Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants, convicted of state-law sex offenses requiring them to register before the enactment of the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. 16901, were indicted for traveling in interstate commerce in 2009 and knowingly failing to update their registrations, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The district court dismissed each of their indictments, holding that SORNA had not yet been made retroactively applicable to the defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that SORNA became retroactively effective on August 1, 2008, the effective date of the SMART guidelines, promulgated by the Attorney General.

GM offered separate defined-contribution 401(k) plans. Benefits were based on the amount of contributions and investment performance of an individual's separate account. The plans offered several investment options, including mutual funds, non-mutual fund investments, and the General Motors Common Stock Fund. Participants could change the allocation in any investment on any business day. The plans invested, by default, in the Pyramis Fund, not the GM Fund. In 2008, the fiduciary suspended purchases of GM and began selling the stock. Plaintiffs filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1109(a), alleging breach of fiduciary duty in allowing investment in GM after its financial trouble was the subject of reliable public information. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that "a prudent fiduciary acting under similar circumstances would have made a different investment decision." The fiduciary cannot escape its duty simply by asserting that the plaintiffs caused the losses by choosing to invest in the GM Fund. Such a rule would improperly shift the duty of prudence to monitor the menu of investments to participants. The fact that a participant exercises control over assets does not automatically trigger section 404(c) safe harbor.

Famed singer-songwriter Roger Miller assigned original and renewal copyrights to his songs to defendant in the 1960s. Defendant filed applications to register renewal copyrights for 1964 songs with the Copyright Office in 1992 and subsequently registered these copyrights. In 2004, plaintiff, a company formed by Miller's heirs, sued for copyright infringement. The district court held that defendant owned the renewal copyrights and held an implied, non-exclusive license to exploit the 1964 songs based on plaintiff's actions and inactions in accepting royalty payments. Defendant moved to amend the judgment, arguing that it owned the renewal copyrights because it had applied to register them prior to Miller's death. The district court refused to hear arguments on the issue. On remand, the district court concluded that defendant did not own the renewal copyrights because Miller had died prior to vesting of the renewal rights and assignees were not included in the list of statutory successors. The court awarded $903,349.17 in damages. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 304(a)(2)(B)(i), the renewal copyright vested with Roger Miller, and thus with defendant as his assignee.

A 1998 settlement (MSA), between states and large tobacco companies (OPMs) included incentives for non-parties to join, but OPMs retained the most favorable payment terms. The MSA permitted states to enact statutes requiring nonparticipants to make deposits into escrows to be held for 25 years, in case a state obtained a future judgment against that nonparticipant. The MSA ensured that OPMs retained favored treatment over other participants. Plaintiff entered the market in 2000, as a nonparticipant, paying into state escrow accounts. As escrow payments became more burdensome, Plaintiff joined the MSA after negotiating a back-payment and future payments. During negotiations, defendants denied Plaintiff information about payment reductions granted to grandfathered companies. Plaintiff, unhappy with the disparate treatment and unable to meet its obligations, was unable to negotiate better terms because of an MSA provision that would entitle other participants to more favorable terms if such terms were granted to a late-joiner. Plaintiff sued tobacco manufacturers and attorneys general, alleging antitrust (15 U.S.C. 1, 3 (a)) and constitutional violations. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Manufacturer defendants were immunized under the Noerr-Pennington and state-action doctrines. Plaintiff's waivers were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, regardless of representations made during negotiations.

A Chapter 7 debtor instituted an adversary proceeding against Sallie Mae, Inc. (11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8)) to determine the dischargeability of a student loan (about $25,000). The bankruptcy court entered a default judgment against Sallie Mae and later denied a motion to set aside the judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court acted within its discretion in rejecting an argument of excusable neglect. It is unclear whether Sallie Mae had no reasonable policy in place to see that mail was delivered to appropriate personnel or simply failed to apprise the court of that policy.Sallie Mae was not entitled to notice of a hearing on the motion for default judgment. Service was proper; it was an internal decision to have Sallie Mae's chief operating officer work at a location other than its listed principal address.

Plaintiff began working for JLF in 2007 at an annual salary of $125,000. He alleges that JLF ceased paying him about a year later because of cash flow problems, but he did not stop working. A few weeks later the entire executive staff was formally laid off. Plaintiff sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and various state laws. The district court dismissed the FLSA claim on the ground that plaintiff was an exempt salaried employee, rejecting an argument that withholding compensation for several months converted the position to an hourly position. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that plaintiff adequately pleaded a claim under the FLSA, based on new regulations. Employment agreements are no longer the starting point for whether an employee is paid on a salary basis; the question is what compensation plaintiff actually received.The burden should have been on the employer to prove the exemption.

In 2000 plaintiff, a Caucasian, began working at a juvenile detention facility. He was a member of the Michigan State Employees Association Union and could only be terminated for cause. Between 2005 and 2007, plaintiff was the subject of incident reports, referred to formal counseling, and suspended several times. In 2007, a co-worker filed a Confidential Discriminatory Harassment Report with the Michigan Department of Human Services. Plaintiff responded by filing an EEOC claim of discrimination. He obtained a right-to-sue letter. After his termination and unsuccessful arbitration, plaintiff filed suit alleging race discrimination (42 U.S.C. 2000e) and violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1),(2)). The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, with respected to the Title VII claims, but vacated with respect to the FLMA. Plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant retaliated against him for exercising his FMLA rights.

Debtors were eligible to participate in their employers' ERISA 401(k) qualified retirement plans, but were not making contributions to those plans when they filed Chapter 13 petitions, but were repaying 401(k) loans to the plans. Proposed Chapter 13 plans called for a five-year commitment period under 11 U.S.C. 1325 and for repayment of 401(k) loans before completion of the commitment periods. Rather than calling for an increase in plan payments to the Chapter 13 trustee for the benefit of unsecured creditors once that repayment was complete, the plans proposed that debtors begin making contributions to their 401(k) retirement plans. The trustee filed objections. The bankruptcy court held that because 11 U.S.C. 541(b)(7) excludes contributions to a 401(k) plan from property of the estate and disposable income, debtors were allowed to exclude proposed 401(k) contributions from disposable income. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ruled in favor of the Trustee. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Post-petition income, available to debtors after 401(k) loans are fully repaid, is "projected disposable income" that must be turned over to the trustee for distribution to unsecured creditors under 11 U.S.C. 1325(b)(1)(B) and may not be used to fund voluntary 401(k) plans.

The Festival is an annual event at a 200-acre public park. Two private organizations rent the park. The city provides a number of facilities and services and the park remains open to the public. The organizations rent booth space to exhibitors; the application prohibits sales or solicitation outside the booth. Plaintiffs are Christians who attended the Festival to speak on their religious beliefs and carry sandwich board signs. After lengthy discussions, with Festival workers and police, plaintiffs decided to avoid arrest and leave. They sought declaratory relief, an injunction, and nominal damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988. The district court denied a preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. City officials engaged in state action by supporting and actively enforcing the solicitation policy. The policy was content-neutral, but not narrowly-tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a); one count of possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B); and one forfeiture count, 18 U.S.C. 2253 following his sexual assault and exploitation of his 13-year-old niece and was sentenced to 235 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, vacated forfeiture of a computer and payment of restitution for childcare, and declined to consider conditions of supervised release.