Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner operated a licensed business buying and selling automobile parts to consumers and mechanics. He solicited, bought, and sold parts that he knew were stolen. Petitioner cashed a $9,000 check every morning and used cash to purchase stolen parts. He shipped some stolen goods across state lines. In 2000, he was convicted of conspiracy to transport stolen goods and conspiracy to launder money, 18 U.S.C. 371; interstate transportation of stolen goods, 18 U.S.C. 2314; aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. 2; structuring financial transactions, 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3); and money laundering in the amount of more than $2,000,000, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). He was sentenced to 188 months imprisonment. Petitioner twice unsuccessfully appealed to the Sixth Circuit and moved to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner subsequently sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241, asserting that he fell within the "savings clause" of section 2255. He argued that the 2008 Supreme Court decision, United States v. Santos, changed the definition of "proceeds" in 18 U.S.C. 1956 and that he is "actually innocent" of money laundering under the new definition. The district court dismissed the petition as time-barred and stated that Santos was not retroactively applicable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiffs were catastrophically injured in automobile accidents. All sustained traumatic brain injuries and are now mentally impaired. State Farm initially paid no-fault insurance benefits for the cost of attendant care services rendered at home, but reduced the rates on the basis of market surveys of the cost of the services. State Farm refused to raise the rates because it could not verify whether plaintiffs had received the type of care that would justify paying higher rates. Plaintiffs refused to submit documentation regarding the nature and extent of the care they were receiving. Plaintiffs sued. The district court awarded plaintiffs monetary sanctions, instead of default judgment, in response to State Farm’s violation of discovery orders. A jury rendered a verdict in State Farm’s Favor. The Sixth Circuit dismissed appeal regarding the discovery sanctions, for lack of jurisdiction, but otherwise affirmed.

Defendant was found guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment, to be served consecutively to a state-court sentence for probation violation. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, which requires a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for defendants convicted of three or more serious drug offenses or violent felonies, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). Defendant's Missouri conviction for third-degree assault qualified as a violent felony.

Wanting to place its advertising benches on private property and in public rights-of-way, the company first sued the city in 1993. The parties settled. The city granted the company 300 permits and amended laws to give the company access to place benches in rights-of-way. In 2006-2007, the city rescinded those amendments and amended other laws and the company again filed suit, alleging violations of the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights and claiming non-conforming use protection. While the case was pending, the city again amended the laws at issue. The district court determined that certain claims were moot, that the company lacked standing to bring its First Amendment claims, that the company was not similarly situated for purposes of its equal-protection claim, and that it would not consider the non-conforming use claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Noting that there has been no admission or finding of unconstitutionality, the court agreed the claims were moot. The only claimed injury, the difference between fees paid by bench advertisers and those paid by the other advertising media, did not establish standing.

Defendant was sentenced to 51 months in prison after entering a conditional guilty plea to charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)), making counterfeit money (18 U.S.C. 471), and passing counterfeit money (18 U.S.C. 472). The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from an apartment and car pursuant to a search warrant. The affidavit supporting the search warrant described evidence that someone using the car in question tried to pass counterfeit bills of different denominations at different times, that the car and residence belonged to defendant, that the car was seen in front of the residence, and that defendant was identified as having attempted to pass a counterfeit bill on one of the occasions. There was probable cause to search the residence and car.

Plaintiffs, allegedly injured while working for Cassens, sought worker's compensation benefits under Michigan’ law. Cassens’s third-party administrator, denied each plaintiff benefits. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the denials were fraudulent and violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B), 1962(c), and 1964(c). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Supremacy Clause prevents the Michigan legislature from preempting a RICO remedy by declaring its worker"s compensation scheme to be exclusive of federal remedies. An expected entitlement to benefits under the state statute qualifies as property, as does the claim for such benefits, and the injury to such property creates, under certain circumstances, a RICO violation.

Plaintiff, an air traffic controller 1974-1981, was fired by President Reagan and subject to a ban on rehiring until 1993, when he applied for rehiring. He had moved and did not update his contact information. He was not rehired and, in 2002, brought a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621–634against the Secretary, who oversees operations of the Federal Aviation Administration. Plaintiff failed to respond to both the district court's motions deadline and the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment. After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, plaintiff filed Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, claiming that his attorney did not receive electronic notices of case filings due to a change of his email address. The court denid the motion, citing an affirmative duty to monitor the docket and maintain a current e-mail address, as well as the prejudice the Secretary would suffer were the motion to be granted. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, also rejecting the case on the merits.

Defendant was convicted of knowingly possessing with the intent to distribute approximately 4.9 grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. 2. Following direct review, he sought correction of his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise at sentencing that a portion of the 4.9 grams of cocaine base was for personal use and should be excluded from the drug-quantity calculation. The district court held that defendant could not establish either deficient performance or prejudice because the court believed that the conviction amounted to a rejection of defendant's testimony that the 4.9 grams of cocaine base was attributable to personal use. The Sixth Circuit vacated, concluding that the verdict did not establish that all 4.9 grams were intended for distribution and that the record was incomplete with respect to whether defendant suffered any prejudice.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to the statutory of minimum of 180 months on the firearms offense, to be served concurrently with a sentence of one day for the narcotics offense. The court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.924(e), concluding that two prior convictions for domestic violence qualified as "violent felonies," because, although the offense is a misdemeanor under Michigan law, he had faced a two-year maximum sentence on each under the state recidivism provision. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A sentencing court should reference underlying enhancements when evaluating whether a predicate offense meets ACCA’s violent felony definition.

Charged with possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver in 1988, petitioner was convicted of possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine. At the time, the offense required a mandatory sentence of life without possibility of parole. The court held that that sentence violated the state constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment and sentenced him to 40 to 100 years in prison. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the sentence. The court held a new sentencing hearing in 2004. Despite changes in stated law that eliminated mandatory life sentences in such cases, the court imposed a sentence of life without parole. The state appeals court affirmed; the supreme court denied appeal. The federal district court denied habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first rejecting the state's argument was untimely because the conviction was affirmed in 1993. Petitioner was no notice that he could be convicted of possession, even though the state charged only possession with intent to deliver. Federal law does not entitle him to retroactive application of amended sentencing laws