Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs held shares in three mutual funds issued by an open-end investment company (15 U.S.C. 80a-5(a)(1)). The shares were "redeemable securities," entitling the holders to redemption at any time for their proportionate share of the issuer's current net assets. Like most investments, the shares lost value between 2007 and 2008. Plaintiffs attributed their losses to defendants' taking unjustified risks in allocating assets and concealing those risks. They filed a class action, bringing state-law claims for breach of contract, violations of the Maryland Securities Act, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. The district court dismissed, holding that the action was barred by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. 77p(b), (f)(2)(A), (f)(3). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the case fell within an exemption, known as the first Delaware carve-out, which preserves a class action otherwise facing SLUSA preclusion if it involves "purchase or sale of securities by the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer exclusively from or to holders of equity securities of the issuer."

Petitioner was convicted of a murder, committed to prevent testimony in a criminal case, and was sentenced to death. After Ohio courts denied appellate and post-conviction relief, the federal district court denied 47 claims of error asserted in a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The defense argued that the prosecution wrongfully withheld evidence of prior inconsistent statements made to the police by state witnesses and plea-agreement deals, grants of immunity, and other inducements given to such witnesses in violation of its "Brady" obligation. The court concluded that the defense did not establish prejudice to excuse procedural default of some aspects of the claim and did not show that the undisclosed evidence was sufficiently material to warrant relief. Defense counsel's representation of a witness did not adversely affect his representation so that defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel, nor was he prejudiced by counsel's failure to object to hearsay evidence during the penalty phase or to adequately prepare and present mitigation evidence. The court also rejected claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Plaintiffs have filed several lawsuits in the past ten years, asserting ownership of mines in Indonesia. Each suit was rejected and sanctions were imposed on plaintiffs in two prior suits. The present suit alleges false filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission and failure, by federal agencies, to take enforcement actions. Following dismissal and denial of reconsideration, the district court ordered that plaintiffs and their counsel pay more than $100,000 in attorney fees and costs and enjoined plaintiffs and from ever filing another lawsuit arising out of the same subject matter in any state or federal court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, but reversed imposition of sanctions. The district court lacked jurisdiction over the mining company defendant. The district court did not comply with Rule 11 because it found a Rule 11 violation in conduct that went beyond the specific conduct identified in defendant's motion for sanctions.

Petitioner, arrested for rape on July 6, 2001, was not tried until February, 2003 because of continuances and motions by both parties and the court, some of which concerned DNA testing and unavailability of a defense expert. He was received four consecutive life sentences. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected a claim under speedy trial provisions in Ohio Rev. Code 2945.71 and the supreme court denied leave to appeal. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the deference owed state court decisions under the pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). Ohio's manner of looking at the reason for delay is thus not contrary, or diametrically opposed, to federal precedent. The state court reasonably considered relevant factors and its finding that petitioner was not prejudiced was supported. At most, the delay in holding trial constituted official negligence, but petitioner did not put forth any facts to show that the continuances, failing to submit DNA samples on time, and failing to submit a bill of particulars were a calculated attempt to gain an advantage at trial.

In 1996, an immigration judge ordered petitioner deported unless he voluntarily left the U.S. In 2009 he was detained and sought a stay of removal, claiming he had departed before the 1996 voluntary-departure deadline, precluding his conditional order of removal from becoming a final order of removal. He presented an expired Mexican passport and a marriage certificate, both issued in Mexico in 1998. The application was denied and petitioner was deported. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Federal courts of appeal do not have jurisdiction over denials of petitions to stay removal; petitioner had not appealed to the BIA the decisions on his motion for a speedy bond hearing and never challenged his removability in 1996. He cannot challenge enforcement of the 1996 order as if it were a new order.

Patient, insured by defendant, diagnosed with end-stage renal disease, and received dialysis at plaintiff's center. Three months after diagnosis, she became entitled to Medicare benefits (42 U.S.C. 426-1). Her plan provided that coverage ceased at that time, because of her entitlement to Medicare, but the insurer continued to pay for two months. Under the 1980 Medicare Secondary Payer Act, a group health plan may not take into account that an individual is entitled to Medicare benefits due to end-stage renal disease during the first 30 months (42 U.S.C. 1395y(b)(1)(C)(i)), but the insurer terminated coverage. Plaintiff continued to treat and bill. The insurer declared that termination was retroactive and attempted to offset "overpayment" against amounts due on other patients' accounts. The outstanding balance after patient's death was $210,000. Medicare paid less than would have been received from the insurer. The center brought an ERISA claim, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), and a claim for double damages under the 1980 Act. The district court granted plaintiff summary judgment on its ERISA claim but dismissed the other. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the ERISA claim and reversed dismissal. A healthcare provider need not previously "demonstrate" a private insurer's responsibility to pay before bringing a lawsuit under the 1980 Act's private cause of action.

Plaintiff became a firefighter-member in the department in 1991 and also became an administrative assistant in 1997. She alleges that defendant, fire chief until 2005, subjected her to unwanted sexual advances and verbal and physical contact of a sexual nature. She filed charges with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 2004. In 2006 the EEOC determined that firefighter "members" are employees, even if not paid, and that plaintiff was sexually harassed and subjected to a sexually hostile work environment, but that there was insufficient evidence to support allegations of retaliation and constructive discharge. The district court dismissed Title VII claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court did not consider and weigh all aspects of the firefighters' relationship with the department in determining that they were not "employees" under 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b); remuneration is a factor, but not decisive. The firefighters received a number of other benefits, including insurance.

Petitioner, convicted of the first degree murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254), arguing that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing present an insanity defense, despite knowledge of petitioner's long, well-documented history of severe mental illness. The Sixth Circuit reversed The Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law and unreasonably determined facts. That court acknowledged that counsel did not sufficiently investigate the insanity defense by obtaining an independent evaluation to rebut that provided by the forensic center, but instead relied on a self-defense strategy that was contradicted by the evidence. The court improperly looked at petitioner's actions after the shooting, rather than his state of mind at the moment of the offense, resulting in "a thinly veiled and unsupportable conclusion that it simply did not believe" that petitioner was legally insane, a factual issue that it should not have addressed. There is an "overwhelming probability" that knowledge of petitioner's history would have shed a different light on testimony that petitioner killed a complete stranger with minimal or no provocation, but then testified clearly and consistently that he believed the victim was trying to kill him and did shoot him.

A state court issued a judgment in forcible detainer and a notice of eviction, which was executed by defendants. Although the warrant did not mention personal property, the landlord and county attorney advised the officers that the landlord had the right to sell tenant's personal property. Tenant was threatened with arrest for his efforts to prevent removal of his personal property. Officers apparently assisted in removing the property to a truck and sent away state police officers called by the tenant. In tenant's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers' motion for judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The officers' participation amounted to an unconstitutional seizure of property in violation of a clearly established right; there was nothing extraordinary about the situation that entitled the officers to rely on advice given by the county attorney by phone.