Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

John was a ninth grade special education student. Jane, in eighth grade, believed that she was John's girlfriend. Jane's mother claims that John sexually harassed Jane by shoving her into a locker out of jealousy, requesting oral sex, and making obscene gestures during a basketball game. After confronting John, who became hostile, Jane's stepfather wrote to administration. John's IEP team created a plan requiring constant adult supervision at school for the next 30 days. Seven weeks after the supervision ended, after school, John sexually assaulted Jane on school grounds. John, who had a long disciplinary history, including harassment and assault, and had been arrested twice, was then expelled. A school he previously attended had agreed not to expel John and to purge disciplinary records in exchange for his withdrawal. Jane's mother filed sued the school and officials, alleging violations of Title IX and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered judgment for defendants on all counts. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff abandoned her 1983 claim, did not establish animus for a 1985 claim, did not establish deliberate indifference, or a special relationship that would create a duty to protect her daughter, or that Jane was deprived of access to educational opportunities.

Plaintiff, a new teacher, approached the principal to deny rumors that she had a sexual relationship with a minor student, JS. The principal spoke with JS, who denied the allegations. Days later, JS changed his story. The school called the police. JS stated he had consensual sex with plaintiff at her apartment and described her apartment and a tattoo and skin graft on her body. Plaintiff admitted to exchanging sexually inappropriate text messages, but denied having a physical relationship and that he visited her apartment. Photos matched JS's descriptions of plaintiff's tattop and apartment, and a warrant issued. Prior to execution of the warrant, plaintiff's attorney, asked for a polygraph. Plaintiff appeared for the polygraph, but the exam was never administered. At trial , JS significantly changed his testimony and plaintiff was acquitted. The district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and violations of due process and claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Kentucky law. The state's attorney acted in the course of his prosecutorial duties, entitling him to absolute immunity, and his actions were not in violation of clear constitutional rights, entitling him to qualified immunity.

Petitioner was convicted in 1993 of a 1991 aggravated murder, was sentenced to death, and exhausted Ohio state court remedies. He filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas corpus in 1999 and amended his petition in 2003 to set forth 28 claims for relief, some with multiple subclaims. After filing, petitioner obtained information that the prosecution had withheld evidence that, before trial, a witness had been adjudicated delinquent for marijuana trafficking, contradicting his testimony that he never sold drugs. The district court held proceedings in abeyance while he exhausted state law remedies on the new Brady claim, then denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The state court decision on the Brady claim was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. The court rejected claims of prosecutorial misconduct (vouching, inflaming the jury, and denigrating defendant and defense counsel) and ineffective assistance.

Among other provisions, the ordinance prohibited door-to-door canvassing and soliciting between 6 P.M. and 9 A.M. The district court struck licensing requirements as unconstitutional, invalidated a requirement that those going door-to-door honor a "do-not-solicit" list, but upheld the requirement that would-be canvassers obtain a copy of the list before going door to door. The court upheld the 6 P.M. curfew and held that that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge a provision allowing the city manager to extend the curfew upon good cause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Plaintiff, an environmental advocacy organization, had standing to challenge the curfew. The curfew was unconstitutional as applied. The curfew is not narrowly tailored to serve city's interests in protecting residential privacy, allocating public safety resources, and preventing crime.

Defendant, a businessman, was convicted on 10 counts of bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344) involving creation of 10 fraudulent entries on the books of a small bank in Benton, Tennessee. At trial, the government offered the theory that defendant and the bank's president jointly created the phony entries in an effort to disguise earlier, troubled loans to defendant's business. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court improperly excluded evidence that the bank president had, unassisted, previously engaged in a large number of identical frauds. The prosecutor suggested to the jury that acquittal would deliver a financial windfall to defendant. The government offered no direct evidence and insufficient circumstantial evidence to show that defendant knew about or participated in the bank president's fraud, a fraud that the bank president had independent reasons for creating.