Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2001, petitioner was convicted of criminal sexual conduct. Following his arrest, while on bond for that charge, he was arrested for possession with intent to deliver cocaine. He was convicted of that offense as well. Petitioner became eligible for parole in 2008. The Michigan Parole Board used a guidelines scoresheet and assigned a score that gave him a status of "high probability of parole." Nonetheless, after an interview, the Board denied the application, indicating that petitioner required sex offender therapy and had no insight, empathy, or remorse. Petitioner filed a pro se motion, which the court interpreted as a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, and dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. After examining the state's parole system, the court concluded that petitioner identified only a basis for his hope of parole, but did not identify a protected liberty interest to which he is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Defendant pled guilty to a three-count indictment charging him with receipt of visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, receipt and/or distribution of child pornography, and possession of child pornography. The district court imposed a concurrent 120-month term of imprisonment on each count. The Sixth Circuit remanded for determination of whether separate acts or conduct underlie the convictions for receipt and possession as to each of the three convictions. Possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B) is a lesser-included offense of receipt of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A). It is unclear whether the two convictions were based on receiving the same images.

The 2003 incident started with the mayor calling police to complain about children running through yards. Plaintiff, mother of one of the boys, claims that the officer became angry, blocked her from her house, knocked her down, dragged her to the squad car, shoved her inside, and used pepper spray. She escaped to the house with the children and called 911. When officers arrived, plaintiff refused to open the door until her brother, an attorney, arrived. Plaintiff was handcuffed and placed in the first officer's car, was held for five to six hours, was arraigned on charges of disorderly conduct, assault of a police officer, resisting arrest, and escape in the second degree. Several charges were felonies. She refused to sign an agreement that charges would be dismissed if she promised that she would not pursue a civil suit. She was found not guilty. In her civil suit, a jury awarded $2,400 for physical injury, pain, and suffering, $5,000 for legal expenses, $50,000 for mental pain and suffering, and $1,000,000 in punitive damages (reduced to $229,600 by the judge). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, but modified the punitive damages award to $550,000 so that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is in the single digits.

In 1994 the then-18-year-old petitioner robbed a liquor store with a 14-year-old accomplice. Both wore masks. The security camera captured petitioner shooting and killing the owner, who did not resist. After a tracking dog led police to petitioner's house, they obtained a warrant and found the murder weapon and cash. Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery and murder. The jury recommended the death penalty. A juror admitted consulting an outside source about the definition of paranoid schizophrenia, but stated that her answer had played no role in his deliberations. The judge imposed the death penalty. Petitioner exhausted state appeals and collateral attack, then filed a federal habeas petition. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a juror misconduct claim. There is no constitutional imperative to admit cumulative or irrelevant evidence; the court properly excluded evidence of mental illness in petitioner's family. The Ohio Supreme Court's reweighing cured whatever misconduct the prosecutor engaged in at trial. The court also rejected challenges involving exclusion of a juror and jury instructions.

Wife noticed her 72-year-old husband acting strangely and, fearing a stroke, called 911. When paramedics responded, husband refused to cooperate, demanding that they leave and threatening to retrieve a firearm. The paramedics retreated and radioed police for support. Police established a defensive perimeter around the home, called husband and told him to exit the house with his hands in the air, so that the officers could see he was unarmed. Although he acted confused on the first call and did not answer the second, he exited a few minutes later holding a shotgun skyward at a forty-five degree angle, with the barrel in his left hand and the stock in his right. None of the officers spoke to husband or told him to drop the gun. An officer fired a single shot, hitting his back and killing him. Police allege that he paused and leveled his gun in the direction of officers. Wife alleges that stopped and began to turn; as he turned, the gun barrel dropped. The district court dismissed the 42 U.S.C. 1983, but held that there were material issues of fact on whether officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no legal issue for appeal.

Defendant was convicted of bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344) and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343), based a scheme to acquire a house for $1.4 million, intending to resell for a profit. The purchase involved recruiting a third-party with good financial credit to act as nominal purchaser. Defendant and her now-deceased husband provided the straw buyer with $30,000 that she deposited in her bank account, and falsified documents so that she appeared as president of defendants' sales group since 2003, earning a salary of $30,000-to-$40,000 per month. Within months of the purchase, the loan went into default. The lien holder foreclosed and resold the house, resulting in a net loss of $376,070.16. The straw buyer was not prosecuted, but testified without a nonprosecution agreement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion for a new trial. The prosecution's failure to disclose that the straw buyer was testifying without an agreement was not material, for purposes of a "Brady" violation or a claim of ineffective assistance.

Employee injured her wrist as a result of an equipment malfunction while performing her job and was sent to the hospital, where she was tested for drugs in accordance with a drug policy negotiated as part of a collective bargaining agreement. She tested positive for marijuana and was subsequently terminated. The parties submitted the dispute to arbitration pursuant to the CBA. The arbitrator sustained the Union's grievance, finding that employer lacked just cause to terminate a nine-year and otherwise satisfactory employee, who was not given adequate advance notice of the drug policy and the consequences. The district court ruled in favor of the Union. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The outcome reached by the arbitrator was based on his interpretation of the relevant contractual language, which is all a court is asked to determine in conducting "exceedingly deferential," "very limited" review.

Husband learned of a problem on the school bus involving his 10-year-old daughter. He and his wife went to the bus stop, where they saw police cars and a school bus. They could not see their daughter, but saw their son being held against a police car. They stated that they were the parents and asked where their daughter was. The officer shouted, "Get back." They complied. An officer approached wife, who yelled "don’t hit me." Husband told wife to return to their car. Husband claims that the officer grabbed him and began to kick him on his right side and groin. Other officers joined in and sprayed his face with pepper spray. The officers claim that husband and wife were aggressive. Husband was arrested and charged with assault on a police officer, but was found not guilty and filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court found that there were genuine issues of material fact and denied summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit remanded for trial.

A citizen of Canada, admitted in 1963 as a lawful permanent resident, has held academic positions at universities. In 1983, he was convicted of larceny and of taking money under false pretenses. In 1984, he was convicted of mail and wire fraud. He was imprisoned from 1992 to 1995, for violating parole. In 1990, the INS charged deportability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) based on conviction of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme. In 1997 INS added grounds under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii): conviction of an aggravated-felony theft offense, and an aggravated-felony fraud offense involving losses exceeding $10,000. The IJ, found petitioner deportable. The BIA affirmed, but remanded because the INS had granted the Attorney General discretion to waive deportation of lawful permanent residents, otherwise deportable for having committed crimes. DHS added another ground, charging that his 1984 conviction qualified as an aggravated felony because it constituted an attempt or conspiracy to commit fraud or deceit involving over $10,000 in losses. In 2007 the IJ denied all claims. The BIA agreed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting procedural claims and his claim that removal proceedings should be terminated based on his prima facie eligibility for naturalization under 8 C.F.R. 1239.2(f).

Following a 2007 train derailment and three-day fire that allegedly exposed a small Ohio town to cancer-causing agents, plaintiffs sought damages on behalf of a putative class. Plaintiffs' expert testified that the normal background level of dioxin is four parts per trillion and that the range within area homes was from 11.7 to 274 ppt. A doctor testified about increased risk of cancer. The district court granted summary judgment for the train company, finding that plaintiffs had not established general or specific causation and, as a matter of law, any increased risk of cancer or other diseases was too insignificant to warrant the court's ordering a lengthy period of medical monitoring. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the absence of conclusive medical evidence that plaintiffs faced even a one-in-a-million increased risk of cancer.