Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After his trial for intentional possession of an unregistered firearm, defendant was instructed to place his hands behind his back for cuffing. Instead he grabbed a plastic water pitcher and hit a deputy in the head with it. The officer was not seriously hurt and did not seek medical attention. Defendant pled guilty to assaulting a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and 1114. At sentencing, the district court found that the pitcher constituted a "dangerous weapon" under the circumstances and applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2A2.2(b)(2)(B). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that examples given in the definition of what constitutes a dangerous weapon should be read as limiting and that the plastic pitcher was incapable of causing serious bodily injury.

On the second day of his trial on 23 counts relating to a series of bank robberies, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The plea stated that the mandatory minimum and the recommended sentence would be 32 years. Three months later at his sentencing hearing, when asked if he had anything to say before sentencing, he attempted to withdraw his plea. His attorney remained silent. The district court denied his request. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Factors concerning delay, defendant's characteristics, the circumstances of the plea, and prejudice to the prosecution, weighed against allowing withdrawal of the plea. The record was inadequate to determine whether counsel was ineffective and such a claim would be better suited for a post-conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255.

Petitioner was indicted in state court on two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, Ohio Rev. Code 2907.04(A), and one count of gross sexualimposition, Ohio Rev. Code 2907.05(A)(1). During trial, the court allowed the prosecution to amend the indictment to conform dates to testimony and declared a mistrial. The state proceeded toward another trial. The court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. The district court denied a pretrial petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Sixth Circuit affirmed after conducting de novo review. The court rejected a double jeopardy argument, finding that the mistrial resulted from prosecutorial negligence, and not from an intentional action by the prosecution because its case was going badly. The court concluded that the prosecution gained no advantage.

Plaintiff filed a class-action lawsuit against the insurance company, claiming breach of contract because the company began interpreting the "actual charges" provision of his cancer-insurance policy to mean the charges that the medical provider accepts as full payment from the primary insurer and the insured. Plaintiff claims that the policy entitles him to be paid the higher "list prices" that appear on his hospital bills before the primary insurer negotiates a lower rate. The company made payments to the insured, not directly to hospitals. The district court certified the class and issued a preliminary injunction, requiring the company to pay plaintiff according to his interpretation. Meanwhile, an Arkansas state court certified a nearly identical class, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed a settlement in that action. The Sixth Circuit vacated class certification, based on the intervening Arkansas case. The court dismissed appeal of the injunction for lack of jurisdiction because was not a decision on the merits.

Defendant entered an unconditional guilty plea to sexually exploiting a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). The district court imposed a within-guidelines 360-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence after rejecting a challenge to federal jurisdiction. The court erred in applying a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2G2.1(b)(4), for an offense involving materials that depict sadistic or masochistic conduct because it considered only defendant's conduct, not the objective nature of the photographs at issue. The court properly applied a five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 4B1.5(b)(1), for engaging in a pattern of activity that involves prohibited sexual conduct.

The university prohibits graduate students in its counseling program from discriminating based on sexual orientation and teaches students to affirm client values during counseling sessions. Plaintiff frequently stated that her faith (Christianity) prevented her from affirming same-sex relationships and certain heterosexual conduct, such as extra-marital relationships. In the last stages of the program, with a 3.91 GPA, she signed up for a required course in experiential learning, involving counseling real clients. When the university asked plaintiff to counsel a gay client, she asked her supervisor either to refer the client to another or to permit her to begin counseling and make a referral if the session turned to relationship issues. The supervisor referred the client. The university commenced a disciplinary hearing and eventually expelled plaintiff. The district court rejected her suit under the First and Fourteenth Amendments on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the school does not have a no-referral policy for practicum students and adheres to an ethics code that permits values-based referrals in general. A reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff's professors ejected her from the program because of hostility toward her speech and faith, not due to a policy against referrals.

Plaintiffs, seven couples who sent money to the defendants (adoption agency and individuals) to facilitate adoptions, in some cases of specific children, believed they had been defrauded and filed federal claims. The case was stayed, pending resolution of state criminal charges. The district court subsequently dismissed claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962. The complaint identified the agency as the enterprise; identified predicate violations of mail fraud and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 341 and 1343, extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1951; transmitting or transferring in interstate commerce goods, wares, merchandise, or money knowing the same to have been stolen, converted, or taken by fraud, 18 U.S.C. 2314; and traveling in interstate or foreign commerce with the intent to distribute the proceeds of extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1952; and alleged a conspiracy among the individual defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Four of plaintiffs' claims adequately alleged predicate acts of mail or wire fraud and adequately alleged a threat of continued criminal activity and, therefore, a pattern of racketeering activity.

Petitioner, a professor, told the FBI and the university that she had received hate mail at her office. The FBI and the university spent thousands of dollars investigating before she admitted to writing and delivering the mail herself. In light of overwhelming evidence of guilt and unable to obtain testimony to support a claim of diminished capacity, petitioner's attorney encouraged a plea. Because petitioner is a citizen of India, he consulted an immigration attorney, who opined, incorrectly, that the matter was not an aggravated felony and that she would not necessarily be deported. Petitioner pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 1001, was sentenced to six months in prison, and ordered to pay more than $66,000 in restitution. An immigration judge found her removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and the BIA dismissed an appeal. In a companion case, the Sixth Circuit agreed. While in prison, petitioner unsuccessfully challenged her sentence, but not her plea or conviction. After completing her sentence, she filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Petitioner did not show a reasonable probability that she was prejudiced by the incorrect advice.

In 2006, plaintiffs contracted with defendant to purchase a condominium for $395,900. They made cash deposits of $11,877 and executed a note for $19,795. When notified of a closing date in 2009, plaintiffs' counsel sent defendant a letter rescinding the agreement and requesting return of the deposits. Defendant declined. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged violation of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 1701, for failing to provide a printed property report, and failure to include a provision notifying plaintiffs that if defendant failed to furnish a property report before execution of the purchase agreement, they had the right to revoke the purchase agreement within two years of its signing. They also asserted a claim under the Michigan Condominium Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 559.184. The district court held that the claim for rescission was untimely, stating that a purchaser must notify the seller of rescission within two years after the signing, but a has an additional third year to bring suit if the seller refused to honor the rescission. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the claim for automatic rescission was untimely, but reversed dismissal of the state law claim and remanded. Equitable rescission may be available under 15 U.S.C. 1709.

One of 14 individuals charged with, among other things conspiring to steal government property, as part of a scheme to defraud the VA of disability benefits, defendant proceeded to trial, but on the third day, changed his mind and pleaded guilty. He entered into a written plea agreement that included an appellate waiver provision. He sent a letter to the court, 80 days later, complaining that he had been coerced into pleading guilty by counsel. The district court appointed new counsel, held an evidentiary hearing, denied the motion, and imposed a 21-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal. The defendant never professed innocence, was competent, and accepted a plea that included a waiver of appeal.