatient department of the hospital." In reimbursing plaintiff, HHS excluded from the FTE count time residents spent on pure research, unrelated to treatment of a patient. While appeal of a decision favoring the hospital was pending, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119, 660–61. For the years at issue, HHS must include in FTE: "all the time spent by an intern or resident in an approved medical residency training program in non-patient care activities, such as didactic conferences and seminars, as such time and activities are defined by the Secretary." HHS promulgated a regulation specifying that eligible non-patient care activities do not include time residents spend conducting pure research. The Sixth Circuit upheld the regulation as within the Secretary's authority and applicable to the years at issue.

Plaintiff a law school faculty member living in Ohio, contracted with defendant (Nevada corporation, doing business in California) for publication of his manuscript, giving a Virginia address. Based on delays in publication, plaintiff sued for breach of contract, interference with contract and prospective advantage, defamation, intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress; misrepresentation, and fraud. After several motions, including default judgment and reinstatement, and discovery, defendant successfully moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Defendant waived the personal jurisdiction defense and voluntarily submitted to the district court’s jurisdiction, when its attorney entered a general appearance on its behalf.

Petitioner, convicted in 1987 of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit first-degree murder, and armed robbery, was denied habeas corpus relief and filed a motion for relief under Rule 60(b). After several appeals, the district court granted a motion to consider the merit of certain claims that it earlier concluded were procedurally defaulted, but ultimately denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the prosecution withheld two pieces of evidence before sentencing, in violation of Brady v. Maryland: pretrial statements made by an accomplice regarding the influence of a quasi-religious paramilitary group on the crime, and a detective's account of petitioner's self-destructive behavior while in police custody. The petitioner already knew the underlying facts and those facts were not material.

Following their termination from appointed county positions, plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they were terminated without due process of law. The positions were "unclassified" and not protected under the Tennessee Civil Service Merit System. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county and its officials. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiffs had no legitimate property right to their positions and nothing for the Due Process Clause to protect. Plaintiffs, in their positions five to 21 years, never previously challenged the unclassified nature of their jobs

In 1993, the FAA decided to privatize all Level I air traffic control towers. About 1500 controllers were forced to leave the field, be trained to operate higher level towers, or secure employment with the private contractors. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 prohibits the federal government from performing an activity that could be performed for less cost by the private sector. Before privatizing a function, an agency must determine whether that function is inherently governmental or commercial. A governmental function must be performed by government employees. The district court first dismissed, but, on remand, instructed the FAA to undergo Circular A-76 analysis. The FAA continued to privatize towers and controllers again brought suit. The district court again remanded to the FAA for analysis, but refused to terminate private contracts already in place. The court later granted the FAA partial summary judgment, based on a 2003 amendment to 49 U.S.C. 47124, indicating that work in Level I towers is not an inherently governmental function, then dismissed remaining claims for lack of standing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Every tower privatized in the 1993 program fit within the section 47124(b)(3) mandate.

Defendant was discharged from the U.S. Army due to a personality disorder. He was later charged under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. 3261(a), and sentenced, by a federal district court, to life in prison for participating in a sexual assault and multiple murders while stationed in Iraq. Co-conspirators, still on active duty and subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 802(a)(1), were tried by courts-martial and each sentenced to between 90 and 110 years imprisonment; they are eligible for parole in ten years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first noting that Iraq could not prosecute the defendant and that prosecution in the U.S. did not violate international law. The Army completed a valid discharge of defendant, so that he was no longer subject to courts-martial. His trial under MEJA did not violate the separation-of-powers principle or his due process or equal protection rights. Defendant was no longer similarly situated with his co-conspirators when charges were filed.