Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to charges of conspiracy to distribute the drug ecstacy, (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846) and, after the court granted a 24-month downward variance for his cooperation with the government, was sentenced to 71 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court adequately considered mitigating arguments and did not improperly consider the possibility of future sentence relief under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court is not required to respond to every argument and adequately acknowledged that defendant ended his criminal conduct on his own, apparently wants to be a successful, law-abiding citizen, and requested a facility with a substance-abuse program. The district court would have erred had it imposed a higher sentence than merited at the time of sentencing because of the possibility of future cooperation and a future Rule 35(b) motion, but the record did not clearly reflect that the court committed such an error.

Petitioner and her daughter illegally entered the U.S. in 2002, from Colombia. They applied for asylum in 2006 and sought withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. An Immigration Judge denied the application for asylum as untimely and declined to withhold removal under CAT for lack of proof. The IJ found both petitioners removable under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), ordered that the be removed to any country other than Colombia. The Department of Homeland Security appealed and the BIA concluded that petitioners failed to establish a clear probability of future persecution in Colombia on account of political opinion and remanded to the IJ for the sole purpose of allowing petitioners to apply for voluntary departure. The Sixth Circuit first held that it had jurisdiction to review the BIA order denying withholding of removal, but declined to exercise that jurisdiction for prudential reasons.

The district court denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254) by an Ohio death row prisoner, convicted of two 1992 murders. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first rejecting a claim that he could not make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial because the jail doctor had him taking an anti-psychotic drug. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a substance abuse expert, any such evidence would have been cumulative. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence from defendant's upbringing, the rationale for not presenting the materials is consistent with concerns about some of the damaging elements that might have been introduced. The decision not to suppress defendant's confession, even though he was in drug and alcohol withdrawal at the time, was reasonable.

The district court certified a class action and a proposed class in an action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. The suit claimed that Blue Cross breached its fiduciary duty by imposing and failing to disclose an other-than-group subsidy and that the OTG subsidy violated Mich. Comp. Laws 550.1211(2). The state insurance commissioner took the position that state law allows the assessment and that revenue it generates funds Medigap coverage. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the class action is not the superior method of adjudication (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)) and prosecuting separate actions does not present the risk of inconsistent adjudications (FRCP 23(b)(1)(A)). ERISA fiduciary status is a crucial threshold factual issue specific to every class member, requiring the court to make individualized determinations. Resolution of the legality of the subsidy before that determination would also mitigate the state's concerns about stopping collection of the fee. Potential awards at stake would not preclude individual class members from seeking relief and there was no evidence that individual litigation would create a risk of inconsistent adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the defendant.

The debtor's property was subject to first and second mortgages with complex histories of assignment involving the defendants. The district court dismissed the chapter 7 trustee's action for declaratory judgment to determine the validity, extent, and priority of defendants' liens and vacated a default judgment entered against one defendant, Wilmington. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded in part and affirmed in part. Under 11 U.S.C. 544 and Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.9-102(1)(az)(3), operating together, the trustee's interest as a hypothetical judicial lien creditor is superior to those security interests which are unperfected as of the filing of the petition, so the trustee stated a claim against GMAC. The bankruptcy court must make further factual findings regarding Litton and Bank of New York as to the first mortgage, to determine which was the secured party on the date of the filing of the petition. The record established that Wilmington was not a proper party, having assigned its interest years earlier, and the bankruptcy court acted within its discretion in setting aside the default judgment.

After exhausting state appeals from his conviction for crimes including felony murder, defendant unsuccessfully petitioned the district court for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial. A claim that defendant was required to walk in front of the jury in shackles was procedurally defaulted and defendant did not demonstrate prejudice that would excuse the default. A claim that failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel was also defaulted.Defendant failed to allege any facts sufficient to make out an access-to-courts violation in regard to his prison's law library.

The government appealed the district court's decision not to apply a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(b)(1) following defendant's guilty plea for receipt and possession of child pornography. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Defendant's prior Virginia conviction for sexual battery did not mandate sentence enhancement. The statute of conviction does not require, as an element of the offense, that the complaining witness be a minor; indictment references to a minor must be disregarded because the plea was limited to sexual battery. The district court properly found that validity of the Virginia pre-sentence report was too questionable for it to serve as the factual predicate for a sentencing enhancement.

Prior to defendant's trial for shipping telecommunications and navigation equipment to Iraq, in violation of an embargo (Executive Order 12722) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the district court denied a motion to suppress; granted a protective order to prevent disclosure of certain confidential documents to the defense; and excluded testimony from a defense witness. Following conviction, the the district court found the sentencing range to be 188-235 months, but only imposed concurrent sentences of 72 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The motion to suppress was properly denied; the affidavit would have provided a sufficient basis to establish probable cause, even if defendant's desired changes had been made. The court properly imposed a sentencing enhancement for an offense involving national security, but improperly applied U.S.S.G 251.1(a)(2); as "invited error," it did not warrant reversal. No Brady violations occurred. Newly-discovered evidence was not exculpatory and did not advance a theory that the government approved and assisted with the shipments.

Defendant admitted to participating in the 1984 robbery and to shooting husband (who survived), but claimed not to have shot wife. He entered a plea of guilty to aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder. At a penalty hearing, defendant argued that he had participated in the plot only under the influence of Wesley, who shot wife. The panel sentenced defendant to death. When Wesley was tried, the state presented evidence that he, not defendant, was the principal offender in the murder. Wesley was sentenced to life imprisonment with possibility of parole after 20 years. Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea or vacate the death sentence was rejected. The Sixth Circuit's 2004 grant of habeas corpus was remanded by the Supreme Court. The Sixth Circuit again remanded with instructions that the district court issue a conditional writ of habeas corpus unless the state holds a new sentencing hearing within 90 days. Defendant's due process rights were violated by arguments leaving the impression with that he was the principal offender in the murder, even though the state had evidence and a belief that Wesley was actually the triggerman. It is likely that the panel would not have imposed a death had the state not persisted in its efforts.

Defendant, who has a history of substance abuse and mental illness, failed to return to a halfway house where he had been placed following a conviction on credit card fraud charges. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison for escape. The Sixth Circuit vacated, first rejecting a claim that the sentence was "greater than necessary to fulfill the requirements of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)." In imposing the sentence, the court improperly relied on defendant's need for rehabilitation and psychiatric treatment. Although 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(D) requires that sentencing courts consider needs for "educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment,' section 3582(a) cautions that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.