Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, U.S. Marshals worked with officers in 24 states on a fugitive round-up that led to arrests of 10,733 people, including plaintiff, who was wrongfully arrested because of clerical mistakes. All charges were eventually dropped, but news reporters had filmed her arrest and aired the story, including plaintiff's name and a statement that she was wanted for identity theft, after the dismissal. One station also placed the video on its website, along with a written story. Plaintiff's attorney faxed a cease and desist letter to the station, which removed the story, although it remained accessible by keyword search for several days. Most of plaintiffs' claims against the federal and city governments, the U.S. Marshals Service, the broadcast company and employees, and various named and unnamed Marshals, were resolved. The district court rejected defamation and false light claim against the broadcast company, based on the fair report privilege requirement of proof of actual malice, and a Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), claim against the U.S. for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the discretionary function exception. Investigating and apprehending plaintiff was discretionary and not within the safe harbor for intentional torts.

In 2009, AT&T sought to introduce a video service in Hopkinsville, Kentucky, relying on authority provided by its perpetual, Commonwealth-wide, telephone franchise granted in 1886. The city sued, claiming the telephone franchise did not allow AT&T to offer such services over its telephone wires. After Hopkinsville and AT&T settled, Mediacom, an incumbent cable provider in Hopkinsville, intervened and asserted that AT&T was required under the Kentucky Constitution and local law to obtain a new cable franchise. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Before resolving the legal question, the district court must determine whether the video service is more analogous to a one-way television service, or a two-way telephone service.

Defendant, a sheet metal contractor, was bound by bargaining agreements that required journeymen to perform sheet metal work. A 1996 agreement allowed defendant to use lower-wage production workers for some, but not all, journeymen work; defendant continued to assign journeyman-only work to production employees and his sons. In 2004, defendant laid off three of its four journeymen. In 2005, production employees presented a union-disaffection petition. Defendant withdrew from the association that had served as its bargaining agent and declined to recognize the Union as the journeymen’s representative. The Union petitioned for an election; defendant laid off its last journeymen. After laid-off journeymen voted in favor of the Union, defendant hired a non- journeyman for work restricted to journeymen under the agreements. The Union claimed that defendant was bound and had unlawfully repudiated the agreement. The Board dismissed. The Union filed charges under Sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, alleging that defendant refused to recall laid-off journeymen because of anti-union animus, unlawfully withdrew recognition from the Union, and refused to provide requested information. An ALJ dismissed the failure-to-recall charge, but concluded that defendant had committed the other violations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding substantial evidence to support the decision.

Plaintiffs are among the world’s largest purchasers of air conditioning and refrigeration copper tubing. Defendants imported ACR copper into the U.S. In 2003 the Commission of the European Communities found that defendants and other conspired on prices targets and other terms for industrial tubes and allocated customers and market shares in violation of European law. The findings did not identify any conspiratorial agreements with respect to U.S. markets. In 2004, another EC decision found violation in the market for plumbing tubes. Plaintiff claimed that the European conspiracy was also directed at the U.S. market for ACR industrial tubes, violating the Sherman Act and the Tennessee Trade Practices Act. Two similar cases, involving different plaintiffs, had been dismissed. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the complaint adequately stated a claim under the Sherman Act and was not barred by the Act's limitations period, 15 U.S.C. 15b and that the court had personal jurisdiction. The fact that the complaint borrows its substance from the EC decision and then builds on the EC’s findings does not render its allegations any less valid.

Plaintiff, hired as a temporary hourly employee, wanted to take an additional week off after the annual plant shutdown to tour with his band. He did not speak with his assigned union representative or any member of GM management, but to his stepfather, a union committeeman, who spoke to a labor relations representative, who stated that temporary employees were not entitled to leaves of absence. His stepfather told plaintiff that he was “good to go.” Plaintiff neither requested nor receive any paperwork. When he returned, he again went through his stepfather, who was told that there were no openings. Plaintiff took no action for a year. In 2008, he was re-hired as a temporary employee. Having never filed a grievance, he filed suit alleging breach of the collective bargaining agreement against GM and breach of the duty of fair representation against UAW, 29 U.S.C. 185. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's fair representation claim is interdependent with his section 301 claim; he must prevail on his fair representation claim before he may litigate the merits of his claim against GM. Plaintiff failed to undertake his obligation to exhaust internal union remedies mandated by the UAW Constitution.

Perkins was convicted of a fatal stabbing. He exhausted appeals. The conviction became final in 1997. He did not file a petition for habeas corpus within one year, as required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). In 2008, he filed a habeas petition, raising sufficiency of the evidence, jury instruction, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance claims. Arguing that the petition should be governed by AEDPA’s "new evidence" statute of limitations, Perkins introduced new affidavits that alluded to his innocence and to the guilt of a witness. The latest was signed in 2002, so that the limitations period expired in 2003; Perkins argued that the period should be equitably tolled because he is actually innocent. The district court denied the request because the evidence was not of the sort needed to pursue an innocence claim, was substantially available at trial, and pointed to the same theory argued at trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. While equitable tolling generally depends on the petitioner's diligence in pursuing his rights, a petitioner with a credible claim of actual innocence should be treated differently.