Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During 1998, while living in Tashkent, petitioner graduated from medical school, married, and had a son. He is of the Dungan ethnicity, a group he says is readily distinguishable from ethnic Uzbekis. He claims that they faced substantial persecution due to their ethnicity. He was arrested at least once and held for three days, during which he was beaten with batons. He claims that his wife died as the result of a police beating. He entered the U.S. on a nonimmigrant visa in 2001. His petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, was denied, based on an adverse credibility determination and a lack of corroborating evidence. The Sixth Circuit denied review, while acknowledging that the agency decision suffers from a number of errors regarding its findings on credibility and corroborating evidence. The court found that one critical credibility finding was supported by substantial evidence.

The company granted plaintiff leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, listing a June 27 return date. The doctor cleared plaintiff for light work beginning on May 31 and set June 13 as the probable date for unrestricted work. On May 31, plaintiff was sent home because the company did not permit employees with non-work-related injuries to perform light duty work after leave. Plaintiff did not return on June 13 and told the company that he was experiencing pain and would return on June 27. He obtained a doctor's note, but the company counted June 13 to 17 as unexcused absence and terminated his employment. The district court ruled for plaintiff on a claim of FLMA interference (29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(D)); awarded $99,960 in attorney fees, $2,732.90 in costs, and $104,354.85 in back pay; and ordered the company to change the termination date, for purposes of pension and retiree health benefits. The court denied statutory liquidated damages because it found that the company acted with reasonable grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the interference claim and reversed on the liquidated damages claim, noting the company's "obdurate refusal to correct an obvious mistake that constituted a wrongful discharge of a 36-year employee."

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to knowing possession of child pornography transported via computer, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). He was sentenced to 72 months and appealed sentencing enhancement under USSG 2G2.2(b)(3)(F), which requires a two-level increase for distribution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the evidence at least arguably refuted any claim that defendant was ignorant of the fact that his use of a file-sharing program made the files he downloaded through the program "available" to be searched and downloaded by others.

Plaintiff began working as an assistant restaurant manager in late 2005 and missed several weeks of work in 2006-2007 for medical treatments. In 2008 her supervisor discovered irregularities with her receipts and suspected that plaintiff improperly discounted orders and pocketed the difference. Her employment was terminated. After filing a grievance with the company, plaintiff declined an offer of three weeks paid leave and employment at a different location. She filed a complaint with the EEOC and Michigan Department of Civil Rights, which appears to have been unsuccessful, then filed suit alleging violation of the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12102, and Michigan's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that it was not clear that the termination was based on plaintiff's medical conditions or on her taking leave time. There was nonpretextual reason for the firing. Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA.

After months of surveillance, police searched curbside trash and found marijuana paraphernalia, an empty ammunition box, and mail addressed to people including defendant. Executing a warrant, they found numerous firearms. After indictment of defendant and 28 others, police obtained arrest warrants and drove to the house. A woman who was an arrest target answered the door. Within one minute of the officer's entry, defendant appeared at the top of the steps and followed orders to come down and submit to arrest. Officers conducted a protective sweep of places in the house that were large enough to hold a person and discovered a handgun and bag of marijuana on a dresser, a semiautomatic machine gun in a closet , and based on statements of a resident, a gun under a couch cushion. After obtaining a warrant for the house, police found more drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea for conspiracy to distribute 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(vii), and 846, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the evidence was found as part of a lawful protective sweep, but vacated the sentence.

Defendant, a Russian citizen, attended graduate school and owns real property, vehicles, and bank accounts in Ohio. He spends some time in Ohio each year, ranging from 40 days in 2007 to a total of 17 days in 2008–2009. He visits under a tourist visa and does not have an Ohio driver's license. After going to Russia to take part in a business venture with defendant, plaintiff filed suit in Ohio. The contract had no connection to the state. The trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, noting that defendant was not served with process in a manner that automatically confers personal jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that notions of fair play and substantial justice weigh against jurisdiction in Ohio. The court quoted a Russian proverb, “If you’re afraid of wolves, don’t go into the forest” that could be read, “If you’re afraid of the Russian legal system, don't do business in Russia.”

The police arrested defendant on February 4, 2009, on charges involving heroin distribution. He appeared before a magistrate the same day and was released on bond. A grand jury returned an indictment on June 17. Defendant was returned to custody and arraignment took place on September 22. The district court dismissed without prejudice, under the Speedy Trial Act, finding that more than 30 non-excludable days elapsed between initial arrest and indictment and that more than 70 non-excludable days elapsed between arraignment and the start of trial (18 U.S.C. 3161(b), (c)(1)). Three months later, the grand jury returned a new indictment charging the same crimes. The court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that defendant's reading of the Act would render all Speedy Trial dismissals "with prejudice." The Act permits a court to dismiss without prejudice and to start the clock anew when the defendant files the motion to dismiss. When the government asks the court to dismiss, the 70-day clock is tolled, not reset. The government delayed indicting defendant for the legitimate purpose of giving him the chance to cooperate and exceeded the 70-day speedy-trial clock by just nine days, so dismissal without prejudice was appropriate.

In 2002 defendant was tried in Michigan for the stabbing death of a police officer after a traffic stop. The jury sent a note to the judge asking to re-hear testimony from five witnesses. Without consulting with counsel, the judge denied the request. Defendant was convicted and exhausted appeals without raising the court's failure to consult with the parties before denying the request. State courts also rejected collateral attacks that did raise the issue. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus, holding that defendant procedurally defaulted all his grounds for relief, except for his ineffective-assistance argument, because he did not raise them on direct appeal. The court rejected the ineffective-assistance argument on the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Defendant made no argument that he suffered actual harm from the failure to consult the parties; the trial court had good reason to conclude that the request to re-hear testimony was unreasonable. Not all communications between a judge and jury are critical or per se harmful. The state court reasonably concluded that defendant failed to demonstrate his appellate counsel's deficiency.

After a man stole a car at gunpoint, the FBI agent learned that about an hour later someone attempted to use the owner's stolen bank cards. Surveillance video showed an unshaven, African American man wearing a red and white patterned shirt and a hooded jacket. Agents found the car in an apartment complex parking lot, searched the apartment and found the keys and items stolen in another robbery. They arrested defendant in the apartment and, in the car, found pictures of defendant, wearing the patterned shirt. Other items in the car were traceable to similar car thefts. At trial on charges of carjacking (18 U.S.C. 2119) and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)) the court admitted evidence of a 2006 assault and of the uncharged theft of a gun from another car, under the res gestae doctrine and 404(b), and issued a limiting instruction. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 360 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The evidence was sufficient to allow a rational fact-finder to infer that defendant was guilty, but the court improperly admitted evidence of the gun theft and the prejudicial impact was high.

Plaintiff, an African American, began working for defendant in 1987 and was a member of the Army Reserve. In 2004, after rehabilitation for an injury sustained in Iraq, he returned to his job as a supervisor. When he presented orders for training, a manager told plaintiff that he needed to choose between the company and the Army. Plaintiff claimed that managers assigned him more work than others, otherwise treated him differently, and terminated his employment for falsifying a safety form, which, he claimed, was a widespread practice. Plaintiff also claims that he was told to disqualify an African American female trainee, no matter how well she performed, and refused to do so. The district court ruled in favor of the employer on discrimination and retaliation claims under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4311(c)(1), and race discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981, Title VII, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to retaliation claims under Title VII, but otherwise reversed. The district court improperly denied discovery with respect to treatment of other supervisors. There were material issues of fact as to whether military service was a factor in the company's actions.