Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, manufacturers and sellers of tobacco products, alleged that provisions of the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act violated their First Amendment rights. The district court granted partial summary judgment upholding the law and partial summary judgment to plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and ruled in favor of the government on most issues, declining to apply strict scrutiny and finding that warnings required by the Act reasonably related to the government's interest in preventing deception of consumers. The court upheld bans on event sponsorship, branding non- tobacco merchandise, and free sampling (loyalty and continuity programs); a requirement that tobacco manufacturers reserve significant packaging space for textual health warnings; the restriction of tobacco advertising to black and white text; and the constitutionality of the Act's color graphic and non-graphic warning label requirement. Reversing the district court, the court upheld the Act's restriction on claims that tobacco products are "safe or less harmful by virtue of” FDA regulation, inspection or compliance" 21 U.S.C. 331(tt)(4).

The collective bargaining agreement was scheduled to expire. During negotiations, the union disclaimed representation of the company's employees and terminated the collective bargaining process. The company then withdrew from the multiemployer pension plan. The pension fund imposed withdrawal liability and assessed $57,291.50, 29 U.S.C. 1399. The company demanded indemnification from the union pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, which stated: "The Union shall indemnify the Company for any contingent liability which may be imposed under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980." The district court concluded that an arbitration provision was enforceable. The arbitrator ordered the union to pay. The district court upheld the award. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that it would violate public policy for a union to indemnify an employer for any contingent liability to a pension plan established under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1381-1461.

Reyes alleges that her home was foreclosed upon and that she and her children were forced to live in a motel. She agreed to pay debtor $22,000 for a mobile home and gave debtor $15,000 in cash. The closing never took place and Reyes claims that debtor was not the owner of the trailer at the time of the sale. Reyes filed suit and, just before trial, debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition. Reyes filed a complaint (11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A)and (a)(6)), arguing that the debt was not dischargeable. The bankruptcy court found that the complaint met the heightened pleading standard for fraud. Debtor's attorney withdrew. After several continuances, Reyes sought voluntary dismissal without prejudice. The court dismissed with prejudice without explanation. The Sixth Circuit reversed.

In 2006 debtors sublet land from lessees on a 30-year recorded lease and purchased a three-story cottage on the land by bill of sale. The lease refers to removal of the structure upon termination of the lease and requires approval by the lessor of any liens or mortgages. The landowner consented to a mortgage on the cottage and leasehold. Two years later, debtors filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition and listed the cottage as real property, with a secured claim of $235,000. The Trustee sought to avoid security interests held by the bank and landowner, arguing that the cottage was a chattel so that a lien could only be perfected by filing a financing statement with the Ohio Secretary of State. The bankruptcy court ruled that the mortgage was valid, concluding that the cottage was a fixture. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. To avoid the security interest (11 U.S.C. 544) the trustee had to show that the cottage was chattel. The cottage is highly integrated with the land and unlikely to be moved or dismantled; there was no proof that the parties intended that it be chattel. Security interests in both the cottage and leasehold were properly secured.

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison, exhausted state remedies and unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. The district court rejected his petition for habeas corpus, which was based on an argument that his Confrontation Clause rights had been violated at trial when, over his objection, the government played a tape recording of his co-defendant's custodial statement without affirmatively calling the co-defendant as a witness. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Though the trial court may have violated petitioner's constitutional rights, the court noted that granting habeas corpus under the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), requires "that fairminded jurists could not disagree." "Four such fairminded justices of the Kentucky Supreme Court did disagree" and concluded that confrontation only requires that a declarant be made available in the courtroom for a criminal defendant to call during his own case.

Defendant was convicted for failing to register under the Sex Offender Registration Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). Though the state's own sex registration form included notification of the federal duty to register and alerted registrants to federal criminal penalties of up to 10 years' imprisonment, Tennessee had not taken additional steps required to achieve substantial implementation of SORNA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that SORNA is effective in a state, even prior to its complete implementation. Refusing to address theoretical situations in which a state law would make compliance with federal law impossible or impractical, the court noted that defendant did not register under any possible definition of the term. Alternate arguments, that SORNA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, the nondelegation doctrine, and the Tenth Amendment, were found to be without merit.

Police responded to a call, about a shooting, spotted a car that matched the description, and stopped defendant, who briefly resisted and was handcuffed. After police patted him down and discovered no weapons, they entered his vehicle to retrieve identification from the console. A records check turned up an outstanding warrant. The police arrested defendant, searched him and the car, and found cocaine on his body and cocaine and firearms under the front seat. He was convicted under 21 U.S.C. 860 and 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and sentenced to 120 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court should have instructed the jury that the proximity-to-a-school component of section 860 is an element of the offense. While proximity is an element of the offense, not simply a sentencing enhancement, the issue was entirely uncontested. After defendant was convicted, the Supreme Court held that search of a vehicle incident to arrest is unconstitutional unless the arrestee has access to the passenger compartment, but the police followed the rule in place at the time of the search, so evidence from the search was properly admitted.

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), to the mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.Defendant did not comply with the officer's commands to stop and was not seized until the officer physically restrained him by taking him down and handcuffing him. The officer had reasonable suspicion based on: his knowledge that the area was known for drug activity; his observation that defendant and another man engaged in an apparent hand-to-hand transaction; defendant's fleeing and throwing items to the ground. The court upheld sentencing under the ACCA.

Tennessee law mandates mediation in certain contested divorce proceedings. Now-Judge Martin was appointed and performed mediation in plaintiff's divorce as part of his private legal practice. The divorce was granted, allowing wife to take the children to Japan during vacations but requiring her to live within 100 miles of husband. Husband believed that wife planned to abduct the children to her native Japan, petitioned to modify the parenting plan, and sought a restraining order. The hearing, initially assigned to another, was re-assigned to Judge Martin. The parties agreed to have Judge Martin hear the motion, despite the judge raising the issue. Judge Martin ruled in favor of wife, who subsequently took the children out of the U.S. with no apparent intent to return. Husband was awarded full custody; wife was charged with felony custodial interference. Husband filed suit against Martin as both judge and mediator; the law firm as his employer; and a court-ordered parental coordinator, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law negligence and contract theories. The district court dismissed all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

The debtor filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition and her Chapter 13 plan. A few weeks later, she filed her Michigan state income tax return, showing that she owed $4,900 for the 2008 tax year. She did not make payment, but later filed a proof-of-claim on behalf of the Michigan Department of Treasury, which meant that the tax debt would be paid through her Chapter 13 plan. Treasury objected, arguing that this was a post-petition claim under 11 U.S.C. 1305, which gives only a creditor the option of filing; debtor responded that the claim was permitted under section 501(c). The bankruptcy court overruled the objection; the district court affirmed The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The tax debt is entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8), (i) and (iii), so the post-petition protective claim on behalf of Treasury is treated under section 502(i) as a prepetition claim. A debtor is permitted to file a prepetition claim on behalf of a creditor that fails to timely file.