Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Extinguishing a basement fire, firefighters discovered a meth lab. According to the occupant, defendant had paid to use the basement and fled when the fire started. Defendant later caused an explosion and fire in a motel room while cooking meth. He pled guilty to conspiring to manufacture, possess and distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii). A presentence report calculated a total offense level of 36 and a criminal history category of VI, adding two "recency points" under U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(e), because the offense occurred less than two years after release from confinement on a counted sentence. The applicable range was 324 to 405 months. Defendant requested that the court consider the substantial assistance he had provided the government and stated that he expected the government to file a 5K1.1 motion. The court stated that it could not consider possible future motions and imposed a sentence of 324 plus supervised release and restitution. The Sixth Circuit found the sentence procedurally and substantively reasonable.

In 1997, at age 39, plaintiff started working as a sales associate in defendant's store. She was later promoted to a full-time supervisor position. In 2008, another employee, age 33, was promoted to assistant manager. In 2007 and 2008, due to economic conditions, defendant underwent restructuring and eliminated the full-time supervisor position, permitting plaintiff to postpone reduction to part-time in order to utilize the medical benefits for an additional month. A new manager (age 28) was brought in from another store, so that the store had too many supervisory employees. Ultimately, plaintiff was given the option to step down to a position as a part-time sales associates or leave the company. She resigned in 2008 and filed suit, claiming violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws. 37.2101. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff did not prove pretext in the face of defendant's nondiscriminatory reasons for its promotional decisions.

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and the district court sentenced him to 120 months of incarceration. The Sixth Circuit rejected his claim that his prior conviction for felony escape could not be used to support his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The Supreme Court vacated for reconsideration in light of its 2009 decision in Chambers v. United States. On remand, the district court determined that defendant ran from a courtroom, which was not a secure facility. The Sixth Circuit remanded for sentencing without consideration of the escape as a violent felony. Escape from nonsecure custody is rarely violent.

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to launder monetary instruments (18 U.S.C. 1956). The district court denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and sentenced him to 63 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Defendant was familiar with the system, having faced previous charges, and delayed eight months before attempting to withdraw the plea; he did not consistently maintain his innocence. Defendant did not show that he was prejudiced by his attorney's claimed failings. Counsel did not perform unreasonably in advising defendant.

In 1979, plaintiff bought land from the Michigan State Transportation Commission. A decade later, he sued the Department of Transportation under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601, claimed that there was contamination on the site. After discovery, the parties settled. The district court entered a consent decree in 1991 that required the Department to remediate the property by March 31, 1995. If by then the Department failed to make a good-faith effort to remediate, the decree required payment of $2,000 per month until remediation was complete. The Department failed to remediate or to pay the liquidated damages. On a 2009 motion to enforce the decree, the court held that the Department had waived its sovereign immunity and that a 10-year statute of limitations barred enforcement of the remediation obligation, but that each of the missed $2,000 payments triggered its own 10-year limitations period. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the court should have relied on the doctrine of laches rather than the limitations period because the consent decree amounted to a remedy in equity. The waiver of immunity remained effective.

Defendant, sentenced to death for the murder of his girlfriend and her two children in 1988, exhausted state remedies. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. The federal district court denied his petition for habeas corpus in 2001; the Sixth Circuit held appeal in abeyance while he exhausted "Atkins" claims in state court. Tennessee courts rejected his claim of mental retardation. The district court also denied an Atkins petition. The Sixth Circuit vacated the decision on the Atkins claim and affirmed on all other claims. On remand, the court must consider the relationship between mental retardation and mental illness and whether defendant displayed deficits in adaptive behavior by the time he was 18. Rejected claims concerned the court's failure to answer jury questions regarding whether defendant could be paroled from a life sentence; ineffective assistance in counsel's failing to object to the prosecution's penalty-phase closing argument that giving a life sentence would reward him for the additional killings of the children and by failing to hire a psychiatrist regarding his mental-health issues; and the court's determination of his competency to stand trial.

For about 15 years, defendant owned and operated a business that trained individuals to use the computer-aided design program CATIA, which was developed by plaintiff. Plaintiff owns the copyrights for CATIA software products and has registered the CATIA trademark with the USPTO. Plaintiff sought damages for copyright and trademark infringement, unfair competition, and Michigan Consumer Protection Act violations arising from allegedly unauthorized use of its name and software licenses to operate a for-profit training course. The district court ruled in favor of plaintiff. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's refusal to set aside default judgment against defendant, who was pro se, and likely confused rather than engaging in a strategy of delay and who raised a plausible defense. The court upheld the court's grant of plaintiff’s motion for leave to subpoena the FBI, which had seized defendant's computers; the information sought was not protected grand jury information.

Debtors borrowed $157,291.77, secured by their home and took a second loan for $15,870, using their truck as security. They filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection and signed a reaffirmation agreement committing to pay those two debts. They stopped making payments; the truck had been stolen. The bank filed an unsecured claim. The trustee sought to avoid the mortgage as not properly perfected; the matter was resolved by agreement. The bank bought the property at auction, re-sold it at a profit of $33,400 and filed an unsecured claim for the full balance of the mortgage. The bankruptcy court allowed the claim; the bank received a total of about $37,000 in payments as an unsecured creditor on the two loans. The bank then sued the debtors in Kentucky state court, seeking about $89,000 on the real property loan and about $11,500 on the truck loan. The bankruptcy court reopened the case and voided the reaffirmation agreement on the ground of mutual mistake because the parties signed the agreement based on the false assumption that the bank held secured interests in the real property and the truck, which would have allowed debtors (rather than the bankruptcy estate) to retain ownership. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed.

In 1999 Debtor borrowed $75,558.93 secured by a recorded mortgage lien, encumbering real property and all improvements and fixtures. The property contains a manufactured home, with a plate indicating compliance with federal manufactured home standards. The lender's notes indicated that in 1997, the mobile home was gutted and rebuilt as a house. Debtor did not acquire a separate title to the manufactured home; it is unclear whether such a certificate ever issued. In 2009, Debtor filed a petition for chapter 13 relief. He sought to avoid the lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 544 because the Bank failed to perfect its lien on the manufactured home pursuant to Kentucky law. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to Debtor. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first holding that Debtor had derivative standing to seek to avoid the lien. Regardless of the issuance of a certificate of title, Debtor has an interest in the home that is part of the bankruptcy estate. Under Kentucky law, a mobile home is personal property; perfection of a lien requires notation on the certificate of title. The mobile home had not been converted to real property and the lender did not perfect a lien on personal property.

Plaintiff was terminated from her job as a medical sales representative and filed a complaint alleging she was wrongfully discharged in violation of Michigan’s public policy because of her refusal to unlawfully promote non-approved uses of medical products and to violate anti kickback laws. The district court entered judgment for plaintiff, awarding $880,000. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the court was within its discretion in not requiring plaintiff to prove to the jury that her employer directed her to violate the law and in finding that she had presented sufficient evidence to prove that the cause of her termination was her refusal to violate the law.